Tort Law and Alternatives

Franklin, Rabin, Green
8th Edition
ISBN: 1599410354

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Page	Case Name	Citation	Court	Audio
3	Hammontree v. Jenner	97 Cal. Rptr. 739	Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, 1971	Download
35	Brown v. Kendall	60 Mass. 292	Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850	Download
44	United States v. Carroll Towing Co.	159 F.2d 169	United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947	Download
60	Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman	275 U.S. 66	Supreme Court of the United States, 1927	Download
62	Pokora v. Wabash Ry.	292 U.S. 98	U.S. Supreme Court, 1934	Download
66	Andrews v. United Airlines	24 F.3d 39	United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1994	Download
69	Trimarco v. Klein	56 N.Y.2d 98, 436 N.E.2d 502, 451 N.Y.S.2d 52	Court of Appeals of New York, 1982	Download
75	Martin v. Herzog	126 N.E. 814	New York Court of Appeals, 1920	Download
92	Byrne v. Boadle	159 Eng. Rep. 299	Court of Exchequer, 1863	Download
95	McDougald v. Perry	716 So. 2d 783	Supreme Court of Florida, 1998	Download
157	Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California	551 P.2d 334	Supreme Court of California, 1976	Download
168	Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District	720 N.E.2d 886	Court of Appeals of New York, 1999	Download
230	Riss v. New York	22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897.	New York Court of Appeals, 1968	Download
347	Zuchowicz v. United States	140 F.3d 381	U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1998	Download
375	Summers v. Tice	199 P.2d 1	Supreme Court of California, 1948	Download
406	In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co.	3 K.B. 560	Court of Appeal, 1921	Download
409	Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd.	A.C. 388	Privy Council, 1961	Download
425	Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.	162 N.E. 99	Court of Appeals of New York, 1928	Download
475	Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.	166 N.E. 173	New York Court of Appeals, 1929	Download
497	Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.	529 U.S. 861	Supreme Court of the United States, 2000	Download
506	Fletcher v. Rylands	L.R. 1 Ex. 265	In the Exchequer Chamber, 1866	Download
519	Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co.	916 F.2d 1174	United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1990	Download
550	MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.	111 N.E. 1050	New York Court of Appeals, 1916	Download
556	Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno	150 P.2d 436	Supreme Court of California, 1944	Download
596	Hood v. Ryobi America Corp.	181 F.3d 608	United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1999	Download
682	Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.	257 N.E.2d 870	Court of Appeals of New York, 1970	Download
718	McDougald v. Garber	536 N.E.2d 372	Court of Appeals of New York, 1989	Download
749	State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell	538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit)	Supreme Court of the United States, 2003	Download
885	Garratt v. Dailey	46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091	Supreme Court of Washington, 1955	Download
934	Courvoisier v. Raymond	47 P. 284	Supreme Court of Colorado, 1896	Download
937	Katko v. Briney	183 N.W.2d 657	Supreme Court of Iowa, 1971	Download
943	Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.	124 N.W. 221	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910	Download
1028	New York Times Co. v. Sullivan	376 U.S. 254	Supreme Court of the United States, 1964	Download
1052	Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.	418 U.S. 323	Supreme Court of the United States, 1974	Download
1167	Nader v. General Motors Corp.	255 N.E.2d 765	Court of Appeals of New York, 1970	Download
1181	Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc.	44 F.3d 1345 (Torts Edit)	United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1995
18	Christensen v. Swenson	874 P.2d 125	Supreme Court of Utah, 1994	Download
24	Roessler v. Novak	858 So.2d 1158	Florida District Court of Appeal, 2003	Download
40	Adams v. Bullock	227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93	Court of Appeals of New York, 1919	Download
50	Bethel v. New York City Transit Authority	92 N.Y.2d 348, 703 N.E.2d 1214, 681 N.Y.S.2d 201	Court of Appeals of New York, 1998	Download

Case Information	Fact Summary	Rule of Law
Hammontree v. Jenner Court of Appeal of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, 1971 97 Cal. Rptr. 739 Pg. 3	Defendant suffers seizure while driving and crashes into plaintiff's business and causes personal injury and property damage.	1. "Users of the streets and highways" are subject to the principles of negligence. 2. If the risk is not reasonably foreseeable, then the driver is not liable for negligence.
