Torts: Cases and Materials

Prosser, Wade, Schwartz
11th Edition
ISBN: 1587788748

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Page	Case Name	Citation	Court	Audio
5	Weaver v. Ward	80 Eng. Rep. 284	King's Bench, England, 1616	Download
6	Brown v. Kendall	60 Mass. 292	Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850	Download
10	Cohen v. Petty	62 App.D.C. 187, 65 F.2d 820	Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 1933	Download
13	Spano v. Perini Corp.	250 N.E.2d 31	Court of Appeals of New York, 1969	Download
17	Garratt v. Dailey	46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091	Supreme Court of Washington, 1955	Download
20	Spivey v. Battaglia	258 So.2d 815	Supreme Court of Florida, 1972	Download
24	Ranson v. Kitner	31 Ill.App. 241	Appellate Court of Illinois, 1889	Download
25	McGuire v. Almy	8 N.E.2d 760	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937	Download
28	Talmage v. Smith	101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1894	Download
29	Cole v. Turner	6 Modern Rep. 149, 90 Eng.Rep. 958	Nisi Prius, 1704	Download
30	Wallace v. Rosen	765 N.E.2d 192	Court of Appeals of Indiana, 2002	Download
35	Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc	424 S.W.2d 627	Supreme Court of Texas, 1967	Download
37	I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S.	Assisarum, folio 99, placitum 60	At the Assizes, 1348 or 1349	Download
37	Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill	25 Ala.App. 540, 150 So. 709	Court of Appeals of Alabama, 1933	Download
40	Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Newman	461 S.W.2d 195	Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 1970	Download
42	Parvi v. City of Kingston	41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161	Court of Appeals of New York, 1977	Download
44	Hardy v. LaBelle's Distributing Co.	203 Mont. 263, 661 P.2d 35	Supreme Court of Montana, 1983	Download
46	Enright v. Groves	39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851	Colorado Court of Appeals, 1977	Download
48	Whittaker v. Sandford	110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399	Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1912	Download
50	State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff	38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282	Supreme Court of California, 1952	Download
54	Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida	100 So.2d 396	Supreme Court of Florida, 1958	Download
57	Harris v. Jones	281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611	Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1977	Download
64	Taylor v. Vallelunga	171 Cal. App.2d 107, 339 P.2d 910	District Court of Appeal of California, 1959	Download
66	Dougherty v. Stepp	18 N.C. 371	Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1835	Download
68	Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co.	104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782	Supreme Court of Washington, 1985	Download
70	Herrin v. Sutherland	74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328	Supreme Court of Montana, 1925	Download
72	Rogers v. Board of Road Com'rs for Kent County	319 Mich. 661, 30 N.W.2d 358	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1947	Download
75	Glidden v. Szybiak	95 N.H. 318, 63 A.2d 233	Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1949	Download
77	CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.	962 F.Supp. 1015	United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, 1997	Download
81	Pearson v. Dodd	395 U.S. 947, 89 S.Ct. 2021, 23 L.Ed.2d 465	United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1969	Download
91	O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co.	154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1891	Download
92	Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc.	601 F.2d 516, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 275, 62 L.Ed.2d 188 (1979)	United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 1979	Download
94	Mohr v. Williams	104 N.W. 12	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905	Download
99	De May v. Roberts	46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1881	Download
107	Katko v. Briney	183 N.W.2d 657	Supreme Court of Iowa, 1971	Download
113	Hodgeden v. Hubbard	18 Vt. 504, 46 Am.Dec. 167	Supreme Court of Vermont, 1846	Download
115	Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store	12 Mich.App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347	Court of Appeals of Michigan, 1968	Download
118	Surocco v. Geary	3 Cal. 69, 58 Am.Dec. 385	Supreme Court of California, 1853	Download
121	Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.	124 N.W. 221	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910	Download
128	Sindle v. New York Transit Authority	33 N.Y.2d 293, 307 N.E.2d 245, 352 N.Y.S.2d 183	New York Court of Appeals, 1973	Download
133	Lubitz v. Wells	19 Conn.Sup. 322, 113 A.2d 147	Superior Court of Connecticut, 1955	Download
134	Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works	156 Eng. Rep. 1047	Court of Exchequer, 1856	Download
135	Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams	183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234	Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1938	Download
138	Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl	65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880	Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1902	Download
139	Davison v. Snohomish County	149 Wash. 109, 270 P. 422	Supreme Court of Washington, 1928	Download
141	United States v. Carroll Towing Co.	159 F.2d 169	United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947	Download
