Studies in American Tort Law

Johnson, Gunn
3rd Edition
ISBN: 1594600341

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Page	Case Name	Citation	Court	Audio
11	Vosburg v. Putney	50 N.W. 403	Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891	Download
12	Garratt v. Dailey	46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091	Supreme Court of Washington, 1955	Download
20	Cohen v. Petty	62 App.D.C. 187, 65 F.2d 820	Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 1933	Download
44	Ranson v. Kitner	31 Ill.App. 241	Appellate Court of Illinois, 1889	Download
45	McGuire v. Almy	8 N.E.2d 760	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937	Download
64	Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill	25 Ala.App. 540, 150 So. 709	Court of Appeals of Alabama, 1933	Download
72	Harris v. Jones	281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611	Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1977	Download
81	Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida	100 So.2d 396	Supreme Court of Florida, 1958	Download
96	Taylor v. Vallelunga	171 Cal. App.2d 107, 339 P.2d 910	District Court of Appeal of California, 1959	Download
100	Bird v. Jones	115 Eng. Rep. 688	King's Bench Division, 1845	Download
106	Enright v. Groves	39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851	Colorado Court of Appeals, 1977	Download
117	CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.	962 F.Supp. 1015	United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, 1997	Download
138	O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co.	154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1891	Download
150	De May v. Roberts	46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1881	Download
156	Katko v. Briney	183 N.W.2d 657	Supreme Court of Iowa, 1971	Download
164	Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store	12 Mich.App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347	Court of Appeals of Michigan, 1968	Download
164	Surocco v. Geary	3 Cal. 69, 58 Am.Dec. 385	Supreme Court of California, 1853	Download
168	Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.	124 N.W. 221	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910	Download
170	Ploof v. Putnam	71 A. 188	Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908	Download
181	Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.	377 F.Supp. 136	United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 1974	Download
192	Zimmerman v. Ausland	266 Or. 427, 513 P.2d 1167	Supreme Court of Oregon, 1973	Download
207	O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co.	677 F.2d 1194	United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 1982	Download
219	State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell	538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit)	Supreme Court of the United States, 2003	Download
238	Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.	162 N.E. 99	Court of Appeals of New York, 1928	Download
246	Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams	183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234	Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1938	Download
247	United States v. Carroll Towing Co.	159 F.2d 169	United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947	Download
252	Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl	65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880	Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1902	Download
270	Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co.	173 N.W.2d 619	Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970	Download
276	Hodges v. Carter	239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144	Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1954	Download
287	Boyce v. Brown	51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455	Supreme Court of Arizona, 1938	Download
293	Scott v. Bradford	606 P.2d 554	Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1979	Download
307	Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp.	259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436	Supreme Court of Oregon, 1971	Download
311	Brown v. Shyne	151 N.E. 197	New York Court of Appeals, 1926	Download
313	Martin v. Herzog	126 N.E. 814	New York Court of Appeals, 1920	Download
317	Zeni v. Anderson	397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270.	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1976	Download
336	Goddard v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co.	179 Mass. 52, 60 N.E. 486	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1901	Download
337	Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Co.	208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1911	Download
352	Ybarra v. Spangard	154 P.2d 687	Supreme Court of California, 1944	Download
365	Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.	37 La.Ann. 694	Court of Appeals of Louisiana, 1885	Download
367	Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins	184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625	Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1939	Download
374	Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. R.R. Co.	146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1920	Download
386	Summers v. Tice	199 P.2d 1	Supreme Court of California, 1948	Download
389	Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories	26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 934, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 285, 66 L.Ed.2d 140 (1980)	Supreme Court of California, 1980	Download
425	Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. "Wagon Mound No. 2"	[1967] 1 A.C. 617.	Privy Council, 1966
421	Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd.	A.C. 388	Privy Council, 1961	Download
480	Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.	439 F.2d 477	United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970	Download
519	Riss v. New York	22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897.	New York Court of Appeals, 1968	Download
545	Campbell v. Weathers	153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72	Supreme Court of Kansas, 1941	Download