Brown v. Kendall Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850 60 Mass. 292 Pg. 35	Two dogs are fighting in the presence of their masters. The defendant tries to separate the dogs with a stick beating, and accidentally strikes plaintiff in the eye.	In order to recover for unintentional harm, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that defendant failed to meet at least an ordinary level of care.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 159 F.2d 169 Pg. 44	Carroll Towing (defendant) is towing a line of barges, including the "Anna C" (owned by Connors, plaintiff). Connors does not place an employee on board its barge. The "Anna C" breaks away from the line of barges and crashes into a tanker.	The "Hand Formula": if B < P*L, and the actor does not take the adequate precaution (B), then the actor has breached a legal duty. B = "the burden of adequate precautions." P = "the probability" that injury will result. L = "the gravity of the resulting injury"
Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Goodman Supreme Court of the United States, 1927 275 U.S. 66 Pg. 60	Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. Instead of getting out of his car and checking for an oncoming train, plaintiff relies on his hearing and drives on. Train (defendant) strikes and kills our hapless plaintiff.	When the standard of care is clear, it should be "laid down once and for all by the Courts" as a question of law. NOTE: THIS IS NO LONGER GOOD LAW. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry.
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. U.S. Supreme Court, 1934 292 U.S. 98 Pg. 62	Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. He stops and tries to look, but proceeds without getting out of his car for a better vantage point. Train (defendant) strikes and injures plaintiff.	The standard of care in negligence cases is "for the judgment of a jury". In other words, the determination of duty and breach is a question of fact, not law.
Andrews v. United Airlines United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1994 24 F.3d 39 Pg. 66	Suitcase fell on the head of passenger.	Common carriers have a duty of the utmost care.
Trimarco v. Klein Court of Appeals of New York, 1982 56 N.Y.2d 98, 436 N.E.2d 502, 451 N.Y.S.2d 52 Pg. 69	Plaintiff was injured while exiting the bathtub in his rented apartment. The bathtub had a screen of normal, untempered glass, which shattered unexpectedly and suddenly, severely injuring him. At the time, it was ordinary and recommended practice to use plastic or tempered safety glass, which had been treated with shatterproof material, in shower or bath enclosures. Plaintiff could not have known the glass was not safety glass.	By examining the common and reasonable practice of a business, the evidence of custom and usage can be proved. A common practice, however, is not "necessarily a conclusive or even compelling test of negligence."
Martin v. Herzog New York Court of Appeals, 1920 126 N.E. 814 Pg. 75	Plaintiff's buggy collides with defendant's automobile, and plaintiff dies. Plaintiff is driving without his headlights on, which violates a statute.	Breach of a statutory duty can also constitute CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PER SE, subject to the same requirements: 1) plaintiff is a member of the class of persons that the statute is designed to protect, AND 2) harm is of the character that the statute is designed to prevent. Finally, Cardozo states that negligence per se, like all negligence, must be causally connected to the injury.
Byrne v. Boadle Court of Exchequer, 1863 159 Eng. Rep. 299 Pg. 92	Plaintiff was walking along a highway when he was struck by a barrel of flour that was being lowered from defendant's window. Defendant was a flour dealer. Plaintiff submitted no evidence of negligence other than the facts above, arguing that negligence was established under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant argued that plaintiff must submit some direct evidence of negligence.	There is a presumption of negligence where "the defendant had the entire possession and exclusive use of this warehouse...", and a barrel of flour, owned by the defendant, was lowered from the warehouse and fell on plaintiff; The burden is on the defendant to show that he was not negligent.
McDougald v. Perry Supreme Court of Florida, 1998 716 So. 2d 783 Pg. 95	Plaintiff was driving on a highway when his vehicle was struck by a tire that came loose from defendant's tractor-trailer. Defendant, although he did inspect the car before the trip, including the tire, did not check thoroughly enough to see if the tire was fastened absolutely. After the accident, the defendant noticed that the chain holding the tire in place had slipped off, freeing the tire. The question before the court is whether res ipsa loquitur applies.	"[O]n the basis of common experience and as a matter of general knowledge, [this type of accident] would not occur but for the failure to exercise reasonable care [. . .] the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is particularly applicable in wayward wheel cases." This case is essentially no different from Byrne v. Boadle.
