Constitutional Law

Sullivan, Gunther
16th Edition
ISBN: 1599412462

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Page	Case Name	Citation	Court	Audio
758	Abrams v. United States	250 U.S. 616	Supreme Court of the United States, 1919	Download
529	Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena	515 U.S. 200	Supreme Court of the United States, 1995	Download
868	American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut	475 U.S. 1001	Supreme Court of the United States, 1986
50	Baker v. Carr	369 U.S. 186	Supreme Court of the United States, 1962	Download
340	Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore	32 U.S. 243	Supreme Court of the United States, 1833	Download
307	Bowsher v. Synar	478 U.S. 714	Supreme Court of the United States, 1986	Download
785	Brandenburg v. Ohio	395 U.S. 444	Supreme Court of the United States, 1969	Download
1218	Branzburg v. Hayes	408 U.S. 665	Supreme Court of the United States, 1972
491	Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)	347 U.S. 483	Supreme Court of the United States, 1954	Download
496	Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II)	349 U.S. 294	Supreme Court of the United States, 1955	Download
1167	Buckley v. Valeo	424 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1976	Download
196	C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York	511 U.S. 383	Supreme Court of the United States, 1994	Download
917	Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commn. New York	447 U.S. 557	Supreme Court of the United States, 1980	Download
1257	Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah	508 U.S. 520	Supreme Court of the United States, 1993
992	Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence	468 U.S. 288	Supreme Court of the United States, 1984
795	Cohen v. California	403 U.S. 15	Supreme Court of the United States, 1971	Download
20	Cooper v. Aaron	358 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United Sates, 1958
577	Craig v. Boren	429 U.S. 190	Supreme Court of the United States, 1976	Download
256	Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury	453 U.S. 654	Supreme Court of the United States, 1981	Download
195	Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin	340 U.S. 349	Supreme Court of the United States, 1951	Download
778	Dennis v. United States	341 U.S. 494	Supreme Court of the United States, 1951	Download
1276	Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith	497 U.S. 872	Supreme Court of the United States, 1990
1338	Everson v. Board of Education, Township of Ewing	330 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1947
884	Federal Communications Commn. v. Pacifica Foundation	438 U.S. 726	Supreme Court of the United States, 1978	Download
800	Feiner v. New York	340 U.S. 315	Supreme Court of the United States, 1951	Download
926	44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island	517 U.S. 484	Supreme Court of the United States, 1996	Download
83	Gibbons v. Ogden	22 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1824	Download
768	Gitlow v. New York	268 U.S. 652	Supreme Court of the United States, 1925	Download
119	Gonzales v. Raich	545 U.S. 125	Supreme Court of the United States, 2005
542	Gratz v. Bollinger	539 U.S. 244	Supreme Court of the United States, 2003	Download
534	Grutter v. Bollinger	539 U.S. 306	Supreme Court of the United States, 2003	Download
273	Hamdi v. Rumsfeld	542 U.S. 507	Supreme Court of the United States, 2004	Download
89	Hammer v. Dagenhart	247 U.S. 251	Supreme Court of the United States, 1918	Download
639	Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections	383 U.S. 663	Supreme Court of the United States, 1966	Download
293	Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha	462 U.S. 919	Supreme Court of the United States, 1983	Download
690	Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.	419 U.S. 345	Supreme Court of the United States, 1974	Download
711	Katzenbach v. Morgan	384 U.S. 641	Supreme Court of the United States, 1966	Download
387	Kelo v. City of New London	125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439	Supreme Court of the United States, 2005
640	Kramer v. Union Free School District	395 U.S. 621	Supreme Court of the United States, 1969	Download
458	Lawrence v. Texas	539 U.S. 558	Supreme Court of the United States, 2003	Download
1297	Lee v. Weisman	505 U.S. 577	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992
366	Lochner v. New York	198 U.S. 45	Supreme Court of the United States, 1905	Download
1262	Locke v. Davey	540 U.S. 714	Supreme Court of the United States, 2004
501	Loving v. Virginia	388 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1967	Download
32	Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife	504 U.S. 555	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992	Download
2	Marbury v. Madison	5 U.S. 137	Supreme Court of the United States, 1803	Download
63	McCulloch v. Maryland	17 U.S. 316	Supreme Court of the United States, 1819	Download
848	Miller v. California	413 U.S. 15	Supreme Court of the United States, 1973	Download
1224	Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue	460 U.S. 575	Supreme Court of the United States, 1983
657	M.L.B. v. S.L.J.	519 U.S. 102	Supreme Court of the United States, 1996	Download
1133	NAACP v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson	357 U.S. 449	Supreme Court of the United States, 1958	Download
1104	Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson	283 U.S. 697	Supreme Court of the United States, 1931	Download
134	New York v. United States	505 U.S. 144	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992	Download
1108	New York Times Co. v. United States	403 U.S. 713	Supreme Court of the United States, 1971	Download
321	Nixon v. United States	506 U.S. 224	Supreme Court of the United States, 1993	Download
97	NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.	301 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1937	Download
230	Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn.	461 U.S. 190	Supreme Court of the United States, 1983	Download
850	Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton	413 U.S. 49	Supreme Court of the United States, 1973	Download
434	Planned Parenthood v. Casey	505 U.S. 833	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992	Download
625	Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York	336 U.S. 106	Supreme Court of the United States, 1949	Download
827	R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota	505 U.S. 377	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992	Download
895	Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union	521 U.S. 844	Supreme Court of the United States, 1997	Download