145	Vaughan v. Menlove	132 Eng. Rep. 490	Court of Common Pleas, 1837	Download
148	Delair v. McAdoo	324 Pa. 392, 188 A. 181	Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1936	Download
150	Trimarco v. Klein	56 N.Y.2d 98, 436 N.E.2d 502, 451 N.Y.S.2d 52	Court of Appeals of New York, 1982	Download
154	Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.	27 N.Y.S.2d 198	City Court of New York, New York County, 1941	Download
157	Roberts v. State of Louisiana	396 So.2d 566	Court of Appeal of Louisiana, 1981	Download
161	Robinson v. Lindsay	92 Wash.2d 410, 598 P.2d 392	Supreme Court of Washington, 1979	Download
165	Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co.	173 N.W.2d 619	Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970	Download
168	Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc.	40 N.C.App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526	Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1979	Download
173	Hodges v. Carter	239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144	Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1954	Download
177	Boyce v. Brown	51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455	Supreme Court of Arizona, 1938	Download
181	Morrison v. MacNamara	407 A.2d 555	District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1979	Download
185	Scott v. Bradford	606 P.2d 554	Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1979	Download
191	Moore v. The Regents of the University of California	51 Cal.3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal.Rptr. 146	Supreme Court of California, 1990
200	Pokora v. Wabash Ry.	292 U.S. 98	U.S. Supreme Court, 1934	Download
204	Osborne v. McMasters	41 N.W. 543	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1889	Download
206	Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp.	259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436	Supreme Court of Oregon, 1971	Download
210	Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.	2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74	Illinois Supreme Court, 1954	Download
215	Perry v. S.N. and S.N.	973 S.W.2d 301.	Texas Supreme Court, 1998	Download
222	Martin v. Herzog	126 N.E. 814	New York Court of Appeals, 1920	Download
224	Zeni v. Anderson	397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270.	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1976	Download
229	Goddard v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co.	179 Mass. 52, 60 N.E. 486	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1901	Download
230	Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Co.	208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1911	Download
231	Ortega v. Kmart Corp.	114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 26 Cal.4th 1200, 36 P.3d 11	Supreme Court of California, 2001	Download
231	Joye v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co.	405 F.2d 464	United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1968	Download
233	Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co.	177 Colo. 418, 494 P.2d 839	Supreme Court of Colorado, 1972	Download
234	H.E. Butt Groc. Co. v. Resendez	988 S.W.2d 218	Supreme Court of Texas, 1999	Download
237	Byrne v. Boadle	159 Eng. Rep. 299	Court of Exchequer, 1863	Download
240	McDougald v. Perry	716 So. 2d 783	Supreme Court of Florida, 1998	Download
246	Larson v. St. Francis Hotel	83 Cal.App.2d 210, 188 P.2d 513	District Court of Appeal of California, 1948	Download
250	Ybarra v. Spangard	154 P.2d 687	Supreme Court of California, 1944	Download
254	Sullivan v. Crabtree	36 Tenn.App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782	Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1953	Download
259	Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans Ry. Co.	243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646	Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1962	Download
262	Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co.	37 La.Ann. 694	Court of Appeals of Louisiana, 1885	Download
263	Gentry v. Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc.	290 Mont. 126, 962 P.2d 1205	Supreme Court of Montana, 1998	Download
267	Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins	184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625	Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1939	Download
270	Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative	664 P.2d 474	Supreme Court of Washington, 1983	Download
274	Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.	43 F.3d 1311.	United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1995	Download
282	Hill v. Edmonds	26 A.D.2d 554, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1020	Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, 1966	Download
283	Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. R.R. Co.	146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1920	Download
285	Summers v. Tice	199 P.2d 1	Supreme Court of California, 1948	Download
287	Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories	26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 934, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 285, 66 L.Ed.2d 140 (1980)	Supreme Court of California, 1980	Download
293	Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daniels	8 Ga.App. 775, 70 S.E. 203	Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1911	Download
294	Ryan v. New York Central R.R.	35 N.Y. 210	Court of Appeals of New York, 1866	Download
297	Bartolone v. Jeckovich	103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545	Surpeme Court of New York, 1984	Download
300	In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co.	3 K.B. 560	Court of Appeal, 1921	Download
