Criminal Procedure: Principles, Polices and Perspectives
- Dressler, Thomas
- 3rd Edition
- ISBN: 0314166653
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 292 | Arizona v. Hicks | 480 U.S. 321 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | |
| 277 | California v. Acevedo | 500 U.S. 565 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 |  Download |
| 31 | Duncan v. Louisiana | 391 U.S. 145 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | |
| 957 | Faretta v. California | 422 U.S. 806 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1975 | |
| 931 | Gideon v. Wainwright | 372 U.S. 335 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1963 | |
| 286 | Horton v. California | 496 U.S. 128 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1990 | Download |
| 141 | Illinois v. Gates | 462 U.S. 213 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 | |
| 75 | Katz v. United States | 389 U.S. 347 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 | |
| 116 | Kyllo v. United States | 533 U.S. 27 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | |
| 63 | Mapp v. Ohio | 367 U.S. 643 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1961 | Download |
| 559 | Miranda v. Arizona | 384 U.S. 436 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 | Download |
| 951 | Ross v. Moffitt | 417 U.S. 600 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | |
| 973 | Strickland v. Washington | 466 U.S. 668 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | |
| 372 | United States v. Drayton | 536 U.S. 194 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2002 | |
| 128 | United States v. Karo | 468 U.S. 705 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 | |
| 83 | United States v. White | 401 U.S. 745 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
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Arizona v. Hicks Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 480 U.S. 321 Pg. 292 |
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California v. Acevedo Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 500 U.S. 565 Pg. 277 |
A DEA agent notified a California police officer that a large package of marijuana that was destined for Santa Ana was seized in Hawaii. The agent let the package travel via FedEx to see who would pick it up. The police officer opened the package to verify the contents once in Santa Ana and then later observed Jamie Daza pick up the package and take it to his apartment. Later respondent, Charles Acevedo, arrived at Daza's apartment and left with a full brown paper bag. Acevedo walked to his car, put the bag in the trunk and then police officers stopped him and opened the trunk. | "If police know that that ma open a bag only if the are actually searching the entire car, they may search more extensively than they otherwise would in order to establish the general probable cause required by Ross. . . . [T]he Fourth Amendment does not compel separate treatment for an automobile search that extends only to a container within the vehicle." |
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Duncan v. Louisiana Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 391 U.S. 145 Pg. 31 |
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Faretta v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1975 422 U.S. 806 Pg. 957 |
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Gideon v. Wainwright Supreme Court of the United States, 1963 372 U.S. 335 Pg. 931 |
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Horton v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1990 496 U.S. 128 Pg. 286 |
Petitioner was convicted of the armed robbery of Erwin Wallaker, the treasurer of the San Jose Coin Club. Wallaker was assaulted and robbed while walking to his car and afterward was able to identify Petitioner by his distinctive voice. Additionally a witness saw Petitioner leaving the scene and there was evidence that he had attended the coin shows. Officers determined there was probable cause to search Petitioner's home for the goods from the robbery and the weapons. While the magistrate only signed the warrant for the goods from the robbery, when officers searched Petitioner's home they saw a number of firearms in plain sight. They seized the firearms. | To justify a warrantless seizure, "[f]irst, not only must the item be in plain view, its incriminating character must also be 'immediately apparent.' . . . Second, not only must the officer be lawfully located in a place from which the object can be plainly seen, but he or she must also have a lawful right of access to the object itself." |
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Illinois v. Gates Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 462 U.S. 213 Pg. 141 |
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Katz v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 389 U.S. 347 Pg. 75 |
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Kyllo v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 533 U.S. 27 Pg. 116 |
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Mapp v. Ohio Supreme Court of the United States, 1961 367 U.S. 643 Pg. 63 |
On May 23, 1957, police officers arrived at the residence of appellant, Miss Mapp, pursuant to evidence that "a person [was] hiding out in the home who was wanted for questioning in connection with a recent bombing, and that there was a large amount of policy paraphernalia being hidden in the home." Despite appellant's refusal to allow the police entrance into her home without a search warrant, the police forced themselves in and found a large amount of pornography. Appellant was convicted for possession of obscene materials. | "Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice." |
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Miranda v. Arizona Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 384 U.S. 436 Pg. 559 |
The Court decided on the following four cases where the defendants had provided statements during custodial interrogation: (1) Miranda v. Arizona, where the police arrested the defendant and took him to a special interrogation room where they secured a confession; (2) Vignera v. New York, where the defendant made oral admissions to the police after interrogation in the afternoon, and then signed an inculpatory statement upon being questioned by an assistant district attorney later the same evening; (3) Westover v. United States, where the defendant was handed over to the FBI by local authorities after they had detained and interrogated him for a lengthy period, both at night and the following morning and after some two hours of questioning, the federal officers obtained signed statements from the defendant; and (4) California v. Stewart, where the local police held the defendant five days in the station and interrogated him on nine separate occasions before they secured his inculpatory statement. | "[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned." |
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Ross v. Moffitt Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 417 U.S. 600 Pg. 951 |
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Strickland v. Washington Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 466 U.S. 668 Pg. 973 |
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United States v. Drayton Supreme Court of the United States, 2002 536 U.S. 194 Pg. 372 |
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United States v. Karo Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 468 U.S. 705 Pg. 128 |
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United States v. White Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 401 U.S. 745 Pg. 83 |