547	Rowland v. Christian	443 P.2d 561	Supreme Court of California, 1968	Download
619	Kelly v. Gwinnell	96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219	Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984	Download
703	Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno	150 P.2d 436	Supreme Court of California, 1944	Download
711	Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.	59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697	Supreme Court of California, 1963	Download
718	Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.	573 P.2d 443	Supreme Court of California, 1978	Download
749	Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.	529 U.S. 861	Supreme Court of the United States, 2000	Download
809	Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat'l Steel Corp.	495 F.2d 213	United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1974	Download
811	Bruckman v. Pena	29 Colo.App. 357, 487 P.2d 566	Colorado Court of Appeals, 1971	Download
813	American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court	578 P.2d 899	Supreme Court of California, 1978	Download
830	Elbaor v. Smith	845 S.W.2d 240	Supreme Court of Texas, 1992	Download
885	Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co.	104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782	Supreme Court of Washington, 1985	Download
897	Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.	242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363	Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1963	Download
986	New York Times Co. v. Sullivan	376 U.S. 254	Supreme Court of the United States, 1964	Download
995	Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.	418 U.S. 323	Supreme Court of the United States, 1974	Download

Case Information	Fact Summary	Rule of Law
Vosburg v. Putney Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1891 50 N.W. 403 Pg. 11	Fourteen year-old schoolboy (defendant) reaches out his leg and toes the shin of his classmate (plaintiff) while in the classroom. Though the touch is slight, plaintiff experiences pain and swelling in the subsequent days and ultimately loses the use of his leg.	"[T]he wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the [intentional] wrongful act, whether they could or could not have been foreseen by him."
Garratt v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington, 1955 46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 Pg. 12	A five-year-old boy moved a lawn chair from under Plaintiff while she was in the process of sitting down. Plaintiff suffered a broken hip and brings a battery charge against the child.	A court need only find that the defendant behaved with "substantial certainty" that contact would result in order to hold defendant liable for battery. No further finding of intent is necessary.
Cohen v. Petty Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 1933 62 App.D.C. 187, 65 F.2d 820 Pg. 20	Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile that crashed when the defendant driver fainted. Plaintiff appeals from the lower court's directed verdict for the defendant.	Negligence cannot be predicated upon defendant's recklessness in driving an automobile when he did not know, and had no reason to know, of the possibility of an accident due to such an event as a sudden illness.
Ranson v. Kitner Appellate Court of Illinois, 1889 31 Ill.App. 241 Pg. 44	Appellants, while wolf hunting, accidentally killed appellee's dog when they mistook it for a wolf. Appellee brought action to recover for the value of the dog.	Appellants are liable for any damage caused, regardless of whether they were acting in good faith.
McGuire v. Almy Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937 8 N.E.2d 760 Pg. 45	Live-in nurse (plaintiff) hears her mental patient (defendant) thrashing about and offers to enter room and help. Patient replies, "If you come in, I will kill you." Nurse enters, and patient beats her with the leg of broken furniture.	If an insane person intends to do the HARM, then she is liable for the intentional tort. (Note the difference from the competent individual, who is liable so long as she merely intends the OFFENSIVE ACT)
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill Court of Appeals of Alabama, 1933 25 Ala.App. 540, 150 So. 709 Pg. 64	Sapp, an agent for the defendant, put his hand on Plaintiff's wife and propositioned her. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for assault against the defendant.	To constitute an assault, "there must be an intentional, unlawful, offer to touch the person of another," that the other person must have "a well-founded fear of an imminent battery," and the perpetrator must possess "the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt."
Harris v. Jones Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1977 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 Pg. 72	Plaintiff suffered a severe speech impediment and brought an action against General Motors Company and one of its supervisory employees, who oversaw plaintiff. During plaintiff's eight year employment defendant mimicked and ridiculed plaintiff for his speech problems, and as a result plaintiff was prescribed pills for nerves and his impediment worsened. He brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.	An action for intentional infliction of mental distress must contain (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the distress, and (4) severe distress that goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida Supreme Court of Florida, 1958 100 So.2d 396 Pg. 81	Plaintiff brought a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendant, whose employee used language in a "malicious or grossly reckless manner" to the plaintiff when she inquired as to the price of an item in defendant's store.	To constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, "[t]he unwarranted intrusion must be calculated to cause %u201Csevere emotional distress%u201D to a person of ordinary sensibilities, in the absence of special knowledge or notice."