302	Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd.	A.C. 388	Privy Council, 1961	Download
308	Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R.	162 N.E. 99	Court of Appeals of New York, 1928	Download
319	Yun v. Ford Motor Co.	276 N.J. Super. 142, 647 A.2d 841	Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, 1994
325	Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.	51 N.Y.2d 308, 414 N.E.2d 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166	New York Court of Appeals, 1980	Download
329	Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co.	137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146	Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1910	Download
335	Fuller v. Preis	35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568	New York Court of Appeals, 1974	Download
338	McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp.	136 Wash.2d 350, 961 P.2d 952	Supreme Court Washington, 1998	Download
344	Kelly v. Gwinnell	96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219	Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984	Download
349	Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co.	77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550	Court of Appeals of New York, 1991	Download
361	Bierczynski v. Rogers	239 A.2d 218	Supreme Court of Delaware, 1968	Download
364	Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.	97 Ill.2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197, 73 Ill.Dec. 337	Supreme Court of Illinois, 1983	Download
366	Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc.	98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794	Court of Appeals of New Mexico, 1982	Download
371	Bundt v. Embro	48 Misc.2d 802, 265 N.Y.S.2d 872	Supreme Court of New York, Queens County, 1965	Download
374	Cox v. Pearl Investment Co.	168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60	Supreme Court of Colorado, 1969	Download
378	Elbaor v. Smith	845 S.W.2d 240	Supreme Court of Texas, 1992	Download
383	Knell v. Feltman	85 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 174 F.2d 662	United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1949	Download
386	Yellow Cab Co. of D.C., Inc. v. Dreslin	86 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 181 F.2d 626	United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1950	Download
388	Slocum v. Donahue	44 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 693 N.E.2d 179	Court of Appeals of Massachusetts, 1998	Download
392	Bruckman v. Pena	29 Colo.App. 357, 487 P.2d 566	Colorado Court of Appeals, 1971	Download
395	Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat'l Steel Corp.	495 F.2d 213	United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1974	Download
400	Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co.	85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111	Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1932	Download
409	MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.	111 N.E. 1050	New York Court of Appeals, 1916	Download
412	Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co.	159 N.E. 896	Court of Appeals of New York, 1928	Download
414	Clagett v. Dacy	47 Md. App. 23, 420 A.2d 1285	Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1980	Download
417	Hegel v. Langsam	29 Ohio Misc. 147, 55 Ohio Ops.2d 476, 273 N.E.2d 351	Court of Common Pleas of Ohio 1971	Download
420	L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks	220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334	Supreme Court of Indiana, 1942	Download
426	J.S. and M.S. v. R.T.H.	155 N.J. 330, 714 A.2d 924	Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1998	Download
432	Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California	551 P.2d 334	Supreme Court of California, 1976	Download
439	State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank	752 F.2d 1019, cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986)	United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (en banc), 1985	Download
450	Daley v. LaCroix	384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1970	Download
456	Thing v. La Chusa	48 Cal.3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865	Supreme Court of California, In Bank 1989	Download
464	Endresz v. Friedberg	24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65	New York Court of Appeals, 1969	Download
469	Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo	97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755	Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984	Download
480	Taylor v. Olsen	282 Or. 343, 578 P.2d 779	Supreme Court of Oregon, 1978	Download
482	Salevan v. Wilmington Park, Inc.	45 Del. (6 Terry) 290, 72 A.2d 239	Superior Court of Delaware, 1950	Download
485	Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co.	76 Fed. 201	United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 1896	Download
489	Barmore v. Elmore	83 Ill.App.3d 1056, 403 N.E.2d 1355, 38 Ill.Dec. 751	Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, 1980	Download
492	Campbell v. Weathers	153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72	Supreme Court of Kansas, 1941	Download
495	Whelan v. Van Natta	382 S.W.2d 205	Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1964	Download
502	Rowland v. Christian	443 P.2d 561	Supreme Court of California, 1968	Download
507	Borders v. Roseberry	216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366	Supreme Court of Kansas, 1975	Download
511	Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America	91 Wis.2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55	Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1979	Download
