Ethical Lawyering: Legal and Professional Responsibility in the Practice of Law

Hayden
2nd Edition
ISBN: 0314162259

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Page	Case Name	Citation	Court	Audio
2	Bates v. State Bar of Arizona	433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810	Supreme Court of the United States, 1977	Download
6	Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association	486 U.S. 466	Supreme Court of the United States, 1987	Download
33	In re Application of Chapman	69 Ohio St.3d 17	Supreme Court of Ohio, 1994	Download
36	In re Hamm	211 Ariz. 458	Supreme Court of Arizona, 2005	Download
43	The Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh	355 So.2d 1186	Supreme Court of Florida, 1978	Download
55	Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County	17 Cal.4th 119	Supreme Court of California, 1998	Download
67	Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co.	788 A.2d 478	Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2002	Download
76	Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe	291 N.W.2d 686	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1980	Download
83	Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle	55 P.3d 1054	Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2002	Download
88	Equitania Insurance Co. v. Slone & Garrett, P.S.C.	191 S.W.3d 552	Supreme Court of Kentucky, 2006	Download
93	TIG Insurance Co. v. Giffin Winning Cohen & Bodewes, P.C.	444 F.3d 587	United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2006	Download
100	Jones Motor Co. v. Holtkamp, Liese, Beckmeier & Childress, P.C.	197 F.3d 1190	United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1999	Download
104	Vandermay v. Clayton	328 Or. 646	Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc, 1999	Download
111	Clark v. Rowe	428 Mass. 339	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1998	Download
115	Shumsky v. Eisenstein	96 N.Y.2d 164	Court of Appeals of New York, 2001	Download
137	Burdine v. Johnson	262 F.3d 336	United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, En Banc, 2001	Download
145	Wiley v. County of San Diego	19 Cal.4th 532	Supreme Court of California, 1998	Download
160	Upjohn Co. v. United States	449 U.S. 383	Supreme Court of the United States, 1981	Download
164	Stewart v. Falley's, Inc.	2001 WL 1318371	United States District Court for the District of Kansas, 2001	Download
172	Stroh v. General Motors Corp.	213 A.D.2d 267	New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1995	Download
180	In re: Investigating Grand Jury (Stretton)	887 A.2d 257	Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2005	Download
183	Swidler & Berlin v. United States	524 U.S. 399	Supreme Court of the United States, 1998	Download
188	Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cassano	189 F.R.D. 83	United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1999	Download
198	Spaulding v. Zimmerman	263 Minn. 346	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1962	Download
206	Purcell v. District Attorney	424 Mass. 109	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1997	Download
214	Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co.	497 F.2d 1190	United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1974	Download
220	State of Ex Re. Counsel for Discipline of Nebraska Supreme Court v. Lopez Wilson	262 Neb. 653	Supreme Court of Nebraska, 2001	Download
229	In the Matter of Anonymous	655 N.E.2d 67	Supreme Court of Indiana, 1995	Download
244	Patriarca v. Center for Living & Working, Inc.	438 Mass. 132	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2002	Download
248	Moores v. Greenberg	834 F.2d 1105	United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1987	Download
250	Jones v. Barnes	463 U.S. 745	Supreme Court of the United States, 1983	Download
258	Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California	528 U.S. 152	Supreme Court of the United States, 2000	Download
264	Nichols v. Keller	15 Cal.App.4th 1672	California Court of Appeal, 5th District, 1993	Download
272	Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Hart	186 W. Va. 75	Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1991	Download
277	The Florida Bar v. Bailey	803 So.2d 683	Supreme Court of Florida, 2001	Download
286	Hanlin v. Mitchelson	794 F.2d 834	United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1986	Download
291	Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Intercounty National Title Ins. Co.	310 F.3d 537	United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 2002	Download
296	Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C.	185 Ill.2d 372	Supreme Court of Illinois, 1998	Download
300	Eisenstein v. Conlin	444 Mass. 258	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2005	Download
305	Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young	94 P.3d 179	Supreme Court of Utah, 2004	Download
317	In the Matter of Fordham	423 Mass. 481	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1996	Download
326	Culpepper & Carroll, PLLC v. Cole	929 So.2d 1224	Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2006	Download
329	Gagnon v. Shoblom	409 Mass. 63	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1991	Download
335	Fogarty v. State	270 Ga. 609	Supreme Court of Georgia, 1999	Download
341	King v. Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf	709 So.2d 572	District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1998	Download
351	Farrar v. Hobby	506 U.S. 103	Supreme Court of the United States, 1992	Download
361	Ford v. Albany Medical Center	283 A.D.2d 843	New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 2001	Download
364	Gorman v. Grodensky	130 Misc.2d 837	New York Supreme Court, New York County, 1985	Download
376	In Re Dresser Industries, Inc.	972 F.2d 540	United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1992	Download
383	Bottoms v. Stapleton	706 N.W.2d 411	Supreme Court of Iowa, 2005	Download
389	Fiandaca v. Cunningham	827 F.2d 825	United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1987	Download
397	Holloway v. Arkansas	435 U.S. 475	Supreme Court of the United States, 1978
407	Exterior Systems, Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc.	175 F.Supp.2d 1112	United States Disctrict Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 2001	Download
415	Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co.	81 Ohio St.3d 1	Supreme Court of Ohio, 1998	Download
427	Mickens v. Taylor	535 U.S. 162	Supreme Court of the United States, 2002	Download
436	In Re Sofaer	728 A.2d 625	District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1999	Download
442	Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n. v. Mershon	316 N.W.2d 895	Supreme Court of Iowa, 1982	Download
449	Passante v. McWilliam	53 Cal.App.4th 1240	California Court of Apeal for the Fourth District, 1997	Download
452	In Re Blackwelder	615 N.E.2d 106	Supreme Court of Indiana, 1993	Download
455	In re Rinella	175 Ill.2d 504	Supreme Court of Illinois, 1997	Download
461	In re Swihart	517 N.E.2d 792	Supreme Court of Indiana, 1988	Download
465	People v. Conner	34 Cal.3d 141	Supreme Court of California, 1983	Download
483	Hunter v. Earthgrains Company Bakery	281 F.3d 144	United States Court Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2002	Download
493	Lee v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc.	93 F.Supp.2d 1322	United State District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 2000	Download
503	Jorgenson v. County of Volusia	846 F.2d 1350	United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1988	Download
508	Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co.	747 F.2d 863	United States Court Appeals for the Third Circuit, 1984	Download
514	Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Visser	629 N.W.2d 376	Supreme Court of Iowa, 2001	Download
520	In the Matter of Estate of Waters	647 A.2d 1091	Supreme Court of Delaware, 1994	Download
525	People v. DePallo	96 N.Y.2d 437	Court of Appeals of New York, 2001	Download
531	Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker	47 Cal.3d 863	Supreme Court of California, 1989	Download
541	Morrell v. State	575 P.2d 1200	Supreme Court of Alaska, 1978	Download
554	Kentucky Bar Association v. Geisler	938 S.W.2d 578	Supreme Court of Kentucky, 1997	Download
571	State ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Smolen	17 P.3d 456	Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2000	Download
579	In re R.M.J.	455 U.S. 191	Supreme Court of the United States, 1982	Download
590	Walker v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee	38 S.W.3d 540	Supreme Court of Tennessee, 2001	Download
599	Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association	436 U.S. 477	Supreme Court of the United States, 1978
610	The Florida Bar v. Barrett	897 So.2d 1269	Supreme Court of Florida, 2005
621	Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.	515 U.S. 618	Supreme Court of the United States, 1995
635	Quercia v. United States	289 U.S. 466	Supreme Court of the United States, 1933
641	In re Sheldon Schapiro	845 So.2d 170	Supreme Court of Florida, 2003

Case Information	Fact Summary	Rule of Law
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 433 U.S. 350, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 53 L.Ed.2d 810 Pg. 2	Appellants, two licensed attorneys and members of the Arizona State Bar, published an advertisement of services and rates in a newspaper. They were charged in a complaint filed by the State Bar's president with violating the State Supreme Court's disciplinary rule, which prohibits attorneys from advertising in newspapers or other media.	Advertising by attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression, however advertising that is false, misleading, illegal, or deceptive is subject to restraint. In addition, there may be reasonable restrictions on the time, manner, and place of advertising.
