Bridges v. Diesel Service, Inc.

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1994

3 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 914

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Brief Fact Summary

The plaintiff brought a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. "[T]he Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies...."

Rule of Law and Holding

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Edited Opinion

Note: The following opinion was edited by CVN Law School staff. © 2012 Courtroom Connect, Inc.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER, HUYETT, J.

I. BACKGROUND

James Bridges ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against Diesel Service, Inc. ("Defendant") under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" . . . By Order dated June 29, 1994, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In particular, Plaintiff did not file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") until after commencement of this action. Defendant now moves for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED.

II. DISCUSSION

The Supreme Court in Zipes v. Trans World Airways, Inc. . . . stated that the filing of a timely charge with the EEOC is "not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII suit, but a requirement subject to waiver as well as tolling when equity so requires." Authorities appear to be divided as to whether the Supreme Court's holding concerns only the timeliness of the filing of a charge with the EEOC. See discussion in Learned v. City of Bellevue. . . . Accordingly, Plaintiff's failure to file a charge with the EEOC "may or may not affect jurisdiction under Title VII." Id.

However, as explained in this Court's June 29 Order, the filing of a charge with the EEOC is still a condition precedent to maintenance of a discrimination suit under the ADA. . . . The parties do not dispute that administrative remedies must be exhausted before commencement of an action under the ADA. Indeed, Plaintiff's counsel stated that it would stipulate to dismissal of the Complaint without prejudice provided Defendant does not explicitly retain the right to move for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

For these reasons, dismissal without prejudice was warranted. . . .

Rule 11 "imposes an obligation on counsel and client analogous to the railroad crossing sign, 'Stop, Look and Listen'. It may be rephrased, 'Stop, Think, Investigate and Research' before filing papers either to initiate the suit or to conduct the litigation." Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp. . . .; Project 74 Allentown, Inc. v. Frost. . . . Rule 11 is violated only if, at the time of signing, the signing of the document filed was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products, Inc. . . . "The Rule does not permit the use of the 'pure heart and an empty head' defense.". . . Rather, counsel's signature certifies the pleading is supported by a reasonable factual investigation and "a normally competent level of legal research." Lieb v. Topstone Industries, Inc. . . .

The Court is not convinced that Plaintiff's counsel displayed a competent level of legal research. A brief review of case law would have revealed the EEOC filing requirement. Further, an award of sanctions for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not unprecedented. . . .

Notwithstanding, the Court will not grant sanctions. Rule 11 is not intended as a general fee shifting device. . . . The prime goal of Rule 11 sanctions is deterrence of improper conduct. Waltz v. County of Lycoming . . . ; Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders. . . . In this case, monetary sanctions are not necessary to deter future misconduct. Plaintiff's counsel immediately acknowledged its error and attempted to rectify the situation by filing a charge with the EEOC and moving to place this action in civil suspense. In fact, the Complaint has been dismissed without prejudice. The Court expects that Plaintiff's counsel has learned its lesson and will demonstrate greater diligence in future.

Further, Rule 11 sanctions should be reserved for those exceptional circumstances where the claim asserted is patently unmeritorious or frivolous. Doering, 857 F.2d at 194. The mistake in the present case was procedural rather than substantive. It is also possible that Plaintiff's counsel was confused by the different interpretations of the Supreme Court's holding in Zipes. Finally, the Court is aware of the need to avoid "chilling" Title VII litigation.

III. CONCLUSION

For the above stated reasons, Defendant's motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, is DENIED. However, this Opinion should not be read as condoning the conduct of Plaintiff's counsel. As stated above, the standard of pre-filing research was below that required of competent counsel. Plaintiff's case has been dismissed without prejudice. If the action is refiled, the Court fully expects to see a high standard of legal product from Plaintiff's counsel - in particular attorney London, who signed the Complaint.

An appropriate Order follows.

Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd, Judge

ORDER

HUYETT, J.

Upon consideration of Defendant's motion for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, and the argument of the parties in support of and in opposition thereto, the motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.