514	Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.	439 F.2d 477	United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970	Download
520	Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.	377 F.Supp. 136	United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 1974	Download
524	Richardson v. Chapman	175 Ill. 2d 98, 676 N.E.2d 621	Supreme Court of Illinois, 1987	Download
540	Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson	334 Ark. 561, 976 S.W.2d 382	Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1998	Download
545	Zimmerman v. Ausland	266 Or. 427, 513 P.2d 1167	Supreme Court of Oregon, 1973	Download
551	Cheatham v. Pohle	789 N.E.2d 467	Supreme Court of Indiana, 2003	Download
556	State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell	538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit)	Supreme Court of the United States, 2003	Download
565	Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.	398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339	Supreme Court of the United States, 1970	Download
573	Selders v. Armentrout	190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686	Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1973	Download
578	Murphy v. Martin Oil Co.	56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583	Supreme Court of Illinois, 1974	Download
592	McIntyre v. Balentine	833 S.W.2d 52	Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1992	Download
601	Seigneur v. National Fitness Institute, Inc.	132 Md. App. 271, 752 A.2d 631	Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 2000	Download
607	Rush v. Commercial Realty Co.	7 N.J.Misc. 337, 145 A. 476	Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1929	Download
610	Blackburn v. Dorta	348 So.2d 287	Supreme Court of Florida, 1977	Download
614	Teeters v. Currey	518 S.W.2d 512.	Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1974	Download
622	Freehe v. Freehe	81 Wash.2d 183, 500 P.2d 771	Supreme Court of Washington, 1972	Download
625	Renko v. McLean	346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468	Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1997	Download
633	Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's	446 S.W.2d 599	Supreme Court of Missouri, 1969	Download
637	Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education	453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877	Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1973	Download
642	Riss v. New York	22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897.	New York Court of Appeals, 1968	Download
644	DeLong v. Erie County	89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887	New York Supreme Court, 1982	Download
648	Deuser v. Vecera	139 F.3d 1190	United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1998	Download
661	Bussard v. Minimed, Inc.	129 Cal.Rptr.2d 675, 105 Cal.App.4th 798	California Court of Appeal, 2003	Download
663	O'Shea v. Welch	350 F.3d 1101	United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 2003	Download
667	Murrell v. Goertz	597 P.2d 1223	Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, 1979	Download
669	Maloney v. Rath	69 Cal.2d 442, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal.Rptr. 897	Supreme Court of California, 1968	Download
673	Popejoy v. Steinle	820 P.2d 545	Supreme Court of Wyoming, 1991	Download
678	Shuck v. Means	302 Minn. 93, 226 N.W.2d 285	Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1974	Download
681	Smalich v. Westfall	440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476	Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1970	Download
692	Rylands v. Fletcher	L.R. 3 H.L. 330	House of Lords, 1868	Download
699	Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc.	272 Ill.App.3d 263, 651 N.E.2d 239	Illinois Court of Appeal, 1995	Download
702	Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co.	916 F.2d 1174	United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1990	Download
710	Foster v. Preston Mill Co.	44 Wash.2d 440, 268 P.2d 645	Supreme Court of Washington, 1954	Download
712	Golden v. Amory	329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d 131	Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1952	Download
714	Sandy v. Bushey	124 Me. 320, 128 A. 513	Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1925	Download
722	Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.	168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409	Supreme Court of Washington, 1932	Download
732	Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.	59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697	Supreme Court of California, 1963	Download
740	Rix v. General Motors Corp.	222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d 195	Supreme Court of Montana, 1986	Download
743	Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co.	421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176	Supreme Court of Michigan, 1984	Download
750	O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.	94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298	Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1983	Download
757	Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.	53 Cal.3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528	Supreme Court of California, 1991	Download
765	Friedman v. General Motors Corp.	43 Ohio St.2d 209, 72 Ohio Ops.2d 119, 331 N.E.2d 702	Supreme Court of Ohio, 1975	Download
769	Daly v. General Motors Corp.	575 P.2d 1162	Supreme Court of California, 1978	Download
774	Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews	291 So.2d 169	Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1974	Download