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 486 U.S. 466 Pg. 6	A member of the Kentucky Bar Association challenged that bar association's rule, based on model rule 7.3, which prohibited lawyers from soliciting business through letters, even though those letters were truthful, on First Amendment grounds.	The Court held that such advertising is constitutionally protected. Commercial speech is subject to intermediate scrutiny. It is subject to restriction only in the service of a substantial governmental interest.
In re Application of Chapman Supreme Court of Ohio, 1994 69 Ohio St.3d 17 Pg. 33	A bar applicant admitted to unlawful business practices in association with his family's carpet sales business prior to and during his law school education. The state bar association found that the applicant failed to sustain his burden of proving good character and fitness.	A State can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a rational connection with the bar applicant's fitness or capacity to practice the law.
In re Hamm Supreme Court of Arizona, 2005 211 Ariz. 458 Pg. 36	A bar applicant was convicted of murder in 1974. He subsequently graduated from college through a prison study program and then graduated from Arizona State University College of Law after he was granted parole in 1992.	When evaluating a bar candidate, the court must determine what past bad acts reveal about an applicant's current character. Past criminal conduct affects the burden the applicant must meet to establish good character. "When an applicant has committed first degree murder, a crime that demonstrates an extreme lack of good moral character, that applicant must make an extraordinary showing of present good moral character to establish that he or she is qualified to be admitted to the practice of law."
The Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh Supreme Court of Florida, 1978 355 So.2d 1186 Pg. 43	Respondent, Mary Brumbaugh, runs a secretarial service that types documents for divorces, wills, resumes and bankruptcies. The Florida Bar claims that she is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law for charging clients $50, for preparing legal documents, and for issuing advice as to the costs and procedures for obtaining a no-fault divorce.	A person not licensed to practice law may provide and charge for legal forms, but "may not advise clients as to the various remedies available to them, or otherwise assist them in preparing those forms necessary for a dissolution proceeding."
Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. The Superior Court of Santa Clara County Supreme Court of California, 1998 17 Cal.4th 119 Pg. 55	The Birbrower firm is a professional corporation based out of New York city. Over the period of two years, attorneys with the firm were engaged in representation in California. None of the attorneys who were representing the client, ESQ, a coproration in California, were licensed to practice in the state.	"[T]he practice of law 'in California' entails sufficient contact with the California client to render the nature of the legal service a clear legal representation. In addition to a quantitative analysis, we must consider the nature of the unlicensed lawyer's activities in the state. Mere fortuitous or attenuated contacts will not sustain a finding that the unlicensed lawyer practiced law 'in California.' The primary inquiry is whether the unlicensed lawyer engaged in sufficient activities in the state, or created a continuing relationship with the California client that included legal duties and obligations."
Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2002 788 A.2d 478 Pg. 67	Defendant brought this motion to vacate a default judgment in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of $458,533.69. Defendant's attorney failed to respond to a series of requests and orders to compel, which resulted in the default judgment for the plaintiffs. Defendant cites Rule 60(b)(1) which states that a party may be relieved from a final judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or inexcusable neglect." The original action concerned plaintiffs who claimed the negligence of defendant, Algonquin Gas Transmission Co., caused their personal injuries as they were laying a gas line and excavating a trench.	"Under Rule 60(b)(1), unexplained neglect, standing alone, whether by counsel or a party, will not excuse a party's noncompliance with orderly procedural requirements, such as compliance with deadlines for responding to discovery requests and the court's compliance orders. . . . But if the neglect is inexcusable, thereby precluding any relief under Rule 60(b)(1), then that same inexcusable neglect cannot constitute the 'other grounds' required to obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) unless other extraordinary and unusual factors also are present that would justify granting such relief. . . ."
Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1980 291 N.W.2d 686 Pg. 76	Mrs. Togstad visited the law offices of the defendant to discuss a possible medical malpractice case concerning her husband. She described the facts that led up her husband's paralysis and was told by attorney Miller that "he did not think she had a case, but would discuss it with his partner." Mrs. Togstad did not hear back from the attorney and so she decided that they did not have a case against the hospital for medical malpractice. She brought this action against Miller claiming that he was negligent in his advice concerning their possible claims.	". . . In a legal malpractice action of the type involved here, four elements must be shown: (1) that an attorney-client relationship existed; (2) that defendant acted negligently or in breach of contract; (3) that such acts were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' damages; (4) that but for defendant's conduct the plaintiffs would have been successful in the prosecution of their medical malpractice claim. . . ."
Leak-Gilbert v. Fahle Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2002 55 P.3d 1054 Pg. 83	Decedent updated his will with the assistance of Pauline Fahle, his lawyer. He requested that his daughter-in-law be added as his personal representative and he wanted her to receive his gun collection. Decedent also stated that he wished to disinherit his grandson. After decedent's death, at probate, it was discovered that the will did not mention the four other grandchildren that decedent had, and so the court treated them as unintentionally omitted heirs and divided the estate evenly among them, as if decedent had died intestate. The will's beneficiaries brought suit against Fahle for legal malpractice.	"When an attorney is hired to prepare a will according to the client's directions, unless the client requests such an investigation, the attorney's obligation does not ordinarily include the duty to investigate the existence of a client's heirs independent of, or in addition to, the information provided by the client."
Equitania Insurance Co. v. Slone & Garrett, P.S.C. Supreme Court of Kentucky, 2006 191 S.W.3d 552 Pg. 88	Two different groups of shareholders, known as the Vimont group, sought control of Equitana Insurance company. Defendant, Laurel Garrett and her law firm, represented the Vimont group during the shareholder dispute. This action was brought against Garrett, claiming that she negligently advised them, was unethical, that she violated a fiduciary duty to shareholders and that she was too expensive.	"Kentucky should not allow lawyers to avoid liability for committing errors in judgment which the average reasonably prudent lawyer would not commit. Any avoidance of liability should only be allowed for errors of judgment made in absolute good faith."