644	Reynolds v. Sims	377 U.S. 533	Supreme Court of the United States, 1964	Download
424	Roe v. Wade	410 U.S. 113	Supreme Court of the United States, 1973	Download
615	Romer v. Evans	517 U.S. 620	Supreme Court of the United States, 1996	Download
843	Roth v. United States	354 U.S. 476	Supreme Court of the United States, 1957	Download
348	Saenz v. Roe	526 U.S. 489	Supreme Court of the United States, 1999	Download
664	San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez	411 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1973	Download
754	Schenck v. United States	249 U.S. 47	Supreme Court of the United States, 1919	Download
562	Shaw v. Reno	509 U.S. 630	Supreme Court of the United States, 1993
683	Shelley v. Kraemer	334 U.S. 1	Supreme Court of the United States, 1948	Download
1266	Sherbert v. Verner	374 U.S. 398	Supreme Court of the United States, 1963
342	Slaughter-House Cases	83 U.S. 36	Supreme Court of the United States, 1873	Download
162	South Dakota v. Dole	483 U.S. 203	Supreme Court of the United States, 1987	Download
956	Texas v. Johnson	491 U.S. 397	Supreme Court of the United States, 1989	Download
223	United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden	465 U.S. 208	Supreme Court of the United States, 1984	Download
632	United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz	449 U.S. 166	Supreme Court of the United States, 1980	Download
837	Virginia v. Black	538 U.S. 343	Supreme Court of the United States, 2003	Download
583	United States v. Virginia	518 U.S. 515	Supreme Court of the United States, 1996	Download
510	Washington v. Davis	426 U.S. 229	Supreme Court of the United States, 1976	Download
772	Whitney v. California	274 U.S. 357	Supreme Court of the United States, 1927	Download
379	Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.	348 U.S. 483	Supreme Court of the United States, 1955	Download
245	Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer	343 U.S. 579	Supreme Court of the United States, 1952	Download
1356	Zelman v. Simmons-Harris	536 U.S. 639	Supreme Court of the United States, 2002

Case Information	Fact Summary	Rule of Law
Abrams v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 250 U.S. 616 Pg. 758	For printing two leaflets (one in Yiddish) that chiefly expressed solidarity with the Russian Revolution, and then distributing these leaflets mostly by heaving them out a window, defendants were charged with violating the Espionage Act, convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and sentenced to 20 years in prison.	Punishing criticism of U.S. war efforts outweigh First Amendment protections. However, this case is known today for Justice Holmes' eloquent dissent: "[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment. . . I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe . . ., unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country."
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 515 U.S. 200 Pg. 529	Petitioner was the low-bidder on a sub-contract to a prime governmental contract. However, the contract was awarded to another business, because of a governmental program, which incentivized prime contractors to hire minority controlled businesses.	Strict scrutiny is the proper review to apply to all cases that involve race-based classifications. Raced-based classifications are only constitutional if they are narrowly tailored to further compelling governmental interests.
American Booksellers Association, Inc. v. Hudnut Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 475 U.S. 1001 Pg. 868
Baker v. Carr Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 369 U.S. 186 Pg. 50	Tennessee did not reapportion its voting districts for 60 years, resulting in distorted representation, putatively in violation of the US Constitution's guarantee of a "republican form of government to the states.	Political rights can be litigated; they do not per se represented nonjusticiable political questions. For example, a challenge to a state's failure to reapportion voting districts is justiciable.
Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore Supreme Court of the United States, 1833 32 U.S. 243 Pg. 340	Barron owned a wharf in the city of Baltimore. The city deposited sand and gravel near the wharf, rendering it worthless. Barron claimed that he was due compensation pursuant to the 5th Amendment of the Constitution.	The Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government and cannot be applied to the States.
Bowsher v. Synar Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 478 U.S. 714 Pg. 307	The question presented by these appeals is whether the assignment by Congress to the Comptroller General of the United States of certain functions under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 violates the doctrine of separation of powers.	The powers vested in the Comptroller General under 251 violate the Constitution's command that Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws. There is no merit to the contention that the Comptroller General performs his duties independently and is not subservient to Congress. Although nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the Comptroller General is removable only at the initiative of Congress
Brandenburg v. Ohio Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 395 U.S. 444 Pg. 785	An Ohio Ku Klux Klan leader invited a local TV station to one of his rallies. The film documented epithets of race hatred and calls for "revengeance." The KKK leader was subsequently arrested and convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law for advocating violence. The KKK leader protested, however, that he was exercising his right to free speech as protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.	"Ohio's Criminal Syndicalism Act cannot be sustained [because it] . . . purports to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate the described type of action. Such a statute falls within the condemnation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
Branzburg v. Hayes Supreme Court of the United States, 1972 408 U.S. 665 Pg. 1218
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I) Supreme Court of the United States, 1954 347 U.S. 483 Pg. 491	A group of parents filed a class action suit against the Topeka, Kansas Board of Education in response to segragated elementary schools made possible by an 1879 Kansas law.	"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown II) Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 349 U.S. 294 Pg. 496	The Supreme Court considered implementing, as a practical matter, desegragation.	Desegregation must occur "with all deliberate speed. . ."