777	Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr	518 U.S. 470, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700	Supreme Court of the United States, 1996	Download
783	Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co.	61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d, 785	Supreme Court of Illinois, 1975	Download
787	Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr.	180 Cal.App.3d 493, 225 Cal.Rptr. 595	Court of Appeals of California, 1986	Download
800	Philadelphia Electric Company v. Hercules, Inc.	762 F.2d 303	United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1985	Download
808	Carpenter v. The Double R Cattle Company, Inc.	108 Idaho 602, 701 P.2d 222	Supreme Court of Idaho, 1985	Download
812	Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.	242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363	Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1963	Download
816	Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.	257 N.E.2d 870	Court of Appeals of New York, 1970	Download
830	Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc.	389 F.2d 579, cert. denied 393 U.S. 825, 89 S.Ct. 88, 21 L.Ed.2d 96 (1968)	United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1967	Download
834	Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n	151 F.2d 733	United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1945	Download
837	Kilian v. Doubleday & Co., Inc.	367 Pa. 117, A.2d 657	Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951	Download
841	Neiman-Marcus v. Lait	13 F.R.D. 311	United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 1952	Download
846	Bindrim v. Mitchell	92 Cal.App.3d 61, 155 Cal.Rptr. 29, hearing denied by California Supreme Court, 1979; cert. denied 444 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 490, 62 L.Ed.2d 412 (1979), reh. denied 444 U.S. 1040, 100 S.Ct. 713, 62 L.Ed.2d 675 (1980)	Court of Appeal of California, Second District, 1979	Download
852	Shor v. Billingsley	4 Misc.2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476	Supreme Court, New York County, Special Term, 1956	Download
853	Terwilliger v. Wands	17 N.Y. 54	Court of Appeals of New York, 1858	Download
871	New York Times Co. v. Sullivan	376 U.S. 254	Supreme Court of the United States, 1964	Download
892	Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.	418 U.S. 323	Supreme Court of the United States, 1974	Download
907	Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps	475 U.S. 767	Supreme Court of the United States, 1986	Download
1024	Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank	42 N.E.2d 808	Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1942	Download

Case Information	Fact Summary	Rule of Law
Weaver v. Ward King's Bench, England, 1616 80 Eng. Rep. 284 Pg. 5	Defendant accidently shot the plaintiff while fighting in front of the king.	". . .[B]ecause felony must be done animo felonico [with a felonious mind]; yet in trespass, which tends only to give damages according to hurt or loss, it is not so. . ."
Brown v. Kendall Supreme Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex, 1850 60 Mass. 292 Pg. 6	Two dogs are fighting in the presence of their masters. The defendant tries to separate the dogs with a stick beating, and accidentally strikes plaintiff in the eye.	In order to recover for unintentional harm, the plaintiff has the burden to prove that defendant failed to meet at least an ordinary level of care.
Cohen v. Petty Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, 1933 62 App.D.C. 187, 65 F.2d 820 Pg. 10	Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile that crashed when the defendant driver fainted. Plaintiff appeals from the lower court's directed verdict for the defendant.	Negligence cannot be predicated upon defendant's recklessness in driving an automobile when he did not know, and had no reason to know, of the possibility of an accident due to such an event as a sudden illness.
Spano v. Perini Corp. Court of Appeals of New York, 1969 250 N.E.2d 31 Pg. 13	Plaintiff suffered damage when defendant blasted.	Because of the dangerousness of the activity, one who blasts is strictly liable for the activity.
Garratt v. Dailey Supreme Court of Washington, 1955 46 Wash.2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 Pg. 17	A five-year-old boy moved a lawn chair from under Plaintiff while she was in the process of sitting down. Plaintiff suffered a broken hip and brings a battery charge against the child.	A court need only find that the defendant behaved with "substantial certainty" that contact would result in order to hold defendant liable for battery. No further finding of intent is necessary.
Spivey v. Battaglia Supreme Court of Florida, 1972 258 So.2d 815 Pg. 20	Petitioner suffered a sharp pain, followed by paralysis on the left side of her face, after Respondent put his arm around her in a "friendly, unsolicited hug." Petitioner brought suit against the respondent for negligence and assault and battery.	"...[A]n assault and battery is not negligence, for such action is unintentional, while negligence connotes an unintentional act." Additionally, "negligence is a relative term and its existence must depend in each a case upon the particular circumstances which surround the parties at the time and place of the events upon which the controversy is based."
Ranson v. Kitner Appellate Court of Illinois, 1889 31 Ill.App. 241 Pg. 24	Appellants, while wolf hunting, accidentally killed appellee's dog when they mistook it for a wolf. Appellee brought action to recover for the value of the dog.	Appellants are liable for any damage caused, regardless of whether they were acting in good faith.