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California Supreme Court of California, 1976 551 P.2d 334 Pg. 157	On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Plaintiffs, Tatiana's parents, allege that two months earlier Poddar confided his intention to kill Tatiana to Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist. They allege that on Moore's request, the campus police briefly detained Poddar, but released him when he appeared rational. They further claim that Dr. Harvey Powelson, Moore's superior, then directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar. No one warned plaintiffs of Tatiana's peril.	Court concluded that public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.
Uhr v. East Greenbush Central School District Court of Appeals of New York, 1999 720 N.E.2d 886 Pg. 168	Plaintiff student was screened for scoliosis as part of a school program in the 7th grade, but not in the 8th grade. In 9th grade, she was screened for scoliosis by her school and tested positive. The condition had progressed to the point where surgery was required.	When determining whether a statute gives rise to an implied private cause of action, a court must determine: "(1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose; and (3) whether creation of such a right would be consistent with the legislative scheme."
Riss v. New York New York Court of Appeals, 1968 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897. Pg. 230	Plaintiff was harassed by a rejected suitor, who claimed he would kill or seriously injure her if she dated someone else. Plaintiff repeatedly asked for police protection and was ignored. After the news of her engagement, the plaintiff was again threatened and called the police to no avail. The next day, a thug, sent by the rejected suitor, partially blinded the plaintiff and disfigured her face.	The municipality does not have a duty to provide police protection to an individual. It has a duty to the public as a whole, but no one in particular.
Zuchowicz v. United States U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, 1998 140 F.3d 381 Pg. 347	Defendant prescribes an overdose of drug to plaintiff, who fills and consumes the prescription for a period of a month. Thereafter, plaintiff begins taking the correct dosage, but ultimately develops lung disease as a side effect and dies.	Test for "but for" causation: If (1) "a negligent act [is] deemed wrongful because that act INCREASES THE CHANCES that a particular type of accident [will] occur", and (2) "a mishap of that very sort [does] happen": THEN there is a rebuttable PRESUMPTION that the negligent behavior caused the harm, and the BURDEN shifts to the defendant to "bring in evidence denying but for cause and suggesting that in the actual case the wrongful conduct had not been a substantial factor."
Summers v. Tice Supreme Court of California, 1948 199 P.2d 1 Pg. 375	Plaintiff and two defendants were hunting quail on the open range. Both defendants shot at the quail, firing in the plaintiff's direction. As a result, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his eye and upper lip.	In situations where plaintiff is injured as a result of defendants negligence, yet it is impossible for plaintiff to determine which defendant caused what injury, the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the whole injury to plaintiff as joint tort feasors. The burden is on the defendants to explain the cause of the injury.
In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. Court of Appeal, 1921 3 K.B. 560 Pg. 406	A ship carrying a cargo of petrol was set fire and destroyed. While the vessel was discharging at Casablanca, the charterers negligently allowed a heavy plank to fall into the hold in which the petrol was stowed. The plank caused an explosion, which set fire to the vessel.	The fall of the board was due to the negligence of the charterers' servants, the charterers were liable for all the direct consequences of the negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated; and they were therefore liable for the loss of the ship by fire.
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. Privy Council, 1961 A.C. 388 Pg. 409	Defendants had carelessly let oil spill from their ship into Sydney harbor. Oil was carried to wharf, which was used for repair work on other ships. The oil caught fire, and caused great damage.	The test of liability for the damage done by fire was the foreseeability of the injury by fire and, as a reasonable man would not, on the facts of this case, have foreseen such injury, the appellants were not liable in negligence for the damage, although their servants' carelessness was the direct cause of the damage.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 162 N.E. 99 Pg. 425	Two guards, employed by defendant, helped a man get on a moving train. The man was holding a package, which he dropped. The package was full of fireworks and exploded, causing a scale to fall many feet away and injure plaintiff. There was no way for the guards to know the contents of the package.	For an act to be negligent, unless that act is imminently dangerous, a duty of care is owed to a foreseeable plaintiff. There is a split of authority on duty of care. Cardozo, writing for the majority, adopted a narrow view of the duty of care: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. . . ." Andrews, dissenting, adopts a broad view: "Where there is the unreasonable act, and some right that may be affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not result. . . . Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain."
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co. New York Court of Appeals, 1929 166 N.E. 173 Pg. 475	Young man (plaintiff) visits amusement park (defendant) and steps onto a ride called the "Flopper." He indeed flops, and suffers injury.	"One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and necessary."