Buckley v. Valeo Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 424 U.S. 1 Pg. 1167	This appeal presented constitutional challenges to key provisions of the Federal Election Campaing Act of 1971.	The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests by imposing significantly more restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial contributions. In addition, the court held that section 608(a)'s restriction on a candidate's personal expenditures is unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court held section 608(c)'s limitations on overall campaign expenditures restricted the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected political expression and thus violated the First Amendment.
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 511 U.S. 383 Pg. 196	In 1989, the town of Clarkston entered into a consent decree with the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation. As part of the decree, the town agreed to close its landfill located on Route 33 and build a new solid waste transfer station on the same site. In order to meet a yearly flow guarantee, the town adopted the flow control ordinance here in question.	The Court found that the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce. State and local governments may not use their regulatory power to favor local enterprise by prohibiting patronage of out-of-state competitors or their facilities.
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commn. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 447 U.S. 557 Pg. 917	Reacting to the 1970s energy crisis, New York's Public Service Commission banned promotional advertising by an electrical utility. The ban remained in effect even when the fuel shortage eased. A gas and electric company opposed the ban as violative of First and Fourteenth Amendments protections.	"In commercial speech cases . . . we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. . . [T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments require that the restriction be no more extensive than is necessary to serve the state interest."
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 508 U.S. 520 Pg. 1257
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-violence Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 468 U.S. 288 Pg. 992
Cohen v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 403 U.S. 15 Pg. 795	Protesting the Vietnam War, a young man wore a jacket emblazoned "Fuck the Draft." He was sentenced to a month in jail for "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] offensive conduct." The young man claimed that the statute infringed his rights to freedom of expression guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.	"[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric. . . . [A]bsent a more particularized and compelling reason for its actions, the State may not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, make the simple public display here involved of this single four-letter expletive a criminal offense."
Cooper v. Aaron Supreme Court of the United Sates, 1958 358 U.S. 1 Pg. 20
Craig v. Boren Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 429 U.S. 190 Pg. 577	Appellant Craig, a male then between 18 and 21 years old, and appellant Whitener, a licensed vendor of 3.2% beer, brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an Oklahoma statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of "nonintoxicating" 3.2% beer to males under the age of 21 and to females under the age of 18 constituted a gender-based discrimination that denied to males 18-20 years of age the equal protection of the laws.	Oklahoma's gender-based differential constitutes an invidious discrimination against males 18-20 years of age in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, Secretary of the Treasury Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 453 U.S. 654 Pg. 256	In 1979, the American Embassy in Tehran was seized and the U.S. diplomatic personnel were captured and held hostage. In response, President Carter declared a national emergency and blocked the removal or transfer of all property and interests in property of the government of Iran. The hostages were later released under an agreement to terminate all litigation between the nationals of each country and bring about the settlement of all such claims through binding arbitration.	The President was authorized to nullify the attachments and order the transfer of Iranian assets by the provision of the IEEPA, which empowers the President to "compel," "nullify," or "prohibit" any "transfer" with respect to, or transactions involving, any property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, in which any foreign country has any interest. While it is not concluded that the President has plenary power to settle claims, even against foreign governmental entities, nevertheless, where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between this country and another, and Congress has acquiesced in the President's action, it cannot be said that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 340 U.S. 349 Pg. 195	This appeal challenges the validity of a section of an ordinance passed by the City of Madison, Wisconsin. The ordinance regulates the sale of milk and milk products within the municipality's jurisdiction. The section makes it unlawful to sell any milk as pasteurized unless it has been processed and bottled at an approved pasteurization plant.	The Court held that the ordinance violated the Commerce Clause and that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation.
Dennis v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 341 U.S. 494 Pg. 778	Shortly after WWII, Communist Party of America leaders were charged with and convicted of conspiring to teach and advocating the overthrow or destruction of the United States government (provisions of the Smith Act). Respondents argued that those specific provisions of the Smith Act violated the First and Fifth Amendments.	The formulation for the "clear and present danger" test is: "In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger." . . . "The provisions of "the Smith Act do not . . . violate . . the First and Fifth Amendments because of indefiniteness. Petitioners intended to overthrow the Government of the United States as speedily as the circumstances would permit. Their conspiracy to organize the Communist Party and to teach and advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States by force and violence created a 'clear and present danger' of an attempt to overthrow the Government."
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith Supreme Court of the United States, 1990 497 U.S. 872 Pg. 1276
Everson v. Board of Education, Township of Ewing Supreme Court of the United States, 1947 330 U.S. 1 Pg. 1338
Federal Communications Commn. v. Pacifica Foundation Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 438 U.S. 726 Pg. 884	A New York radio station broadcast George Carlin's 12-minute monologue, "Filthy Words," one afternoon, after cautioning listeners that the monologue included "sensitive language which might be regarded as offensive to some." A man driving with his young son heard Carlin's profane diatribe and was moved to write a letter of complaint to the FCC, prompting the question, do First Amendment protections empower radio stations to enjoy unrestricted public broadcasting of indecent language?	"Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. . . . '[N]uisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, -- like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.' We simply hold that when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene."