Taylor v. Vallelunga District Court of Appeal of California, 1959 171 Cal. App.2d 107, 339 P.2d 910 Pg. 96	Plaintiff alleged that she was present for a beating inflicted on her father, and that she suffered severe fright and emotional distress as a result. She brought an action against those who assaulted her father.	In order to intentionally cause severe emotional distress one must have the "intention to cause severe emotional distress when the act is done for the purpose of causing the distress or with knowledge on the part of the actor that severe emotional distress is substantially certain to be produced."
Bird v. Jones King's Bench Division, 1845 115 Eng. Rep. 688 Pg. 100	Defendant obstructed the path of plaintiff. Plaintiff could have gone around the man if he had wanted.	False imprisonment requires that the area to which one is confined have barriers.
Enright v. Groves Colorado Court of Appeals, 1977 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 Pg. 106	Defendant, a police officer, demanded plaintiff's driver's license when he observed her dog without a leash. When plaintiff failed to provide the license defendant grabbed her arm and placed her under arrest.	"False arrest arises when one is taken into custody by a person who claims but does not have proper legal authority. Accordingly, a claim for false arrest will not lie if an officer has a valid warrant or probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person who was arrested committed it."
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, 1997 962 F.Supp. 1015 Pg. 117	Plaintiff, CompuServe Inc. is an online communication service provider, who brings this action again defendant, Cyber Promotions, to stop defendant from sending unsolicited emails to plaintiff's customers. Plaintiff notified Cyber Promotions that they are prohibited from sending "spam" emails, but Cyber refused. CompuServe brought this action under a theory of trespass to chattels and the court now considers whether it can order injunctive relief trespass on the Internet.	"A plaintiff can sustain an action for trespass to chattels, as opposed to an action for conversion, without showing a substantial interference with its right to possession of that chattel. . . . Harm to the personal property or diminution of its quality, condition, or value as a result of defendants' use can also be the predicate for liability. . . ."
O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1891 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 Pg. 138	Plaintiff is a female immigrant from Queenstown to Boston, who brought this action against the defendant, the ship she traveled on, for assault and negligence for having their surgeons vaccinate her upon her arrival in the United States. Plaintiff claims that she was already vaccinated and that "there was no evidence of want of care or precaution by the defendant in the selection of the surgeon, or in the procuring of the virus or vaccine matter."	"The master or owners of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical officer when he attends a passenger. He is not their servant, engaged in their business and subject to their control as to his mode of treatment. They do their whole duty if they employ a duly qualified and competent surgeon and medical practitioner, and supply him with all necessary and proper instruments, medicines, and medical comforts, and have him in readiness for such passengers as choose to employ him."
De May v. Roberts Supreme Court of Michigan, 1881 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 Pg. 150	Plaintiff brought along a friend to witness a childbirth without disclosing the fact that his friend was not employed in a professional capacity.	The law affords remedy for deceit that causes injury.
Katko v. Briney Supreme Court of Iowa, 1971 183 N.W.2d 657 Pg. 156	Plaintiff was shot by a spring powered shotgun trap set up inside defendant's unoccupied farm house. There was no warning about the gun trap and it could not be seen from the outside.	Landowners do not have the right to use lethal force to protect property from intrusion unless the intruder "threatens death or serious bodily harm to the occupiers [...] of the premises."
Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store Court of Appeals of Michigan, 1968 12 Mich.App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347 Pg. 164	Plaintiff was accused of stealing by an agent of the defendant. While exiting the defendant's store, defendant's agent called the plaintiff back. The defendant's agent then asked the plaintiff to show him the contents of her purse. Plaintiff won action against the defendant for false arrest and slander.	If there is reasonable belief that someone is shoplifting, then the shopkeeper or agent of the shopkeeper can investigate, as long as the investigation is reasonable as well.
Surocco v. Geary Supreme Court of California, 1853 3 Cal. 69, 58 Am.Dec. 385 Pg. 164	Defendant, administrator of the city of San Francisco, destroyed the plaintiff's building in order to try to stop the spread of a fire. Plaintiff's claim is that the defendant is liable for property he destroyed.	The common law principle of necessity applies to administration of a fire. In order to save the property of neighbors, property might need to be sacrificed. If the administrator can show necessity, he or she can not be held liable for damage due to the destruction.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 124 N.W. 221 Pg. 168	Defendant moors his boat to plaintiff's dock, pursuant to contract to unload cargo. A storm develops, however, and defendant keeps boat moored to dock, adhering to custom. Boat buffets the dock and causes $500 damage to the dock.	Even when necessity provides a valid defense to trespass, the would-be trespasser must pay compensatory relief for damage caused to property.