McGuire v. Almy Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1937 8 N.E.2d 760 Pg. 25	Live-in nurse (plaintiff) hears her mental patient (defendant) thrashing about and offers to enter room and help. Patient replies, "If you come in, I will kill you." Nurse enters, and patient beats her with the leg of broken furniture.	If an insane person intends to do the HARM, then she is liable for the intentional tort. (Note the difference from the competent individual, who is liable so long as she merely intends the OFFENSIVE ACT)
Talmage v. Smith Supreme Court of Michigan, 1894 101 Mich. 370, 59 N.W. 656 Pg. 28	Plaintiff was injured when Defendant threw a stick at a nearby boy and missed, hitting Plaintiff above the eye and causing total loss of that eye's sight.	If one throws a stick, intending to hit person A but misses and hits person B, one will be liable for the injury to person B if (1) there was intent to hit person A, and (2)the force was unreasonable under all the circumstances.
Cole v. Turner Nisi Prius, 1704 6 Modern Rep. 149, 90 Eng.Rep. 958 Pg. 29	Cole harmfully and/or offensively touched Turner.	A person is liable for battery if he/she causes harmful or offensive contact. Intent was not required at this time (1704). This rule protects dignity interest with compensation, and grants money for injury.
Wallace v. Rosen Court of Appeals of Indiana, 2002 765 N.E.2d 192 Pg. 30	During a fire drill, a high school teacher touched a student's mother on the back to get her attention. The mother contends she was pushed down the stairs, and the teacher asserts that she only touched the mother on the back. The jury found in favor of the teacher and the mother appealed.	In order to find battery, the evidence must support the inference that not only was the touching intentional, but that it was done in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, for example, that the batterer intended to invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids.
Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc Supreme Court of Texas, 1967 424 S.W.2d 627 Pg. 35	Plaintiff was standing in a buffet line when defendant approached him and snatched the plate from his hands, saying a "Negro could not be served in the club." Plaintiff sued under a theory of battery for the humiliation he felt.	Battery can be found where there was an “unpermitted and intentional invasion of the plaintiff’s person and no... actual harm [was] done to the plaintiff’s body”.
I. de S. and Wife v. W. de S. At the Assizes, 1348 or 1349 Assisarum, folio 99, placitum 60 Pg. 37	Defendant struck at plaintiff with a hatchet, but did not touch her.	Assault does not require a touching; There is harm for an assault, and damages are recoverable, even though there is no touching.
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill Court of Appeals of Alabama, 1933 25 Ala.App. 540, 150 So. 709 Pg. 37	Sapp, an agent for the defendant, put his hand on Plaintiff's wife and propositioned her. Plaintiff brought an action for damages for assault against the defendant.	To constitute an assault, "there must be an intentional, unlawful, offer to touch the person of another," that the other person must have "a well-founded fear of an imminent battery," and the perpetrator must possess "the apparent present ability to effectuate the attempt."
Big Town Nursing Home, Inc. v. Newman Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, 1970 461 S.W.2d 195 Pg. 40	Plaintiff was admitted into a nursing home by his nephew. His nephew signed all necessary papers, which provided that patients "will not be forced to remain in the nursing home against his will for any length of time." Later, when plaintiff attempted to leave he was forcibly brought back to the home and locked into the wing of the home for the mentally disturbed.	"False imprisonment is the direct restraint of one person of the physical liberty of another without adequate legal justification."
Parvi v. City of Kingston Court of Appeals of New York, 1977 41 N.Y.2d 553, 362 N.E.2d 960, 394 N.Y.S.2d 161 Pg. 42	Plaintiff, along with two friends, were found by police officers to be drunk and rowdy. The officers drove the plaintiff to a golf course out of town so he could "dry out." Plaintiff then wandered onto a thruway and was struck by a car. Plaintiff has no memory of the night's events but brought an action against the city for false imprisonment.	False imprisonment is not suffered unless its victim knows of the invasion/imprisonment or is harmed by it.
Hardy v. LaBelle's Distributing Co. Supreme Court of Montana, 1983 203 Mont. 263, 661 P.2d 35 Pg. 44	Plaintiff was an employee in the jewelry department of LaBelle's. Plaintiff was accused of stealing a watch and was brought into a back to be questioned by the managers and to take a lie detector test. Plaintiff brought an action for false imprisonment claiming she was held against her will.	The elements of false imprisonment are the 1) unlawful restraint of another, and 2) restraint that is against that person%u2019s will.