Feiner v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1951 340 U.S. 315 Pg. 800	A "soapbox orator" in Syracuse put a loudspeaker on top of a car and drew a crowd that filled the sidewalk. After declaring "The Negroes don't have equal rights; they should rise up in arms and fight for their rights," he was arrested for and convicted of "inciting a breach of the peace."	"It is one thing to say that the police cannot be used as an instrument for the suppression of unpopular views, and another to say that, when as here the speaker passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot, they are powerless to prevent a breach of the peace."
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 517 U.S. 484 Pg. 926	Ostensibly seeking to promote temperance, a statewide statute banned all advertisement of retail liquor prices where liquor is not sold. The court contemplates whether such a prohibition is an unconstitutional restriction of commercial speech.	"In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, . . . such an 'interest' is per se illegitimate and can no more justify regulation of 'commercial' speech than it can justify regulation of 'noncommercial' speech." Further, a non-misleading, lawful activity may not be restricted without evidence that it interferes with a substantial government interest.
Gibbons v. Ogden Supreme Court of the United States, 1824 22 U.S. 1 Pg. 83	Defendant had a New York granted monopoly on steamboat operations between New York and New Jersey. Plaintiff began operating like routes, under a license based on a federal Congressional statute. Defendant got a New York injunction forcing plaintiff to stop.	Congress may regulate commerce that has INTERSTATE effects even if the commerce occurs within one state. So, in this case, Congress has the exclusive power, pursuant to the commerce clause, to regulate navigation between the waters of two states.
Gitlow v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1925 268 U.S. 652 Pg. 768	A man published and distributed a socialist "manifesto" that urged strikes, class revolt and eventual government overthrow. He was prosecuted under a state criminal anarchy law, but argued that since no strikes, revolt or overthrow took place on behalf of his manifesto, he should not be penalized for utterences that did not result in concrete action. The New York court decided otherwise.	First and Fourteenth Amendment protections extend to the governments of individual states. "[F]reedom of speech and of the press -- which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress -- are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."
Gonzales v. Raich Supreme Court of the United States, 2005 545 U.S. 125 Pg. 119	Patients and petitioners grew and consumed marijuana for medicinal purposes. Although their consumption was authorized under a California statute, the federal government, under the CSA, confiscated the drugs. The respondents claimed that enforcing the CSA against them would violate the Commerce Clause, the Due process clause of the 5th amendment, and the ninth and tenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution.	Congress can regulate commodities that in the aggregate may have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Gratz v. Bollinger Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 539 U.S. 244 Pg. 542	Petitioners Gratz and Hamacher, both of whom are Michigan residents and Caucasian, applied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts in 1995 and 1997, respectively. Although the LSA considered Gratz to be well qualified and Hamacher to be within the qualified range, both were denied early admission and were ultimately denied admission. The current admission guidelines to the program use a selection method under which every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group is automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission. Petitioners filed this class action alleging that the University's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	Because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted interest in diversity, the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Grutter v. Bollinger Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 539 U.S. 306 Pg. 534	The University of Michigan Law School follows an official admissions policy that seeks to achieve student body diversity. The policy requires admissions officials to evaluate each applicant based on all the information available in the file, including a personal statement, letters of recommendation, an essay describing how the applicant will contribute to Law School life and diversity, and the applicant's undergraduate grade point average (GPA) and Law School Admission Test (LSAT) score. The policy does not define diversity solely in terms of racial and ethnic status and does not restrict the types of diversity contributions eligible for "substantial weight," but it does reaffirm the Law School's commitment to diversity with special reference to the inclusion of African-American, Hispanic, and Native-American students, who otherwise might not be represented in the student body in meaningful numbers. By enrolling a "critical mass" of underrepresented minority students, the policy seeks to ensure their ability to contribute to the Law School's character and to the legal profession. When the Law School denied admission to petitioner Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, she filed this suit, alleging that respondents had discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.	The Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a diverse student body is not prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 542 U.S. 507 Pg. 273	Hamdi was detained after the U.S. government determined that he took up arms with the Taliban. The government contends that Hamdi is an enemy combatant, and that this status justifies holding him indefinitely.	The Court conclued that although Congress authorized the detention of combatants in the narrow circumstances alleged in this case, due process demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.
Hammer v. Dagenhart Supreme Court of the United States, 1918 247 U.S. 251 Pg. 89	Father filed bill to enjoin act of Congress which prohibited the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any product of a cotton mill situated in the United States, in which within 30 days before the removal of the product children under 14 have been employed, or children between 14 and 16 have been employed more than 8 hours in one day, or more than six days in any week, or between 7 in the evening and 6 in the morning.	The Court rules that the making of goods is not commerce. This ruling is later overruled.
Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 383 U.S. 663 Pg. 639	Virginia conditioned the right to vote on the payment of a "poll tax." This "fee" (prohibited in federal elections but sanctioned in state elections) was challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	"A state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth."