TIG Insurance Co. v. Giffin Winning Cohen & Bodewes, P.C. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 2006 444 F.3d 587 Pg. 93	Plaintiff, TIG Insurance brought this professional malpractice action against defendants, a law firm and one of its attorneys. The law firm represented a university in a gender discrimination law suit brought by female professors. TIG insured this university and alleges that the firm committed malpractice when they failed to produce three gender study documents during discovery.	The elements of a legal malpractice action are: "'(1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship that establishes a duty on the part of the attorney; (2) a negligent act or omission constituting a breach of that duty; (3) proximate cause; and (4) damages.' . . . Legal cause, . . . is largely a question of foreseeability. The relevant inquiry is whether 'the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her conduct.' . . . The occurrence must have been 'reasonably' foreseeable: 'Not what actually happened, but what the reasonably prudent person would then have foreseen as likely to happen, is the key to the question of reasonableness.' . . ."
Jones Motor Co. v. Holtkamp, Liese, Beckmeier & Childress, P.C. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1999 197 F.3d 1190 Pg. 100	Jones Motor Co., plaintiff, brings this action for legal malpractice against its attorneys for failure to make a timely effective request for a jury. While the attorneys did make a request, they failed to include the appropriate fee for a jury trial, and as a result a judge heard the complaint.	". . . [E]ach party is deemed entitled to seek the 'protection' of the jury against being tried by a judge. . . . That entitlement, a real legal entitlement and not just a tactical opportunity to obtain a more favorable tribunal" has value to the party.
Vandermay v. Clayton Supreme Court of Oregon, En Banc, 1999 328 Or. 646 Pg. 104	Plaintiff, client, brought this action against defendant, lawyer for failure to draft a sale of property contract that properly limited liability for environmental contamination. After the sale, plaintiff was responsible for cleaning up the site that was sold for approximately $585,000. At trial, the court held that the foundation for the plaintiff's expert witness was inadequate, and defendant moved for a direct verdict arguing that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence without an expert. Court of appeals reversed finding that an expert witness was not necessary to determine that defendant did not follow plaintiff's instructions.	While "in most charges of negligence against professional persons, expert testimony is required to establish what the reasonable practice is in the community. . ." . . . "[e]xpert testimony is not required if, without an expert's opinion, the jury is capable of deciding whether the professional's conduct was reasonable."
Clark v. Rowe Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1998 428 Mass. 339 Pg. 111	Plaintiff, who was a client of an attorney and a borrower of a banker, brought both a legal malpractice action against her attorney, and a negligence and breach of fiduciary duty action against her banker, after she suffered losses in real estate investments. The trial judge found that plaintiff was 70% negligent and that attorney was only 30% negligent. Judge then applied the principles of comparative negligence and denied the plaintiff any recovery. Plaintiff appeals and claims that comparative negligence is inapplicable to her legal malpractice claim.	"Comparative fault appropriately applies to a client's claim of malpractice by a lawyer."
Shumsky v. Eisenstein Court of Appeals of New York, 2001 96 N.Y.2d 164 Pg. 115	Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant, Eisenstein for legal malpractice when he failed to keep them informed and even avoided plaintiff's inquiries. As a result of defendant's actions, the Statute of Limitations for the plaintiff's claims expired.	"The continuous representation doctrine, . . . 'recognizes that a person seeking professional assistance has a right to repose confidence in the professional's ability and good faith, and realistically cannot be expected to question and assess the techniques employed or the manner in which the services are rendered' . . . '[C]ontinuous representation%u201D in the context of a legal malpractice action does not automatically come to an end where, as here, pursuant to a retainer agreement, an attorney and client both explicitly anticipate continued representation."
Burdine v. Johnson United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, En Banc, 2001 262 F.3d 336 Pg. 137	Petitioner seeks habeas corpus relief form his capital murder conviction and death penalty sentence, claiming that his conviction was the result of ineffective assistance, when his counsel slept during the trial.	"The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of the right to effective assistance of counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. . ." and because "the Sixth Amendment serves solely to ensure a fair and reliable trial, any deficiencies in counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute ineffective assistance under the Constitution."
Wiley v. County of San Diego Supreme Court of California, 1998 19 Cal.4th 532 Pg. 145	Wiley brought this action for legal malpractice against his court appointed attorney after his conviction of battery causing serious bodily injury was overturned on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Defendants claim that plaintiff's actual innocence of the charged crimes is a necessary element of his legal malpractice claim.	Actual innocence is a necessary element of a former criminal defendant's legal malpractice action, and the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that, but for the negligence of his or her attorney, the jury could not have found him or her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Upjohn Co. v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1981 449 U.S. 383 Pg. 160	After discovering that some of Upjohn Co.'s employees may have made questionable payments to foreign government officials, Upjohn's general counsel conducted an investigation. The IRS then issued a summons to Upjohn requiring it to produce the investigation documents, which Upjohn refused to do asserting that the tax summons violated the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. The United States then sought to have the summons enforced.	The "privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience." Thus, the "[attorney-client] privilege applies when the client is a corporation. . . ." In addition, "the work-product doctrine does apply to IRS summonses" so that the "disclosure of documents and tangible things constituting attorney work product [is permitted] upon a showing of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship. . ." balanced with the court's obligation to "protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories of an attorney."
Stewart v. Falley's, Inc. United States District Court for the District of Kansas, 2001 2001 WL 1318371 Pg. 164	After discovering that plaintiff made a report of sexual harassment, Beverly Broxterman, Falley's Human Resources Director, contacted plaintiff to ask about the report, to which plaintiff responded by saying "talk to [my] lawyer." Broxterman proceeded to investigate the claims and draft a memorandum summarizing her investigation and opinion of plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff then filed a motion to compel disclosure of the memorandum.	"The party opposing discovery must show (1) that the material is a document or tangible thing, (2) that the material was prepared in anticipation of litigation, and (3) that the material was prepared by or for a party or by or for the party's attorney." After the necessary showing has been made, "the burden shifts to the party seeking discovery to show (1) a substantial need for the materials and (2) that the party is unable, without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent of the material by other means."
Stroh v. General Motors Corp. New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 1995 213 A.D.2d 267 Pg. 172	An action was brought against Mrs. Maychick by the 12 people she injured when she lost control of her car. During a deposition, co-defendant, GMC, questioned Mrs. Maychick regarding discussions between her and her attorney, which she refused to answer claiming attorney-client privilege. GMC filed a motion to compel Mrs. Maychick to answer its questions, asserting that the attorney-client privilege did not apply in this situation because Mrs. Maychick's daughter was present during the discussions.	"[C]ommunications made to counsel through ... one serving as an agent of ... [the] client to facilitate communication, generally will be privileged." Furthermore, the "scope of the privilege is not to be defined by a third party's employment or function; it rather depends upon whether the client had "a reasonable expectation of confidentiality under the circumstances"."