Ploof v. Putnam Supreme Court of Vermont, 1908 71 A. 188 Pg. 170	Due to a severe storm on the lake, plaintiff was forced to moor his sloop to defendant's dock in order to protect the lives aboard. Defendant's servant unmoored the sloop, which was then destroyed upon the shore. Plaintiff and his family survived, but suffered injuries.	"The doctrine of necessity applies with special force to the preservation of human life. One assaulted and in peril of his life may run through the close of another to escape."
Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 1974 377 F.Supp. 136 Pg. 181	Plaintiff was injured in a fire caused by a heater which the defendant negligently produced and was subsequently awarded compensatory damages. Defendant moved for remittitur on the basis of the maximum recovery rule."	The court has the ability to review the award decided by the jury and decided whether it falls within a reasonable maximum recovery.
Zimmerman v. Ausland Supreme Court of Oregon, 1973 266 Or. 427, 513 P.2d 1167 Pg. 192	Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident due to the negligence of the defendant and was subsequently awarded compensatory damages for permanent injury. Defendant claimed the plaintiff should have avoided permanent injury through surgery and therefore the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.	The jury has the ability to decide whether a plaintiff received permanent injury or in fact failed to mitigate damages.
O'Shea v. Riverway Towing Co. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 1982 677 F.2d 1194 Pg. 207	While getting off a harbor boat, the plaintiff fell and sustained an injury. The defendant, Riverway Towing Company, was found negligent. Defendent appealed from the finding that there was no contributory negligence, and from the damage award compensating the plaintiff for her future lost wages.	The calculation of lost wages should be an analytical rather than an intuitive undertaking. Inflation should be taken into account in calculating future lost wages.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit) Pg. 219	Although investigators and witnesses concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability, declined to settle the ensuing claims for the $ 50,000 policy limit, ignored its own investigators' advice, and took the case to trial, assuring Campbell and his wife that they had no liability for the accident, that State Farm would represent their interests, and that they did not need separate counsel. In fact, a Utah jury returned a judgment for over three times the policy limit, and State Farm refused to appeal.	A punitive damages award of $ 145 million, where full compensatory damages are $ 1 million, is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 162 N.E. 99 Pg. 238	Two guards, employed by defendant, helped a man get on a moving train. The man was holding a package, which he dropped. The package was full of fireworks and exploded, causing a scale to fall many feet away and injure plaintiff. There was no way for the guards to know the contents of the package.	For an act to be negligent, unless that act is imminently dangerous, a duty of care is owed to a foreseeable plaintiff. There is a split of authority on duty of care. Cardozo, writing for the majority, adopted a narrow view of the duty of care: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. . . ." Andrews, dissenting, adopts a broad view: "Where there is the unreasonable act, and some right that may be affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not result. . . . Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain."
Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1938 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234 Pg. 246	Appellants delivered a drum of gasoline to the appellee. While removing the cap from the drum, a spark was produced by the ill condition of the threads in the cap. The spark caused a fire which injured the appellee. Appellants argue that they are not liable, due to the event being a "freak accident."	"The test as respects foreseeability is not the balance of probabilities but the existence, in the situation in hand, of some real likelihood of some damage and the likelihood is of such appreciable weight and moment as to induce, or which reasonably should induce, action to avoid it on the part of a person of a reasonably prudent mind."
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 159 F.2d 169 Pg. 247	Carroll Towing (defendant) is towing a line of barges, including the "Anna C" (owned by Connors, plaintiff). Connors does not place an employee on board its barge. The "Anna C" breaks away from the line of barges and crashes into a tanker.	The "Hand Formula": if B < P*L, and the actor does not take the adequate precaution (B), then the actor has breached a legal duty. B = "the burden of adequate precautions." P = "the probability" that injury will result. L = "the gravity of the resulting injury"
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1902 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 Pg. 252	Defendant was injured while playing on the railroad's property and recovered from the plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the defendant does not have the right to recover because it had exercised enough care in maintaining the safety of the premises.	"[I]n all cases of this kind in the determination of the question of negligence, regard must be had to the character and location of the premises, the purpose for which they are used, the probability of injury therefrom, the precautions necessary to prevent such injury, and the relations such precautions bear to the beneficial use of the premises.
Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970 173 N.W.2d 619 Pg. 270	Insane woman (defendant) drives into oncoming lane of traffic, but claims that God was steering. Defendant's car strikes plaintiff's truck.	Insanity is a defense in a case of negligence ONLY IF (1) the person has no reasonable forewarning that an existing condition could cause such an incident AND (2) the condition acts suddenly and prevents the person from conforming conduct to the standard of the reasonable person.
Hodges v. Carter Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1954 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 Pg. 276	Plaintiff was a drug store owner, and his building burned down. He was insured against fire damage by several companies, all of whom declined to pay any of the losses. Plaintiff then hired lawyers, the defendants, to issue summons and complaints against the insurance companies. They sent the summons to the Insurance Commissioner instead of having them personally delivered. The insurance companies claimed this was not proper delivery, and the court agreed on appeal. The plaintiff then sued the defendants, claiming they were negligent in failing to properly serve the summons.	An attorney, like any other professional, is liable for damages caused by his negligent mistakes, held to the standard of skill and knowledge of other professionals in his field. In the case where a custom among professionals was not previously challenged, the professional can not be held liable for negligence.
Boyce v. Brown Supreme Court of Arizona, 1938 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 Pg. 287	Plaintiff was treated by the defendant, a doctor, several years previous to the suit. The defendant treated a fracture in the plaintiff's ankle by joining the plaintiff's bones with a screw, standard practice in medicine. Years later, the plaintiff requested treatment for pain in her ankle, which the defendant treated by wrapping the ankle with adhesive tape and repairing an arch support he had previously given her. When the plaintiff continued to experience pain after treatment, she went to a new doctor. This doctor, noticing a strange mark near the ankle, took an X-ray, which revealed necrosis of the bone around the screw. This new doctor removed the screw and the ankle healed normally.	In order to establish malpractice, the plaintiff needs to prove by expert testimony that the doctor did not adhere to the standard of proper medical care required at the time.
Scott v. Bradford Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1979 606 P.2d 554 Pg. 293	Defendant performed a surgery on the plaintiff. The surgery resulted in a new problem arising. Plaintiff is suing for medical malpractice, claiming that the defendant did not explain the treatment, risks, and other possible options enough for her to make an informed consent.	[I]n a medical malpractice action a patient suing under the theory of informed consent must allege and prove: (1) defendant physician failed to inform him adequately of a material risk before securing his consent to the proposed treatment; (2)if he had been informed of the risks he would not have consented to the treatment; (3) the adverse consequences that were not made known did in fact occur and he was injured as a result of submitting to the treatment.
Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp. Supreme Court of Oregon, 1971 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 Pg. 307	Plaintiff was injured in a bar fight which occurred in defendant's bar. After a belligerent group approached the plaintiff's table, one of the plaintiff's friends complained to the bartender, who told him to avoid those belligerent individuals. The fight occurred not long after the warning. Plaintiff brought suit against the drinking establishment claiming the defendant was negligent in serving the belligerent individuals alcohol and allowing them in the establishment.	"A violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law when the violation results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation and when the harm is of the kind which the statute or regulation was enacted to prevent. [. . .] However, in addition, it is proper for the court to examine preliminarily the appropriateness of the standard as a measure of care for civil litigation under the circumstances presented."
Brown v. Shyne New York Court of Appeals, 1926 151 N.E. 197 Pg. 311	Unlicensed chiropractor (defendant) treats patient (plaintiff). After several treatments, patient becomes paralyzed.	If a statute is designed to protect against a certain type of threat, then a defendant's violation of that statute does NOT constitute negligence per se if the injury was not caused by this specified type of threat.
Martin v. Herzog New York Court of Appeals, 1920 126 N.E. 814 Pg. 313	Plaintiff's buggy collides with defendant's automobile, and plaintiff dies. Plaintiff is driving without his headlights on, which violates a statute.	Breach of a statutory duty can also constitute CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PER SE, subject to the same requirements: 1) plaintiff is a member of the class of persons that the statute is designed to protect, AND 2) harm is of the character that the statute is designed to prevent. Finally, Cardozo states that negligence per se, like all negligence, must be causally connected to the injury.