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Jagdish Rai Chadha Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 462 U.S. 919 Pg. 293	Chadha is an East Indian who was born in Kenya and holds a British passport. He was lawfully admitted to the U.S., but stayed longer than his visa allowed. Later an immigration judge suspended his deportation under section 244(a)(1). After that, Representative Eilberg introduced a resolution opposing the granting of permanent residence in the U.S. to certain illegal aliens including Chadha.	We hold that the congressional veto provision in 244(c)(2) is severable from the Act and that it is unconstitutional.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 419 U.S. 345 Pg. 690	Petitioner, a resident of York, had her electricity service discontinued because of an asserted delinquency in payments.	The Court concluded that the State of Pennsylvania is not sufficiently connected with respondent's action in terminating petitioner's service so as to make respondent's conduct in so doing attributable to the State for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Katzenbach v. Morgan Supreme Court of the United States, 1966 384 U.S. 641 Pg. 711	These cases concern the constitutionality of section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act, which provided that no person who has successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public or private school accredited by Puerto Rico, in which the language of instruction was other than English, shall be denied the right to vote in any election because of an inability to read or write in English.	The Court concluded that section 4(e), in the application challenged in this case, is appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.
Kelo v. City of New London Supreme Court of the United States, 2005 125 S. Ct. 2655, 162 L. Ed. 2d 439 Pg. 387
Kramer v. Union Free School District Supreme Court of the United States, 1969 395 U.S. 621 Pg. 640	By law, a certain New York school district allowed only resident U.S. citizens over 21 to vote in school district elections, provided the citizens additionally must own or lease property in the district or have children of their own enrolled in the district. An adult bachelor taxpayer living with in his parents' home (Kramer) thus could not vote. Kramer petitioned for the right to vote under due process and equal protection.	"The issue is whether the [law's] requirements do in fact sufficiently further a compelling state interest to justify denying the franchise to appellant and members of his class. The requirements of [the law] are not sufficiently tailored to limiting the franchise to those "primarily interested" in school affairs to justify the denial of the franchise to appellant and members of his class." Absent a compelling state interest, only reasonable restrictions on the right to vote are permissible.
Lawrence v. Texas Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 539 U.S. 558 Pg. 458	Two consenting adult men were arrested for a sexual act committed in the privacy of the home, and charged with violating Texas's anti-sodomy statute, a Class C misdemeanor. Plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutional since it prohibits sodomy between same-sex couples, but not between heterosexual couples, and also violated their right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	The Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment. "A law branding one class of persons as criminal solely based on the State's moral disapproval of that class and the conduct associated with that class runs contrary to the values of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause."
Lee v. Weisman Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 577 Pg. 1297
Lochner v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1905 198 U.S. 45 Pg. 366	The 1895 "Bakeshop Act," enacted by the New York legislature, limited the hours bakers could work. Lochner, a New York baker, was fined for working employees overtime. He appealed his conviction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.	The right to enter into a contract is a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the "Bakeshop Act" was not a valid exercise of the State's police powers and therefore was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. NOTE: This is no longer good law.
Locke v. Davey Supreme Court of the United States, 2004 540 U.S. 714 Pg. 1262
Loving v. Virginia Supreme Court of the United States, 1967 388 U.S. 1 Pg. 501	The Loving's left Virginia to get married in Washington D.C. When they returned to Virginia, they were prosecuted under a state law prohibiting interacial marriage.	"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State."
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 504 U.S. 555 Pg. 32	The Department of the Interior sought to challenge regulations concerning when the federal government could comply with the Endangered Species Act. Under the regulations, the federal government would comply with the Act only for actions taken in the United States or the high seas.	The Court held that respondents lacked standing to bring this action and that the Court of Appeals erred in denying the summary judgment motion filed by the United States.
Marbury v. Madison Supreme Court of the United States, 1803 5 U.S. 137 Pg. 2	An 1801 Congressional Act (Organic Act) created 42 new federal judgeships called "Justices of the Peace." President Adams appointed several Federalists to these new positions. After the appointees were approved by the Senate, Adams signed the commissions, but the commission was not delivered to William Marbury before President Jefferson entered office. Jefferson's Secretary of State, Madison, refused to deliver Marbury's commission. Marbury sued Madison on a writ of mandamus claim, claiming the Judiciary Act of 1789 - which stated that the U.S. Supreme Court had the authority to issue a writ of mandamus - gave the Court the power to issue the writ and compel Marbury to deliver the commission.	If the Supreme Court identifies a conflict between a Constitutional provision and a Congressional statute, the Court has the authority to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. The Constitution is supreme and the Supreme Court has the right to be the final interpreter of it, NOT the legislature.
McCulloch v. Maryland Supreme Court of the United States, 1819 17 U.S. 316 Pg. 63	In an attempt to raise revenue, Congress created the Second Bank of the United States. Maryland responded by enacting a law that taxed any bank not chartered by the state.	The Court held that the Constitution grants Congress implied powers to be used in implementing the express enumerated powers and that state action may not impede a valid constitutional exercise of power by the Federal government.
Miller v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 413 U.S. 15 Pg. 848	The owner of a large West Coast mail-order "adult" material business conducted a mass mailing advertising campaign. Some sexually explicit material went to California citizens who did not request it. Following a complaint, the owner was charged with the misdemeanor of knowingly distributing obscene material.	"[O]bscene material is unprotected by the First Amendment. We acknowledge, however, the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate any form of expression. State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited. As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to works which depict or describe sexual conduct . . . [and] must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 460 U.S. 575 Pg. 1224
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 519 U.S. 102 Pg. 657	An indigent woman lost legal custody of her minor children. She could not appeal the decision without paying court recording fees that were beyond her financial means.	"[Parental] choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational rights . . . sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect."