In re: Investigating Grand Jury (Stretton) Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2005 887 A.2d 257 Pg. 180	Attorney Samuel C. Stretton was held in contempt of court for calling upon the attorney-client privilege regarding statements his former client made to him after the representation had been formally terminated. The task of determining whether the attorney-client privilege applied in this situation made this a case of first impression for the Pennsylvania court.	"[D]ue to public policy considerations, all confidential communications and disclosures made by a client to his lawyer in the course of obtaining professional aid or advice is strictly privileged."
Swidler & Berlin v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1998 524 U.S. 399 Pg. 183	Petitioner, an attorney, took notes during an interview with his client nine days before the client committed suicide. The Government then issued subpoenas for those notes to use in a criminal investigation. Petitioners then filed a motion to quash, asserting that the notes were protected under the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine.	". . . the general rule is that the attorney-client privilege continues after death" and "the case law[] implicitl[y] accept[s] . . . the treatment of testamentary disclosure as an "exception" or an implied "waiver.""
Securities and Exchange Commission v. Cassano United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 1999 189 F.R.D. 83 Pg. 188	During discovery, the SEC inadvertently allowed a privileged document to be copied and produced to opposing counsel, only to discover the mistake 12 days later. Opposing counsel shared the privileged document with attorneys, clients, and others and, therefore, the SEC applied for an order to require opposing counsel to return the privileged document and to cease sharing the document.	The "inadvertent production of a privileged document does not waive the privilege unless the producing party's conduct" was so "careless as to surrender any claim that it has taken reasonable steps to ensure confidentiality." Moreover, "[i]n determining whether the production was inadvertent, courts consider (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent disclosure, (2) the time taken to rectify the error, (3) the scope of the discovery and extent of the disclosure, and (4) overarching issues of fairness."
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1962 263 Minn. 346 Pg. 198	Plaintiff requested that a settlement from a previous case, during which plaintiff was a minor, be vacated due to the fact that defendants had information, prior to the settlement, that was unknown by the plaintiff and the court. Due to the character of the concealment, the court vacated the settlement. Defendants then appealed the order to vacate the settlement.	"The court may vacate . . . a settlement [made on behalf of a minor] for mistake even though the mistake was not mutual . . . but where it is shown that one of the parties had additional knowledge with respect thereto and was aware that neither the court nor the adversary party possessed such knowledge when the settlement was approved."
Purcell v. District Attorney Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1997 424 Mass. 109 Pg. 206	During an interview with Joseph Tyree regarding Tyree's eviction from his apartment, Jeffrey Purcell, an attorney, learned of Tyree's intention to set the apartment building on fire. Purcell then notified the authorities in order to prevent the crime from happening. During a trial of Tyree for attempted arson, the District Attorney subpoenaed Purcell to testify regarding his conversation with Tyree. Invoking the attorney-client privilege, Purcell filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which was denied, and then brought this action.	"A statement of an intention to commit a crime made in the course of seeking legal advice is protected by the [attorney-client] privilege, unless the crime-fraud exception applies. That exception applies only if the client or prospective client seeks advice or assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct."
Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1974 497 F.2d 1190 Pg. 214	Plaintiffs sued defendants for violations of, among other things, the Securities Exchange Act. One named defendant, Charles Goldberg, was an attorney formerly employed with defendant's attorneys. When Goldberg later learned that he was named as a defendant he met with plaintiff's counsel and revealed confidential information regarding the case in order to defend himself.	". . . a lawyer may reveal confidences or secrets necessary to defend himself against 'an accusation of wrongful conduct.'"
State of Ex Re. Counsel for Discipline of Nebraska Supreme Court v. Lopez Wilson Supreme Court of Nebraska, 2001 262 Neb. 653 Pg. 220	An attorney, Joseph Lopez Wilson, represented Carlos Moreno in two matters. Subsequently, Wilson and Moreno became friends and Wilson represented Moreno in a few other matters, for which he did not charge because of their friendship. There was then a falling out between the two friends and Wilson, therefore, began threatening Moreno with disclosure of his confidential information if Moreno did not pay him for his previous representation.	". . . [the] disciplinary rule prohibiting disclosure of client confidences except in certain limited circumstances, including when an attorney reasonably believes disclosure is necessary for resolution of a fee dispute, does not permit an attorney to threaten a former client with disclosure of client confidences in order to resolve a fee dispute."
In the Matter of Anonymous Supreme Court of Indiana, 1995 655 N.E.2d 67 Pg. 229	The court issued an opinion for two separate cases, both of which revolved around similar violations of the rules of professional conduct. In the first case, the attorney defended a company against labor union grievances, for which the key witness was the labor union trustee since he negotiated the collective bargaining agreement between the company and the union. Despite the attorney's assertion that he did not expressly agree to be the trustee's attorney, the attorney met with, and received letters from, the trustee regarding the trustee's wrongful discharge allegation against the union. After this, the attorney brought an action for fraud on behalf of the company against the trustee based on his actions during the negotiation of the collective bargaining agreement.	"An attorney-client relationship need not be express, but may be implied by the conduct of the parties. . . . Such a relationship exists "only after both attorney and client have consented to its formation.""
Patriarca v. Center for Living & Working, Inc. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2002 438 Mass. 132 Pg. 244	The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for wrongful termination. During discovery, plaintiff admitted to communicating with some former employees of the defendant regarding events that happened during their employment. Defendant filed a motion for a protective order to bar plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney from having ex parte communication with defendant's former employees regarding the pending litigation.	An attorney is prohibited from having "ex parte contact . . . with certain employees of an organization, namely, those "who exercise managerial responsibility in the matter, who are alleged to have committed the wrongful acts at issue in the litigation, or who have authority on behalf of the corporation to make decisions about the course of the litigation.""
Moores v. Greenberg United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, 1987 834 F.2d 1105 Pg. 248	The plaintiff hired defendant, an attorney, to sue the owners of a ship that plaintiff was injured on. The plaintiff lost his case and then sued his attorney for malpractice because the attorney did not advise the plaintiff about a settlement offer.	". . . a lawyer must keep his client seasonably apprised of relevant developments, including opportunities for settlement. . . ."
Jones v. Barnes Supreme Court of the United States, 1983 463 U.S. 745 Pg. 250	The respondent was convicted of robbery and assault. Respondent was then assigned an attorney to represent him during his appeal, however, respondent's conviction was affirmed. Respondent then filed a petition for habeas corpus based on his claim of ineffective assistance by his appellate attorney because the attorney did not raise all of the issues that respondent requested be raised during the appeal.	"With the exception of . . . specified fundamental decisions, an attorney's duty is to take professional responsibility for the conduct of the case, after consulting with his client."
Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 528 U.S. 152 Pg. 258	Martinez was convicted of embezzlement. He then filed a notice of appeal, a motion to represent himself and a waiver of counsel. His motion to represent himself was denied.	"There is no constitutional right to self-representation on the initial appeal as of right. . . . The denial of self-representation at this level does not violate due process or equal protection guarantees."