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. Supreme Court of the United States, 2000 529 U.S. 861 Pg. 497	Plaintiff, while driving a 1987 Honda Accord, collided with a tree and was seriously injured. The car was equipped with manual shoulder and lap belts, which the plaintiff had buckled up, but the car was not equipped with airbags or other passive restraint devices.	The court applied a narrow reading of the pre-emption provision, excluding common law actions. Thus, the court held that a common law "no airbag" action, conflicted with FMVSS 208.
Fletcher v. Rylands In the Exchequer Chamber, 1866 L.R. 1 Ex. 265 Pg. 506	Defendant contracts to build a reservoir on his land, which is located on top of old coal mines that are connected to the mines constructed by the plaintiff on a separate parcel of land. The reservoir fails, and water falls into the old mines, eventually flooding plaintiff's mines.	"[T]hat the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape."
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1990 916 F.2d 1174 Pg. 519	Defendant is a manufacturer of acrylonitrile, a highly flammable and toxic chemical. Defendant contracted to ship 20,000 gallons of acrylonitrile by railroad. While the car filled with the chemical was being switched to a different line at plaintiff's railroad yard, a leak was discovered. 4,000 gallons of acrylonitrile was spilled in the rail yard before the leak could be stopped. Plaintiff was ordered by the state of Illinois to pay for decontamination measures.	A shipper/manufacturer of acrylonitrile should not be held strictly liable for a spill occuring during transportation; A negligence liability standard is adequate.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. New York Court of Appeals, 1916 111 N.E. 1050 Pg. 550	Buick (defendant) sells car to dealer. Dealer sells car to customer (plaintiff). Customer suffers injury because of a car defect that could have been detected by Buick's reasonable inspection.	Manufacturer negligence liability is based on three elements, as stated by Cardozo in the opinion: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a THING OF DANGER. If to the element of danger there is added KNOWLEDGE THAT THE THING WILL BE USED BY PERSONS OTHER THAN THE PURCHASER, and used WITHOUT NEW TESTS, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully."
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno Supreme Court of California, 1944 150 P.2d 436 Pg. 556	Coca Cola bottle explodes in waitress's (plaintiff) hand as she is stocking the refrigerator.	Traynor's concurrence is the key takeaway from this case: "a manufacturer incurs an ABSOLUTE LIABILITY when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings."
Hood v. Ryobi America Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 1999 181 F.3d 608 Pg. 596	Plaintiff lost part of his thumb and lacerated his leg when he removed the blade guards from his new Ryobi miter saw and then used the unguarded saw for home carpentry.	Maryland does not require and encyclopedic warning. Instead, a warning need only be one that is reasonable under the circumstances.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 257 N.E.2d 870 Pg. 682	Defendant is the operator of a cement plant. Plaintiff sues for private nuisance, due to dirt, smoke, vibration, and particulate contamination coming from defendant's plant.	Where the benefit of an injuction against a nuisance is greatly outweighed by its costs, a court may allow payment of permenant damages to the plaintiff in lieu of injuctive relief.
McDougald v. Garber Court of Appeals of New York, 1989 536 N.E.2d 372 Pg. 718	Plaintiff underwent a Caesarean section and tubal ligation at New York Infirmary. During the surgery the plaintiff suffered oxygen deprivation which resulted in severe brain damage and left her in a permanent comatose condition. The dispute concerned what nonpecuniary damages should have been awarded to the plaintiff.	Cognitive awareness is a prerequiste to recovery for loss of enjoyment of life. There must be some type of awareness in order for a plaintiff to recover this type of damage award.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit) Pg. 749	Although investigators and witnesses concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability, declined to settle the ensuing claims for the $ 50,000 policy limit, ignored its own investigators' advice, and took the case to trial, assuring Campbell and his wife that they had no liability for the accident, that State Farm would represent their interests, and that they did not need separate counsel. In fact, a Utah jury returned a judgment for over three times the policy limit, and State Farm refused to appeal.	A punitive damages award of $ 145 million, where full compensatory damages are $ 1 million, is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Garratt v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington, 1955 46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 Pg. 885	A five-year-old boy moved a lawn chair from under Plaintiff while she was in the process of sitting down. Plaintiff suffered a broken hip and brings a battery charge against the child.	A court need only find that the defendant behaved with "substantial certainty" that contact would result in order to hold defendant liable for battery. No further finding of intent is necessary.