NAACP v. State of Alabama, ex rel. Patterson Supreme Court of the United States, 1958 357 U.S. 449 Pg. 1133	To enjoin the NAACP from operating, or at least to intimidate its membership, the State of Alabama required the organization to produce the names and addresses of everyone associated with the organization.	Highly intrusive governmental action "can be justified only upon some overriding valid interest of the State." The Fourteenth Amendment ensures the freedom for "members to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing."
Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson Supreme Court of the United States, 1931 283 U.S. 697 Pg. 1104	Minnesota authorized abatement as a public nuisance, of any "malicious, scandalous or defamatory" publication. The law took aim at the Saturday Press, a 1920s tabloid rife with rumors and unsavory facts about local political and business leaders. State courts ordered the Saturday Press to either shut down or operate the "newspaper in harmony with the public welfare, to which all must yield." The Saturday Press appealed to the United States Supreme Court claiming that its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated.	"The statute in question cannot be justified by reason of the fact that the publisher is permitted to show . . . that the matter published is true and is published with good motives and for justifiable ends. If such a statute, authorizing suppression and injunction on such a basis, is constitutionally valid, it would be equally permissible for the legislature to provide that at any time the publisher of any newspaper could be brought before a court . . . and required to produce proof of the truth of his publication, or of what he intended to publish, and of his motives, or stand enjoined. . . . And it would be but a step to a complete system of censorship."
New York v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 144 Pg. 134	The Court addressed the constitutionality of three provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Act provided three types of incentives to encourage States to comply with their statutory obligation to provide for the disposal of waste generated within their borders.	The Act's monetary incentives and access incentives provisons are consistent with the Constitution's allocation of power between the Federal and State Governments, but the take title provision is not.
New York Times Co. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1971 403 U.S. 713 Pg. 1108	In June 1971, the Executive Branch of the United States Government hurriedly sought to "enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on the Vietnam Policy" (aka The Pentagon Papers). Requested injunctions were denied. The question ultimately put before the Supreme Court was whether the publication caused "grave and irreparable" danger to the American people, sufficient to warrant suspending the freedom of the press.	"The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information. It is common knowledge that the First Amendment was adopted against the widespread use of the common law of seditious libel to punish the dissemination of material that is embarrassing to the powers-that-be. The present cases will, I think, go down in history as the most dramatic illustration of that principle. . . . Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are vital to our national health. On public questions there should be 'uninhibited, robust, and wide-open' debate. . . ."
Nixon v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 506 U.S. 224 Pg. 321	Walter Nixon asked the Court to decide wether Senate Rule XI, which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who has been impeached and to report that evidence to the full Senate, violates the Impeachment Trial Clause. Nixon was convicted by a jury for making false statements before a federal grand jury.	Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause is nonjusticiable.
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1937 301 U.S. 1 Pg. 97	The National Labor Relations Board found that the respondent had violated the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting commerce.	The Court concluded that the order of the Board was within its competency and that the act is valid as here applied.
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn. Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 461 U.S. 190 Pg. 230	At issue in this case was whether provisions in the 1976 amendments to California's Warren-Alquist Act, which condition the construction of nuclear plants on findings by the State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission that adequate storage facilities and means of disposal are available for nuclear waste, are preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.	The Court held that Congress has left sufficient authority in the States to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped for economic reasons, and that the courts should not assume the role that our system assigns to Congress.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 413 U.S. 49 Pg. 850	Georgia state officials sought to enjoin an adult movie theater from showing "hard core" pornography, even though the theater posted notice of the mature content and required patrons to be at least 21 years of age. The theater argued that the injunction violated the freedom of expression protection under the First Amendment.	"[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effective safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby. . . . The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole."
Planned Parenthood v. Casey Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 833 Pg. 434	At issue are five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982: section 3205, which requires that a woman seeking an abortion give her informed consent prior to the procedure, and specifies that she be provided with certain information at least 24 hours before the abortion is performed; section 3206, which mandates the informed consent of one parent for a minor to obtain an abortion, but provides a judicial bypass procedure; section 3209, which commands that, unless certain exceptions apply, a married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband; section 3203, which defines a "medical emergency" that will excuse compliance with the foregoing requirements; and sections 3207(b), 3214(a), and 3214(f), which impose certain reporting requirements on facilities providing abortion services.	To protect the central right recognized by Roe while at the same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, the undue burden standard should be employed. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1949 336 U.S. 106 Pg. 625	Appellant is engaged in a nation-wide express business. It operates 1,900 trucks in New York City and sells space on the side of those trucks for advertising. Appellant was convicted of violating a traffic regulation of New York City that prohibited vehicles from being used mainly or merely for advertising.	The fact that New York City sees fit to eliminate from traffic this kind of distraction but does not touch what may be even greater ones in a different category, such as the vivid displays on Times Square is immaterial. It is no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the same genus be eradicated or none at all.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 377 Pg. 827	A minor with some friends burned a makeshift cross in the yard of a neighbor, an African-American family, thus violating the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, a misdemeanor. The petitioner moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the ordinance is overbroad and impermissibly content-based.	"It is not true that 'fighting words' have at most a 'de minimis' expressive content or that their content is in all respects 'worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection,' sometimes they are quite expressive indeed. We have not said that they constitute 'no part of the expression of ideas,' but only that they constitute 'no essential part of any exposition of ideas' . . . [J]ust as the power to proscribe particular speech on the basis of a noncontent element (e. g., noise) does not entail the power to proscribe the same speech on the basis of a content element; so also, the power to proscribe it on the basis of one content element (e. g., obscenity) does not entail the power to proscribe it on the basis of other content elements. . . . St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquess of Queensberry rules."