Nichols v. Keller California Court of Appeal, 5th District, 1993 15 Cal.App.4th 1672 Pg. 264	Plaintiff, while working as a boilermaker, was injured by falling debris. Plaintiff hired defendant attorney Fulfer to file a worker's compensation claim and Fulfer then associated co-defendant attorney Keller to prosecute the claim. Neither Fulfer nor Keller advised Plaintiff of other legal remedies available to him. Later, while consulting another attorney, Plaintiff discovered that the statute of limitations had run out for the other remedies previously available to him.	"An attorney, by accepting employment to give legal advice or render legal services, impliedly agrees to use ordinary judgment, care, skill, and diligence in the performance of the tasks he or she undertakes. . . ."
Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar v. Hart Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1991 186 W. Va. 75 Pg. 272	In an attorney disciplinary hearing, the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State Bar recommended that attorney Hart's license to practice law be annulled because he had been convicted of assisting a client in filing a fraudulent tax return. Attorney Hart then claimed a right to an evidentiary mitigation hearing maintaining that he had a bona fide defense to the Committee's complaint.	" . . . an attorney's license shall be annulled upon proof that he has been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude or professional unfitness. . . ."
The Florida Bar v. Bailey Supreme Court of Florida, 2001 803 So.2d 683 Pg. 277	The Florida Bar filed a complaint against attorney F. Lee Bailey for alleged misconduct in violation of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar. One of the most egregious violations that Mr. Bailey was accused of was commingling his own funds with the funds of his client. The referee's findings concluded that Mr. Bailey should be found guilty of all of the alleged violations and, subsequently, Mr. Bailey sought a review of the referee's report.	A lawyer shall hold in trust, separate from the lawyer's own property, funds and property of clients or third persons that are in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation. In no event may the lawyer commingle the client's funds with those of the lawyer or those of the lawyer's law firm.
Hanlin v. Mitchelson United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1986 794 F.2d 834 Pg. 286	Hanlin brought this action against her attorney, Mitchelson, for legal malpractice after he refused to return her retainer fee. Hanln requested the return of the fee after Mitchelson refused to appeal an arbitral award that Hanlin was dissatisfied with.	"As between attorney and client, no special formality is required to effect the discharge of the attorney. 'Any act of the client indicating an unmistakable purpose to sever relations is enough.' . . . A client's malpractice suit against an attorney is enough to indicate that the client has terminated the relationship."
Fidelity National Title Ins. Co. v. Intercounty National Title Ins. Co. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 2002 310 F.3d 537 Pg. 291	Defendants in a civil suit hired a law firm to represent them, and Defendants agreed to pay the law firm an hourly fee plus reimbursement of expenses. Part way through the representation, the Defendants stopped paying the law firm for its services, and, thus, the law firm filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. The district judge denied the motion to withdraw as counsel and the law firm then appealed the decision.	"The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that lawyers are entitled to stop working when clients stop paying."
Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1998 185 Ill.2d 372 Pg. 296	Plaintiff, who, after being hired by a law firm, discovered that the law firm was violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Plaintiff notified one of the firm's principal partners of this violation and was told that it would be remedied. After Plaintiff repeatedly notified the principal partner of the violation, he was then terminated. The Plaintiff then brought an action against the law firm for retaliatory discharge.	"An attorney's obligation to follow the . . . Rules of Professional Conduct should not be the foundation for a claim of retaliatory discharge."
Eisenstein v. Conlin Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2005 444 Mass. 258 Pg. 300	Two attorneys left a firm, to start their own practice, and several clients moved over with them. The old firm brought an action to remit payment of new fees of these clients to the old firm, pursuant to a partnership agreement of the old firm.	There is a "strong public interest in allowing clients to retain counsel of their choice outweighs any professional benefits derived from" provisions that restrict "the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement." Thus, an agreement will be held unenforceable if there are obvious economic disincentives to competition that cannot reasonably be justified by any legitimate interest a company may have in its own survival.
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young Supreme Court of Utah, 2004 94 P.3d 179 Pg. 305	Young, an associate attorney for the defendant, Prince, Yeates and Geldzahler law firm, brought an action for breach of express contract. Young spent over two years working on a contingency fee law suit, and after the matter settled for $650,000, Young and the firm disagreed as to how much of the fee Young should receive and how much should go to the firm.	"In the relationship of a lawyer and his or her employer, there does exist a duty of honest and ethical behavior. Because of the privilege granted to engage in the practice of law, we impose upon members of our bar a fiduciary duty that encompasses the obligation to not compete with their employer . . ."
In the Matter of Fordham Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1996 423 Mass. 481 Pg. 317	The Board of Bar Overseers' brought this appeal for the dismissal of a petition for discipline against attorney Laurence Fordham for charging excessive fees. Fordham represented Timothy Clark on an OUI charge and billed him over $50,000 in attorneys fees.	In determining the reasonableness of a fee a court will consider these factors: "(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly. (2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer. (3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services. (4) The amount involved and the results obtained. (5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances. (6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. (7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services. (8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent." Also, "It cannot be that an inexperienced lawyer is entitled to charge three or four times as much as an experienced lawyer for the same service. A client "should not be expected to pay for the education of a lawyer when he spends excessive amounts of time on tasks which, with reasonable experience, become matters of routine."
Culpepper & Carroll, PLLC v. Cole Supreme Court of Louisiana, 2006 929 So.2d 1224 Pg. 326	Cole hired Culpepper to represent him in the will contest action of his mother's will. They agreed to a one-third contingency fee. Cole was offered a sum of the estate but thought he was entitled to more. After Culpepper refused to file suit to demand more, Cole terminated his representation, and was then unable to recover anything from his mother's will. Culpepper then brought suit against Cole for fees unpaid.	In the absence of a recovery, an attorney can not recover a contingency fee for his/her services.
Gagnon v. Shoblom Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1991 409 Mass. 63 Pg. 329	Gagnon hired an attorney, Mr. Goodman, to represent him in a case against Shoblom. Shoblom seriously injuryed Gagnon when he crashed into his parked trailer. Gagnon and Goodman agreed to a contingency fee, which would entitle Goodman to 33 1/3% of the recovery in the personal injury claim. After Gagnon received a settlement of $2,925,000, with $975,000 going to Goodman, the Superior Court held this fee was unconscionable, even though Gagnon testified that he thought the fee was reasonabe. Goodman appealed.	Where the client has "intelligently and freely" agreed to the amount of a fee, and where there is no challenge, the Court shall not overrule the amount.
Fogarty v. State Supreme Court of Georgia, 1999 270 Ga. 609 Pg. 335	Fogarty was charged with kidnapping, aggravated assault, simple battery and nine counts of stalking. His wife, without his consent, hired a defense attorney to represent him with an advance fee of $25,000, to be reduced to $10,000 should the charged be dismissed. The charges were not dismissed, the case went to trial and Fogarty was found guilty of six counts. On appeal Fogarty asserts that the fee agreement created a conflict of interest that affected his attorney's performance.	"'Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal cases, largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not produce a res with which to pay the fee.' . . . However, the fact that [an] agreement specified both a greater and a lesser fee, dependent upon the extent to which counsel's services would be required . . . does not make it an improper contingency fee contract." This is merely "an attempt to relate the fee to the time and service involved."