Courvoisier v. Raymond Supreme Court of Colorado, 1896 47 P. 284 Pg. 934	Jewelry store owner (defendant) awakes to find unknown persons attempting to break into his store. Owner fires warning shot and chases persons out of building. Outside, police apprehend suspects, and one officer (plaintiff) approaches jewelry store. Owner, unaware of approaching man's identity, shoots the officer	In order for a claim of self-defense to be valid, the defendant's fears must be "reasonable under the circumstances" (in addition to a genuine ("honest") belief). Thus, self-defense has both an objective and subjective component.
Katko v. Briney Supreme Court of Iowa, 1971 183 N.W.2d 657 Pg. 937	Plaintiff was shot by a spring powered shotgun trap set up inside defendant's unoccupied farm house. There was no warning about the gun trap and it could not be seen from the outside.	Landowners do not have the right to use lethal force to protect property from intrusion unless the intruder "threatens death or serious bodily harm to the occupiers [...] of the premises."
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 124 N.W. 221 Pg. 943	Defendant moors his boat to plaintiff's dock, pursuant to contract to unload cargo. A storm develops, however, and defendant keeps boat moored to dock, adhering to custom. Boat buffets the dock and causes $500 damage to the dock.	Even when necessity provides a valid defense to trespass, the would-be trespasser must pay compensatory relief for damage caused to property.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 376 U.S. 254 Pg. 1028	Plaintiff claimed he was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The ad charged that the plaintiff, among others, had been involved with an unprecedented wave of terror against members of the civil rights movement in the south. The court determined the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.	The court held that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 323 Pg. 1052	The principle issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements. The case arose from an article that falsely accused plaintiff of being a communist and engaging in communist activities.	"[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."
Nader v. General Motors Corp. Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 255 N.E.2d 765 Pg. 1167	The plaintiff had for some years been an articulate and severe critic of General Motors' products from the standpoint of safety and design. Plaintiff complained that defendant, General Motors, engaged in intimidation tactics against him in order to suppress plaintiff's criticism and prevent his disclosure of damaging information. Plaintiff claims these intimidation tactics were an invasion of his privacy.	The court held that the mere gathering of information about a particular individual does not give rise to a cause of action under this theory. Privacy is invaded only if the information sought is of a confidential nature and the defendant's conduct was unreasonably intrusive.
Desnick v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1995 44 F.3d 1345 (Torts Edit) Pg. 1181	ABC's Primetime Live sent undercover reporters to an ophthalmic office to see Drs. who were allegedly recommending cataract surgery unnecessarily.	When subversive patients tape record their visits to a Drs. office, there is no invasion of privacy.
Christensen v. Swenson Supreme Court of Utah, 1994 874 P.2d 125 Pg. 18	Swenson, while on duty as a gate guard, left her post to pick up lunch. While in her car, she struck and injured Christensen who was on a motorcycle. Christensen brings suit against Swenson and her employer, Burns, under the theory of respondeat superior.	"[E]mployers are vicariously liable for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment."
Roessler v. Novak Florida District Court of Appeal, 2003 858 So.2d 1158 Pg. 24	Plaintiff, diagnosed as having a perforated viscus, was evaluated by a doctor at Sarasota Memorial Hospital. Plaintiff claims that the doctor was negligent in his evaluation of his abdominal scans and that the hospital is vicariously liable for the doctor's actions.	"[A] hospital may be held vicariously liable for the acts of physicians, even if they are independent contractors, if these physicians act with the apparent authority of the hospital."
Adams v. Bullock Court of Appeals of New York, 1919 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 Pg. 40	Plaintiff, a twelve-year-old boy, was walking on bridge over a trolley line while swinging an 8-foot wire. When the boy's wire and the trolley line came in contact the boy was shocked and burned.	When in lawful exercise of its franchise, a company will not be liable for those dangers that are not within the ordinary prevision.
Bethel v. New York City Transit Authority Court of Appeals of New York, 1998 92 N.Y.2d 348, 703 N.E.2d 1214, 681 N.Y.S.2d 201 Pg. 50	Plaintiff was injured when falling to the floor of a New York city bus after a wheelcahir accessible seat collapsed. Plaintiff argues that Defendant was on constructive notice that the seat had a defect due to a recent repair to the seat, and that Defendant failed to properly inspect the seat.	"[A] common carrier is subject to the same duty of care as any other potential tortfeasor-reasonable care under all of the circumstances of the particular case."