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union Supreme Court of the United States, 1997 521 U.S. 844 Pg. 895	The Communications Decency Act (CDA) sought to protect minors from selective internet material by criminalizing the intentional posting of "obscene or indecent" messages and/or information and pictures that concern "sexual or excretory activities or organs" in a manner deemed "offensive" by community standards. This Act (excepting provisions against obscenity and child pornography) was immediately challenged as an overbroad violation of First Amendment protections.	"[T]he CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another. That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve."
Reynolds v. Sims Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 377 U.S. 533 Pg. 644	The number of congresspersons in the House of Representatives is generally reapportioned on the basis of a ten-year population census. But some states (such as Alabama, Delaware and Tennessee) had not enacted reapportionment for decades. As County populations changed over time, some rural minorities commanded disproportionate political power at the state level.	"To the extent that a citizen's right to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen. The weight of a citizen's vote cannot be made to depend on where he lives. Population is, of necessity, the starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for judgement in legislative apportionment controversies. A citizen, a qualified voter, is no more nor no less so because he lives in the city or on the farm. This is the clear and strong command of our Constitution's Equal Protection Clause."
Roe v. Wade Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 410 U.S. 113 Pg. 424	A Texas woman, who alleged she was raped, challenged a Texas statute which prohibited abortion.	Most State laws prohibiting abortions violate a woman's Constitutional right to privacy. The Court adopts a trimester framework for determining whether the State may regulate abortions, holding that in the third trimester, the fetus is viable and the State has a compelling interest in the fetus.
Romer v. Evans Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 517 U.S. 620 Pg. 615	Various Colorado municipalities passed ordinances banning discrimination based on sexual orientation in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, health and welfare services, and other transactions and activities. In response, Colorado voters adopted by statewide referendum "Amendment 2" to the State Constitution, which precludes all legislative, executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to protect the status of persons based on their "homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships." Respondents, who include aggrieved homosexuals and municipalities, commenced this litigation to declare Amendment 2 invalid and enjoin its enforcement.	Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause.
Roth v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1957 354 U.S. 476 Pg. 843	Certain book-sellers were convicted of mailing lewd and obscene materials, a federal offense. The book-sellers argued that their businesses should enjoy the freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment.	"[I]mplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance. . . . {However,] it is apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was not intended to protect every utterance. This phrasing did not prevent this Court from concluding that libelous utterances are not within the area of constitutionally protected speech."
Saenz v. Roe Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 526 U.S. 489 Pg. 348	In 1992, California enacted a statute limiting the maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents. The scheme limits the amount payable to a family that has resided in the State for less than 12 months to the amount payable by the State of the family's prior residence.	Section 11450.03 violates the Fourteenth Amendment because the right to travel embraces a citizen's right to be treated equally in her new State of residence, a discriminatory classification is itself a penalty. California's classifications are defined entirely by the period of residency and the location of the disfavored class members' prior residences.
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez Supreme Court of the United States, 1973 411 U.S. 1 Pg. 664	Is education was a fundamental right entitled to protection from wealth-based discrimination? Residents of poor Texas districts were taxed at higher rates than residents of a wealthier districts. Those in the poor district were unable to raise local revenues for that district's schools and were thus given the minimum amount of state funding. The wealthy district enjoyed the maximum amount. A class action suit sought to equalize funding for the public education system.	"Education . . . is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution." Thus, Texas' system to fund public schools by reliance on local taxes is permissible even if it causes inter-district expenditure disparities. Equality of education funding is not a fundamental right that is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Schenck v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1919 249 U.S. 47 Pg. 754	Schenck mailed 15,000 circulars to WWI draftees urging them to resist the Conscription Act.	Utterances that are tolerable in peacetime may be punishable during a time of war. Speech that presents or advocates a clear and present danger may lawfully be restricted.
Shaw v. Reno Supreme Court of the United States, 1993 509 U.S. 630 Pg. 562	Appellants, five residents of Durham County, North Carolina, brought this action asserting that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Specifically they claim the General Assembly's plan violates the Fourteenth Amendment when it deliberately "create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily-without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions" with the purpose "to create Congressional Districts along racial lines" and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress."	"Redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is unexplainable on grounds other than race demands same close scrutiny under equal protection clause that is given other state laws that classify citizens by race."
Shelley v. Kraemer Supreme Court of the United States, 1948 334 U.S. 1 Pg. 683	In 1911, numerous owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue in the City of St. Louis signed an agreement restricting the use of that property to every person not of the Caucasian race.	The Court held that in granting judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases, the states have denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws and that, therefore, the action of the state courts cannot stand.