King v. Young, Berkman, Berman & Karpf District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1998 709 So.2d 572 Pg. 341	King retained the firm to represent him in his divorce and the fee agreement included a hourly rate with a $25,000 retainer. The fee agreement also contained a provision that allowed for a bonus fee at the conclusion of the trial, which would take into account the complexity of the trial and the results achieved. King brought this suit against the firm after they attempted to collect on the bonus fee. King asserts that the provision is unenforceable.	"An attorney's fee that includes an unenforceable contingency provision is void in its entirety."
Farrar v. Hobby Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 506 U.S. 103 Pg. 351	will enter later	will enter later
Ford v. Albany Medical Center New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, 2001 283 A.D.2d 843 Pg. 361	will complete later	will complete later
Gorman v. Grodensky New York Supreme Court, New York County, 1985 130 Misc.2d 837 Pg. 364	To enter later	to enter later
In Re Dresser Industries, Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 1992 972 F.2d 540 Pg. 376	to enter later	to enter later
Bottoms v. Stapleton Supreme Court of Iowa, 2005 706 N.W.2d 411 Pg. 383	to enter later	to enter later
Fiandaca v. Cunningham United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1987 827 F.2d 825 Pg. 389	This appeal concerns a class action law suit, involving twenty three female prison inmates. The district court held that the female inmates needed to have facilities with programs and services equivalent to those provided to mail inmates. This appeal was brought by several appellants, including Michael Cunningham, warden of the New Hampshire State Prison, and officials responsible for the operation of the New Hampshire Department of Corrections. The appellants assert that the district court's failure to disqualify the plaintiffs' class counsel, the New Hampshire Legal Assistance ("NHLA"), was an abuse of discretion due to an unresolvable conflict of interest.	Where the "combination of clients and circumstances [places an attorney] in the untenable position of being simultaneously obligated to represent vigorously the interests of two conflicting clients, it is inconceivable that [the attorney] could have properly performed the role of 'advocate' . . . regardless of its good faith or high intentions."
Holloway v. Arkansas Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 435 U.S. 475 Pg. 397	Petitioners, three codefendants at a state criminal trial in Arkansas, made timely motions, both a few weeks before the trial and before the jury was empaneled, for appointment of separate counsel, based on their appointed counsel's representations that, because of confidential information received from the codefendants, he was confronted with the risk of representing conflicting interests and could not, therefore, provide effective assistance for each client. The trial court denied these motions, and petitioners were subsequently convicted. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the record showed no actual conflict of interests or prejudice to petitioners.	1. The trial judge's failure either to appoint separate counsel or to take adequate steps to ascertain whether the risk of a conflict of interests was too remote to warrant separate counsel, in the face of the representations made by counsel before trial and again before the jury was empaneled, deprived petitioners of the guarantee of "assistance of counsel" under the Sixth Amendment. Pp. 435 U. S. 481-487.
Exterior Systems, Inc. v. Noble Composites, Inc. United States Disctrict Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 2001 175 F.Supp.2d 1112 Pg. 407	Defendant Welter's present counsel, Cynthia Gillard, is a member of a firm, Warrick & Boyn, that has represented Welter since 1972. In that year, Welter founded Fabwel, Inc. ("Fabwel") as an Indiana corporation that made fiberglass panels used in recreational vehicles. Welter served as Fabwel's majority shareholder, president and chief executive officer until he sold the company to ABF Investors, Inc. ("ABF") in 1987. Welter continued as president and chief executive officer of Fabwel under ABF's ownership. Warrick & Boyn continued to serve as counsel for Fabwel. As part of this representation, Attorney Gillard represented Fabwel in the purchase of Master Fab, Inc., a company owned and controlled by Defendant Larry Farver. Gillard prepared numerous contracts and other acquisition documents on behalf of Fabwel, including a February 10, 1988 non-competition/non-disclosure agreement between Fabwel and Larry Farver.	to enter later
Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co. Supreme Court of Ohio, 1998 81 Ohio St.3d 1 Pg. 415	The issue before the court is whether a law firm should be automatically disqualified from representing a party when an attorney leaves his or her former employment with a firm representing a party and joins the law firm representing the opposing party, or whether that law firm may overcome any presumption of shared confidences by instituting effective screening mechanisms. Although this issue has been dealt with in many other jurisdictions, this is a case of first impression for Ohio. To fairly decide this issue, we must consider the Disciplinary Rules and Ethical Considerations in the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, competing public policy interests, and the guidance provided by federal case law.	We find that under this set of egregious facts, the appearance of impropriety was so great that the attempts made by Duvin to erect a Chinese wall were insufficient to overcome the appearance of impropriety. Accordingly, we affirm the disqualification ruling of the court of appeals.
Mickens v. Taylor Supreme Court of the United States, 2002 535 U.S. 162 Pg. 427	Petitioner Mickens was convicted of the premeditated murder of Timothy Hall following a forcible sodomy. Petitioner was sentenced to death. Petitioner later filed a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he was denied effective assistance because one of his court-appointed attorneys has previously represented the victim, Timothy Hall. His attorney did not disclose this conflict of interest to the court.	To claim a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation, a defendant must show "both an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect even if the trial court failed to inquire into a potential conflict about which it reasonably should have known. . ."
In Re Sofaer District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1999 728 A.2d 625 Pg. 436	Respondent represented the country of Libya after two Libyans were charged with the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing everyone on board and 11 people in the town below. When Respondent's representation became public, he and his firm withdrew from the representation. They asserted "that the adverse public and governmental reaction made it impossible to accomplish the purposes for which they were retained."	to enter later
Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n. v. Mershon Supreme Court of Iowa, 1982 316 N.W.2d 895 Pg. 442	Respondent, Mershon, is an attorney who conducted tax and property work for Leonard O. Miller, who was a farmer. Miller owned 100 acres of farmland adjacent to a country club near the city and was interested in developing the property. After meeting with a land architect, Miller brought in Mershon to discuss the project and they decided that along with the land architect they would form a company and each contribute their services and, in Miller's instance, the land.	"Before making contract with client, attorney must fully disclose every relevant fact and circumstance which the client should know to make an intelligent decision concerning the wisdom of entering the agreement. . . . 'Full disclosure' required of lawyer who enters into a business transaction with client in which they have differing interests and client expects the lawyer to exercise his professional judgment for the protection of the client means more than making the client fully aware of the nature and terms of the transaction; attorney must see to it that client is fully informed of his own rights and interests in the subject matter and that client either has independent advice or receives from the attorney such advice as the latter would have been expected to give had the transaction been one between his client and a stranger."
Passante v. McWilliam California Court of Apeal for the Fourth District, 1997 53 Cal.App.4th 1240 Pg. 449	Passante, the corporate attorney for the baseball card company Upper Deck, entered into an agreement with the company to receive 3% of the company's stock in exchange for securing financing for the company. At no time did Passante tell the Upper Deck board that it might want to consult with another lawyer before it made its promise.	"In a business transaction with a client, notes our Supreme Court, a lawyer is obligated to give 'his client all that reasonable advice against himself that he would have given him against a third person.'"