Zeni v. Anderson Supreme Court of Michigan, 1976 397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270. Pg. 317	Plaintiff, in the winter, was walking to work on a "well-used pedestrian snowpath, with her back to oncoming traffic" which a security officer testified was safer than the sidewalk during the wintertime, and was struck by a car driven by the defendant. Plaintiff is suing to recover for injuries sustained in the accident. Defendant claimed that plaintiff's failure to use the sidewalk constituted contributory negligence because it violated a statute.	"[W]hen a court adopts a penal statute as the standard of care in a an action for negligence, violation of that statute establishes a prima facie case of negligence, with the determination to be made by the finder of fact whether the party accused of violating the statute has established a legally sufficient excuse. If the finder of fact determines such an excuse exists, the appropriate standard of care then becomes that established by the common law."
Goddard v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1901 179 Mass. 52, 60 N.E. 486 Pg. 336	Plaintiff slipped on a banana peel on defendant's railway platform. The banana peel was most likely dropped by another passenger in the crowd just moments before the plaintiff slipped on it, and would have been difficult if not impossible for the defendant's employees to spot.	The plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent in failing to maintain their premises.
Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1911 208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386 Pg. 337	Plaintiff slipped on a banana peel on defendant's platform. The banana peel appeared as if it had been there for some time, long enough that an employee of the defendants should have seen it and cleaned it up.	"The obligation rested upon the defendant to keep its station reasonably safe for its passengers." Because the inference is drawn that it was there for some time, the defendants are negligent for leaving their platform in a dangerous condition.
Ybarra v. Spangard Supreme Court of California, 1944 154 P.2d 687 Pg. 352	Plaintiff was diagnosed with appendicitis. After being rendered unconscious for surgery to correct the problem, he woke up with severe pain in his right sholder. The plaintiff had no previous injury or pain in the sholder area. The pain eventually spread down his arm, and he developed paralysis and atrophy in the sholder. Two doctors subsequently examined him and determined that the condition was caused by trauma.	The doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" may be applied "where a plaintiff recieves unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, [and] all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct."
Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. Court of Appeals of Louisiana, 1885 37 La.Ann. 694 Pg. 365	Plaintiff was injured after falling down unlighted steps, without a handrail, on defendant's property.	"[W]here the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect between the negligence and the injury.
Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1939 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 Pg. 367	The plaintiff was injured when glass fell from a previously broken window in defendant's hotel. After the incident, skin cancer developed at the point of injury and plaintiff sued for both the injury form the glass and the cancer. Plaintiff won at trial and defendant appealed.	"It is not enough that negligence of one person and injury to another coexisted, but the injury must have been caused by the negligence."
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. R.R. Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1920 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 Pg. 374	Plaintiff's property was destroyed by a fire. Defendant's engine negligently caused a bog fire, while another fire was started independently, not by a party in the trial. The question is whether the defendant is liable for damage caused by a fire which he started when it was joined with another he did not start.	"One who negligently sets a fire is not liable if another's property is damaged, unless it is made to appear that the fire was a material element in the destruction of the property."
Summers v. Tice Supreme Court of California, 1948 199 P.2d 1 Pg. 386	Plaintiff and two defendants were hunting quail on the open range. Both defendants shot at the quail, firing in the plaintiff's direction. As a result, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his eye and upper lip.	In situations where plaintiff is injured as a result of defendants negligence, yet it is impossible for plaintiff to determine which defendant caused what injury, the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the whole injury to plaintiff as joint tort feasors. The burden is on the defendants to explain the cause of the injury.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories Supreme Court of California, 1980 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 934, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 285, 66 L.Ed.2d 140 (1980) Pg. 389	Plaintiff was injured as the result of a drug administered to her mother during pregnancy. The question is whether plaintiff, who cannot identify the manufacturer of the precise product administered, can hold a manufacturer, which produces the exact same drug that caused her injury, liable.	In drug injury cases where a few manufacturers hold a substantial market share for one drug with the same formula, each company can be held liable for an injury by their share of that drug's market.