Sherbert v. Verner Supreme Court of the United States, 1963 374 U.S. 398 Pg. 1266
Slaughter-House Cases Supreme Court of the United States, 1873 83 U.S. 36 Pg. 342	The city of New Orleans created a monopoly by granting a contract to a slaughter house, so that the city could accommodate the influx of cattle from Texas. The butchers in New Orleans brought suit, challenging the granting of the monopoly as an impermissible barrier to trade.	The Court refused to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to the states, but did
South Dakota v. Dole Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 483 U.S. 203 Pg. 162	Congress conditioned funding of federal highways on conforming to national drinking age.	Spending must be (1) in the general welfare (deference is given to Congress on whether the program is in the general welfare); (2) the condition must be clearly and unambiguously stated; and (3) the condition must be clearly related to the federal interest, i.e., there must be a nexus between the condition and the federal interest for a legitimate exercise of spending power.
Texas v. Johnson Supreme Court of the United States, 1989 491 U.S. 397 Pg. 956	Johnson was convicted for burning the American flag.	While "the government generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in restricting the written or spoken word," it may not "proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements."The court found that, "Under the circumstances, Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment. . . . Occurring as it did at the end of a demonstration coinciding with the Republican National Convention, the expressive, overtly political nature of the conduct was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent."
United Building and Construction Trades Council of Camden County v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden Supreme Court of the United States, 1984 465 U.S. 208 Pg. 223	A municipal ordinance of the City of Camden requires that at least 40% of the employees of contractors and subcontractors working on city construction projects be Camden residents.	The ordinance is properly subject to the strictures of the Privileges and Immunities Clause. That the ordinance is a municipal, rather than a state, law does not place it outside the Clause's scope.
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz Supreme Court of the United States, 1980 449 U.S. 166 Pg. 632	The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held unconstitutional a section of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, and the United States Railroad Retirement Board has appealed to this Court.	The challenged provisions of the 1974 Act do not deny the plaintiff class equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
Virginia v. Black Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 538 U.S. 343 Pg. 837	In two separate incidents, three men burned crosses intended to emphasize White Supremacist views. They were convicted of violating a Virginia statute that found any cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Citing especially R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), respondents argued that their actions were constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.	"The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of intimidation. Instead of prohibiting all intimidating messages, Virginia may . . . prohibit only those forms of intimidation that are most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm."
United States v. Virginia Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 518 U.S. 515 Pg. 583	Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is the sole single-sex school among Virginia's public institutions of higher learning. VMI's distinctive mission is to produce "citizen-soldiers," men prepared for leadership in civilian life and in military service. Using an "adversative method" of training not available elsewhere in Virginia, VMI endeavors to instill physical and mental discipline in its cadets and impart to them a strong moral code. The United States sued Virginia and VMI, alleging that VMI's exclusively male admission policy violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.	Virginia's categorical exclusion of women from the educational opportunities that VMI provides denies equal protection to women.
Washington v. Davis Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 426 U.S. 229 Pg. 510	Respondents Harley and Sellers, both Negroes, whose applications to become police officers in the District of Columbia had been rejected, in an action against District of Columbia officials and others, claimed that the Police Department's recruiting procedures, including a written personnel test, were racially discriminatory and violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.	Though the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection component prohibiting the Government from invidious discrimination, it does not follow that a law or other official act is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact regardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose.
Whitney v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 274 U.S. 357 Pg. 772	A co-founder of the Communist Labor Party ("C.L.P.") was convicted and imprisoned under California's 1919 Criminal Syndicalism Act, on a charge of teaching and advocating violent overthrow of the government, despite protesting that the C.L.P. did not contemplate or condone violence.	"[F]reedom of speech . . . does not confer an absolute right to speak, without responsibility, whatever one may choose" and "a State . . . may punish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite to crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow by unlawful means." In his much lauded concurrence, Justice Brandeis notes, "Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature."
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1955 348 U.S. 483 Pg. 379	An Oklahoma statute made it unlawful for any person not a licensed optometrist or opthalmologist to fit lenses to a face or to duplicate or replace into frames lenses or other optical appliances, except upon written prescriptive authority of an Oklahoma licensed opthamologist or optometrist.	The Court upheld the statute. The Court says that even though this law may be wasteful, it is not for the court to determine the economic advantages and disadvantages. "The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought." The Supreme Court held that business regulation will be subject to mere rational basis review.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer Supreme Court of the United States, 1952 343 U.S. 579 Pg. 245	President Truman ordered the federal government to seize control of American steel mills in an effort to avoid a strike that he believed would hinder the ability of the United States to prosecute the conflict in Korea.	The president may take any action not prohibited by the Constitution or a statute. The most frequently cited test for analysis comes from Jackson's delineation of three zones of presidential powers: (1) when the President acts with the authority of Congress, the President's acts are presumptively valid; (2) when there is no Congressional grant or denial of authority, but there is a gray area in which the President and Congress may have concurrent authority, the test of power in this area depends on imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law; (3) when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, the President must rely on his Constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. In this case, because the president is disobeying a federal law, such presidential actions will be allowed only if the law enacted by Congress is unconstitutional.
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris Supreme Court of the United States, 2002 536 U.S. 639 Pg. 1356