In Re Blackwelder Supreme Court of Indiana, 1993 615 N.E.2d 106 Pg. 452	Respondent, an attorney in Indiana, was hired to appeal a default judgment against the Gosnells. After miscalculating a the deadline for filing a record, respondent missed the filing date for his clients. He then met with his clients and proposed to reimburse the Gosnells for their out of pocket expenses in connection with the appeal in exchange for their signature of a "release of claims and covenant not to sue" contract. The Gosnells later brought this malpractice suit against respondent.	". . . A lawyer shall not settle a claim of liability with an unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing . . . that independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith. . . . Such practices are still subject to close scrutiny but may not be subject to discipline under certain specific circumstances, where the client has been adequately advised in writing well in advance of final execution of any release or settlement. Providing to the client a copy of the proposed document so that it can be reviewed by independent counsel would further assure compliance with the intent of this rule."
In re Rinella Supreme Court of Illinois, 1997 175 Ill.2d 504 Pg. 455	Attorney is charged with having three inappropriate sexual relationships with three female clients, all of whom felt obligated to participate for fear that it would negatively affect their legal cases.	An attorney's misconduct does not have to be specifically proscribed by a disciplinary rule in order to be sanctioned. "The practice of law [is similar] to a public trust, [lawyers are charged] with maintaining public confidence in the system of justice by acting competently and with loyalty to the best interests of their clients." Additionally, "an attorney commits overreaching when he takes undue advantage of the position of influence he holds vis-a-vis a client."
In re Swihart Supreme Court of Indiana, 1988 517 N.E.2d 792 Pg. 461	Respondent represented a pregnant and unwed woman in the placement of her expected child with adoptive parents. Respondent and his wife then decided to adopt the child themselves and attempted to do so without directly informing the natural mother.	An attorney is prohibited from "abandoning his professional relationship for the sake of a personal interest." This includes using personal insights gained through confidential communications to take on a matter of personal importance.
People v. Conner Supreme Court of California, 1983 34 Cal.3d 141 Pg. 465	Defendant Conner was charged with armed robberies, burglaries, possession of stolen property and forgery. While awaiting the start of his trial, Defendant was waiting in a nearby jury room and attempted to escape by assaulting a deputy sheriff and by aiming a gun at the deputy district attorney, who ran out of the room. Defendant was charged with addition crimes steaming from this incident and all of the cases against Defendant were reassigned to a new deputy district attorney. Defendant, however, moved for a change of venue and a recusal of the judge and the entire DA's office claiming that there was an apparent conflict that created prejudice.	A motion to recuse will not be granted unless the evidence shows the conflict is "of such gravity as to render it unlikely that defendant will receive a fair trial unless recusal is ordered."
Hunter v. Earthgrains Company Bakery United States Court Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 2002 281 F.3d 144 Pg. 483	Employees brought a Title VII discrimination suit against their employer and the court held a summary judgment against them. In response, attorney for the employees, Hunter, filed another law suit and then another, alleging the same facts. Employer, Earthgrains, filed a motion seeking Rule 11 sanctions against Hunter for filing two subsequent lawsuits on the same facts. The court ruled against Hunter and prohibited her from practicing law in the western district of North Carolina for five years. Hunter appeals.	"We have recognized that maintaining a legal position to a court is only sanctionable when . . . the legal argument [has] 'absolutely no chance of success under the existing precedent.' . . . Although a legal claim may be so inartfully pled that it cannot survive a motion to dismiss, such a flaw will not in itself support Rule 11 sanctions only the lack of any legal or factual basis is sanctionable."
Lee v. American Eagle Airlines, Inc. United State District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 2000 93 F.Supp.2d 1322 Pg. 493	In a suit by an employee against an employer, employee prevailed and moved for attorneys fees and costs. The court held that the attorney was not entitled to fees due to courtroom misconduct, and attorney appealed.	"A finding that counsels' conduct 'constituted or was tantamount to bad faith' must precede any sanction levied pursuant to a court's inherent powers. . . . The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit requires that bad faith be shown by (1) 'clear evidence' or (2) 'harassment or delay or . . . other improper purposes.'"
Jorgenson v. County of Volusia United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, 1988 846 F.2d 1350 Pg. 503	Attorneys representing the owners of a bar that featured topless female dancers failed to mention controlling caselaw and were sanctioned by the court. Attorneys appeal, asserting that through their interpretation, the case law was not controlling.	Failure of counsel to cite clearly controlling case law violates Rule 11 and subjects attorneys to sanctions.
Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. United States Court Appeals for the Third Circuit, 1984 747 F.2d 863 Pg. 508	Lefteri and Athena Poulis filed suit against State Farm Fire and Casualty Company to recover under their insurance policy after a fire damaged their home. Attorney for the plaintiffs, Retos, missed all discover deadlines and the court dismissed the case with prejudice for plaintiffs' failure to comply with the orders to file the pre-trial statement. Retos filed a motion to reconsider alleging that he was sick, that his wife went into false labor, and that no other attorney in the firm could have taken over because they did not speak Greek and the plaintiffs spoke only Greek. The district court denied the motion for reconsideration and the plaintiffs brought this suit.	In determining whether to reverse a dismissal of a case for failure to respond to discovery, a court will consider the following factors: "(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense."
Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Visser Supreme Court of Iowa, 2001 629 N.W.2d 376 Pg. 514	Respondent, Kevin J. Visser, is an attorney who represented one of his former business clients who ended up in litigation. When contacted by a newspaper reporter about the case, Visser provided a written statement that outlined the case. Visser was then charged and found guilty of violating a disciplinary rule that prohibits extrajudicial statements by a lawyer involved in civil litigation.	"In order for [a restriction on extrajudicual statements by lawyers involved in civil litigation] to pass constitutional muster, the statements made here must have been reasonably likely to affect the fairness of the proceedings."
In the Matter of Estate of Waters Supreme Court of Delaware, 1994 647 A.2d 1091 Pg. 520	Elizabeth Waters was an ailing widow when Lilian Young, Waters' cousin, moved in with her to provide care. This action was brought by Claire Trent, granddaughter to Waters, challenging the will which left everything to Young on the basis of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity.	Attorneys are banned from appearing as an advocate and also as a witness "in a case which he or she is handling on behalf of a client."
People v. DePallo Court of Appeals of New York, 2001 96 N.Y.2d 437 Pg. 525	Defendant was charged with calculated attack of a 71-year-old man. Prior to the trial defendant had told his counsel that he was present at the scene. Defendant insisted on testifying and his counsel let him know that the testimony had to be truthful. While on the stand, Defendant said that he was home the entire night and previously made contrary statement while under duress of the police officers. Counsel then conducted an ex parte meeting with the judge, during which he informed him that his client had perjured himself against counsel's orders. Defendant brought this action on appeal, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel.	"[A] defendant's right to testify at trial does not include a right to commit perjury . . . and the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel does not compel counsel to assist or participate in the presentation of perjured testimony . . . [C]ounsel must first attempt to persuade the client not to pursue the unlawful course of conduct. If unsuccessful, withdrawal from representation may be an appropriate response, but when confronted with the problem during trial . . . an 'attorney's revelation of his client's perjury to the court is a professionally responsible and acceptable response.'"
Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker Supreme Court of California, 1989 47 Cal.3d 863 Pg. 531	Sheldon Appel brought this suit against Albery and Oliker, a law firm, for malicious prosecution after the firm repeatedly brought suit for contract issues relating to the sale of an apartment building, despite prior rulings in Appel's favor. The court here determines the standard for probable cause in filing a law suit.	"[A]n appeal could properly be found frivolous only if 'any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit. . . any definition [of frivolousness] must be read so as to avoid a serious chilling effect on the assertion of litigants' rights. . . . Counsel and their clients have a right to present issues that are arguably correct, even if it is extremely unlikely that they will win.'"
Morrell v. State Supreme Court of Alaska, 1978 575 P.2d 1200 Pg. 541	Defendant brought this appeal after he was convicted of kidnapping, assault with intent to commit rape and eight counts of forcible rape. He asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel after his attorney, Cline, was given a written kidnapping plan, approached the Alaska Bar Association for an advisory opinion on what to do with it, and gave the plan back to the person who originally gave it to him with advice to turn it into police.	"[A] criminal defense attorney must turn over to the prosecution real evidence that the attorney obtains from his client. Further, if the evidence is obtained from a non-client third party who is not acting for the client, then the privilege to refuse to testify concerning the manner in which the evidence was obtained is inapplicable."
Kentucky Bar Association v. Geisler Supreme Court of Kentucky, 1997 938 S.W.2d 578 Pg. 554	Respondent, Geisler, brought an action on behalf of Milton F. McNealy for injuries he sustained when he was struck by car while walking along the street. McNealy was in such poor health that he was never able to give a deposition and he died shortly thereafter. Respondent then contacted the defendant and initiated settlement negotiations without informing the other party of her client's demise.	"[C]andor and honesty necessarily require disclosure of such a significant fact as the death of one's client. Opposing counsel does not have to deal with his adversary as he would deal in the marketplace. Standards of ethics require greater honesty, greater candor, and greater disclosure, even though it might not be in the interest of the client or his estate. . . A misrepresentation can occur if the lawyer incorporates or affirms a statement of another person that the lawyer knows is false. Misrepresentations can also occur by failure to act."
State ex Rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Smolen Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2000 17 P.3d 456 Pg. 571	Attorney, Smolen, was disciplined for making a loan to his client for living expenses during the period of representation. Smolen appeals the decision, seeking an exception to the ethical rule.	"The evils associated with champerty and maintenance intended to be prevented by [the rule against making loans to clients] are: (1) clients selecting a lawyer based on improper factors, and (2) conflicts of interest, including compromising a lawyer's independent judgment in the case and creating the potentially conflicting roles of the lawyer as both lawyer and creditor with divergent interests. . ." Thus regardless of humanitarian intent, a lawyer may not loan moneys to his clients.
In re R.M.J. Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 455 U.S. 191 Pg. 579	Appellant is an attorney who, after graduating law school and starting his own law practice, mailed out professional cards to promote himself and also placed several advertisements in local newspaper and yellow pages. The Missouri Advisory Committee brought charges against him for publishing the advertisements which listed areas of practice that were not approved by the Committee and for sending out announcement cards in violation of a professional rule of conduct.	"Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely."
Walker v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee Supreme Court of Tennessee, 2001 38 S.W.3d 540 Pg. 590	Appellant, Walker, is a divorce attorney that advertises his services by placing short ads in local newspapers which state a flat rate fee for divorce settlements in uncontested divorces. The Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee brought two petitions for discipline against him for placing the ads. In response Walker claims that the professional responsibility code violates the First Amendment.	"The fact that the regulation requires disclosure rather than prohibition tends to make it less objectionable under the First Amendment." This requirement must be reasonably related to promoting a substantial interest of the State.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 436 U.S. 477 Pg. 599	The Ohio State Bar Association brought this disciplinary proceeding against appellant for his solicitations of clients while they are in a hospital room or at an accident site.	"The solicitation of business by a lawyer through direct, in-person communication with the prospective client has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession's ideal of the attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to the prospective client. . . . [T]he State does not lose its power to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public whenever speech is a component of that activity."
The Florida Bar v. Barrett Supreme Court of Florida, 2005 897 So.2d 1269 Pg. 610	Attorney Barrett, is charged with numerous counts of misconduct involving schemes to solicit new clients. Barrett hired Cooper, an ordained minister, to find him clients by visiting hospitals and accident sites. Cooper would dress as a pastor, pray with the victims and families and then hand them Barrett's business card.	When determining a proper sanction for attorneys who are found guilty of misconduct, the court will consider the three purposes of lawyer discipline. "[T]he judgment must be fair to society, . . . the judgment must be fair to the respondent, [and] . . . the judgment must be severe enough to deter others who might be prone or tempted to become involved in like violations." The court will also consider any substantial aggravating circumstances.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1995 515 U.S. 618 Pg. 621	Attorney Stewart McHenry and his lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc., brought this action challenging the constitutionality of two rules of the Florida Bar Association. Petitioner asserts that the rules, which place limitations on attorneys' advertising, violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The rules create a thirty-day period after an accident during which lawyers may have no direct or indirect contact with individual accident victims or their families for the purposes of soliciting their business.	Attorney advertising is commercial speech that is "accorded a measure of First Amendment protection. . . . Such First Amendment protection, of course, is not absolute. We have always been careful to distinguish commercial speech from speech at the First Amendment's core." Thus, commercial speech restrictions must pass intermediate scrutiny.
Quercia v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1933 289 U.S. 466 Pg. 635	Petitioner was convicted of violating the Narcotic Act and brought this action to appeal based on the jury instructions the trial judge gave at the close of the trial. Petitioner asserts that the judge committed prejudicial error and exceeded the bounds of fair comment by telling the jurors that hand wiping during testimony is a sure sign of lying and that Petitioner was wiping his hands throughout his testimony.	"[A judge's] discretion is not arbitrary and uncontrolled, but judicial, to be exercised in conformity with the standards governing the judicial office. In commenting upon testimony, he may not assume the role of a witness. He may analyze and dissect the evidence, but he may not either distort it or add to it. His privilege of comment in order to give appropriate assistance to the jury is too important to be left without safeguards against abuses."
In re Sheldon Schapiro Supreme Court of Florida, 2003 845 So.2d 170 Pg. 641	Judge Schapiro is charged with 11 counts of judicial misconduct for various comments and antics in his courtroom, many which involved sarcasm, swear words, and general rudeness. In one such instance he cut off a criminal defense attorney by saying "Do you know what I think of your argument?", and then he pushed a button on a machine that simulated the sound of a toilet flushing.	"To undermine public confidence and respect by such serious violations strikes at the very roots of an effective judiciary, for those who are served by the courts will not have confidence in and respect for the courts' judgments if judges engage in this egregious conduct."

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