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Miller Steamship Co. "Wagon Mound No. 2" Privy Council, 1966 [1967] 1 A.C. 617. Pg. 425
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. Privy Council, 1961 A.C. 388 Pg. 421	Defendants had carelessly let oil spill from their ship into Sydney harbor. Oil was carried to wharf, which was used for repair work on other ships. The oil caught fire, and caused great damage.	The test of liability for the damage done by fire was the foreseeability of the injury by fire and, as a reasonable man would not, on the facts of this case, have foreseen such injury, the appellants were not liable in negligence for the damage, although their servants' carelessness was the direct cause of the damage.
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970 439 F.2d 477 Pg. 480	Plaintiff suffered injuries from a criminal assault & battery occuring in the common hallway of her apartment building. Security measures in the building had decreased significantly from 1959, when plaintiff signed her lease, to 1966, despite an increasing number of crimes committed against tenants.	"There is a duty of protection owed by the landlord to the tenant in an urban multiple unit apartment dwelling ...[The] standard of protection may be taken as that commonly provided in apartments of this character and type in this community ... [The landlord's] duty is to take those measures of protection which are within his power and capacity to take, and which can reasonably be expected to mitigate the risk of intruders assaulting and robbing tenants."
Riss v. New York New York Court of Appeals, 1968 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897. Pg. 519	Plaintiff was harassed by a rejected suitor, who claimed he would kill or seriously injure her if she dated someone else. Plaintiff repeatedly asked for police protection and was ignored. After the news of her engagement, the plaintiff was again threatened and called the police to no avail. The next day, a thug, sent by the rejected suitor, partially blinded the plaintiff and disfigured her face.	The municipality does not have a duty to provide police protection to an individual. It has a duty to the public as a whole, but no one in particular.
Campbell v. Weathers Supreme Court of Kansas, 1941 153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72 Pg. 545	Plaintiff entered defendant's store, which he regularly patronizes. Though he didn't buy anything that day, he browsed the store and eventually went to use the bathroom, which was not regarded as a private toilet. In the dark hallway leading to the toilet, he fell into an open trap door and was injured.	"'An invitee is one who is either expressly or impliedly invited onto the premises of another in connection with the business carried on by that other. If one goes into a store with a view of then, or at some other time, doing some business with the store, he is an invitee.' Of course, if it appears that a person had no intention of presently or in the future becoming a customer he could not be held to be an invitee, as there would be no basis for any thought of mutual benefit."
Rowland v. Christian Supreme Court of California, 1968 443 P.2d 561 Pg. 547	Plaintiff, a social guest of defendant, injures his hand on a faulty porcelain handle on a water faucet. Defendant had complained to her landlord of the defect two weeks prior to the incident.	"The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land ... is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative."
Kelly v. Gwinnell Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 Pg. 619	Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with defendant Gwinnell, who was intoxicated. Plaintiff is also holding another man, Zak, as co-defendant for serving defendant Gwinnell alcohol even though he was visibly intoxicated. There is no statute prohibiting adult hosts from serving adult guests alcohol when they are intoxicated.	"[A] host who serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, is liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication," due to the fact that the "policy considerations served by its imposition far outweigh those asserted in the opposition."
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno Supreme Court of California, 1944 150 P.2d 436 Pg. 703	Coca Cola bottle explodes in waitress's (plaintiff) hand as she is stocking the refrigerator.	Traynor's concurrence is the key takeaway from this case: "a manufacturer incurs an ABSOLUTE LIABILITY when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. Supreme Court of California, 1963 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 Pg. 711	Plaintiff, Greenman, brought this action for damages against defendant, Yuba Power Products, Inc, the manufacturer of a Shopsmith, a combination power tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe. After veiwing a demonstration and reading the brochure, Greenman used the lathe tool to create a chalice from a piece of wood. As he was working the wood "suddenly flew out of the machine and struck him on the forehead, inflicting serious injuries."	"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. Supreme Court of California, 1978 573 P.2d 443 Pg. 718	Plaintiff was injured while operating a Lull High-Lift Loader. While attempting to lift a load of lumber on uneven ground, the plaintiff lost control of the loader and as he attempted to jump to safety was struck and serioulsy injured by some falling timber.	A product may be found defective in design if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 529 U.S. 861 Pg. 749	Plaintiff, while driving a 1987 Honda Accord, collided with a tree and was seriously injured. The car was equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts, which the plaintiff had buckled up, but the car was not equipped with airbags or other passive restraint devices.	The court applied a narrow reading of the pre-emption provision, excluding common law actions. Thus, the court held that a common law "no airbag" action, conflicted with FMVSS 208.
Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat'l Steel Corp. United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1974 495 F.2d 213 Pg. 809	Plaintiffs are Canadian and allege that the defendants, American corporations, are polluting, causing damage to their properties. The question before the court is whether "[u]nder the law of the State of Michigan, may multiple defendants, whose independent actions of allegedly discharging pollutants into the ambient air thereby allegedly create a nuisance, be jointly and severally liable to multiple plaintiffs for numerous individual injuries which plaintiffs claim to have sustained as a result of said actions, where said pollutants mix in the air so that their separate effects in creating the individual injuries are impossible to analyze."	"The [P]laintif's right to recover for his harm should not depend on his ability to apportion the damage but that this is a problem which is properly left with the defendants themselves."
Bruckman v. Pena Colorado Court of Appeals, 1971 29 Colo.App. 357, 487 P.2d 566 Pg. 811	Defendant was involved in an automobile accident with the plaintiff. Later, defendant was involved in another automobile accident with a third party. The question before the court is whether the defendant was able to recover damages for injuries subsequent to the injury caused by the plaintiff.	Damages are limited to those proximately caused by the party, and can not include those from subsequent causes for which the party is not responsible.
American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court Supreme Court of California, 1978 578 P.2d 899 Pg. 813	The plaintiff, a teenage boy, was seriously injured while participating in a novice motorcycle race. The plaintiff sued defendants, the American Motorcyle Association and the Viking Motorcycle Club, claiming that the defendants negligently organized and operated the race. The defendants sought leave from the court to file a cross-complaint against the plaintiff's parents, alleging contributory negligence.	Under the common law equitable indemnity doctrine a concurrent tortfeasor may obtain partial indemnity from cotortfeasors on a comparative fault basis. Additionally, the court concluded (1) that the doctrine subjecting multiple defendants to "joint and several liability" to a single plaintiff was not abolished or limited; (2) that partial equitable indemnity should be adopted to permit apportionment of loss among codefendants on pure comparative principles; (3) that California contribution statutes do not "preclude" the development of comparative indemnity; and (4) that under equitable contribution any defendant may maintain an action against any other party, whether or not that party was joined in the original suit.
Elbaor v. Smith Supreme Court of Texas, 1992 845 S.W.2d 240 Pg. 830	The question before the court is the legality of "Mary Carter" settlements, where plaintiffs settle with a co-defendant but bring suit against another defendant.	The court "does not favor settlement agreements that skew the trial process, mislead the jury, promote unethical collusion among nominal adversaries, and create the likelihood that a less culpable defendant will be hit with the full judgment. [. . .] Thus, [the court declares Mary Carter settlements] void as violative of sound public policy.
Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. Supreme Court of Washington, 1985 104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 Pg. 885	Plaintiffs are landowners who live near defendant's copper smelter. They brought an action for trespass to land and for nuisance for the airborne particles of heavy metals and gases that traveled from defendant's smelter to plaintiff's land.	A trespass can be found in instances of the slightest harm, such as "the vibration of the soil or by the concussion of the air."
Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1963 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 Pg. 897	Plaintiffs allege that defendant's operation of a grocery store next to their home constitutes a nuisance, and they seek an order to restrain defendant's from using the property for a retale grocery store.	"If a lawful business is operated in an unlawful or unreasonable manner so as to produce material injury or great annoyance to others, or unreasonably interferes with the lawful use and enjoyment of their property, it will constitute a nuisance."
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 376 U.S. 254 Pg. 986	Plaintiff claimed he was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The ad charged that the plaintiff, among others, had been involved with an unprecedented wave of terror against members of the civil rights movement in the south. The court determined the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.	The court held that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 323 Pg. 995	The principle issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements. The case arose from an article that falsely accused plaintiff of being a communist and engaging in communist activities.	"[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."