Enright v. Groves Colorado Court of Appeals, 1977 39 Colo.App. 39, 560 P.2d 851 Pg. 46	Defendant, a police officer, demanded plaintiff's driver's license when he observed her dog without a leash. When plaintiff failed to provide the license defendant grabbed her arm and placed her under arrest.	"False arrest arises when one is taken into custody by a person who claims but does not have proper legal authority. Accordingly, a claim for false arrest will not lie if an officer has a valid warrant or probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the person who was arrested committed it."
Whittaker v. Sandford Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1912 110 Me. 77, 85 A. 399 Pg. 48	Plaintiff was in Jaffa, Syria living in a sect colony, and she wished to sail to America and separate from the sect. Defendant was aboard the ship that took them to America and would not allow her to leave the boat until agreed to rejoin the sect.	"False imprisonment must be by way of actual physical restraint, not mere moral influence."
State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff Supreme Court of California, 1952 38 Cal.2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 Pg. 50	Plaintiff brought an action to recover for a debt that he claims defendant owes him as a result of a trash removal contract. Defendant counterclaims that the written agreement between him and the plaintiff was a result of coercion and duress, and that he should receive punitive damages for intentional infliction of mental distress.	"One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it."
Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Florida Supreme Court of Florida, 1958 100 So.2d 396 Pg. 54	Plaintiff brought a tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against defendant, whose employee used language in a "malicious or grossly reckless manner" to the plaintiff when she inquired as to the price of an item in defendant's store.	To constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress, "[t]he unwarranted intrusion must be calculated to cause %u201Csevere emotional distress%u201D to a person of ordinary sensibilities, in the absence of special knowledge or notice."
Harris v. Jones Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1977 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 Pg. 57	Plaintiff suffered a severe speech impediment and brought an action against General Motors Company and one of its supervisory employees, who oversaw plaintiff. During plaintiff's eight year employment defendant mimicked and ridiculed plaintiff for his speech problems, and as a result plaintiff was prescribed pills for nerves and his impediment worsened. He brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.	An action for intentional infliction of mental distress must contain (1) intentional or reckless conduct, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the distress, and (4) severe distress that goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Taylor v. Vallelunga District Court of Appeal of California, 1959 171 Cal. App.2d 107, 339 P.2d 910 Pg. 64	Plaintiff alleged that she was present for a beating inflicted on her father, and that she suffered severe fright and emotional distress as a result. She brought an action against those who assaulted her father.	In order to intentionally cause severe emotional distress one must have the "intention to cause severe emotional distress when the act is done for the purpose of causing the distress or with knowledge on the part of the actor that severe emotional distress is substantially certain to be produced."
Dougherty v. Stepp Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1835 18 N.C. 371 Pg. 66	Defendant enters plaintiff's land with a surveyor and declares the land his own without marking trees or cutting bushes.	"[E]very unauthorized, and therefore unlawful, entry into the close of another is a trespass."
Bradley v. American Smelting and Refining Co. Supreme Court of Washington, 1985 104 Wash.2d 677, 709 P.2d 782 Pg. 68	Plaintiffs are landowners who live near defendant's copper smelter. They brought an action for trespass to land and for nuisance for the airborne particles of heavy metals and gases that traveled from defendant's smelter to plaintiff's land.	A trespass can be found in instances of the slightest harm, such as "the vibration of the soil or by the concussion of the air."
Herrin v. Sutherland Supreme Court of Montana, 1925 74 Mont. 587, 241 P. 328 Pg. 70	Plaintiff brought an action of trespass to land when he discovered defendant, though standing on the land of another, fired his shotgun over the plaintiff's land to hunt ducks.	To be liable for trespass to land, there need not be a physical trespass. Only an interference with the "quiet, undisturbed, peaceful of enjoyment of the plaintiff" is required.
Rogers v. Board of Road Com'rs for Kent County Supreme Court of Michigan, 1947 319 Mich. 661, 30 N.W.2d 358 Pg. 72	Plaintiff brought suit on behalf of her husband who died after defendant failed to remove anchor posts, pursuant to a contract between the decedent and the defendant, and the decedent was thrown from his mowing machine when the machine stuck an anchor post.	A trespass occurs if defendant fails to remove an item "placed on the land pursuant to a license or other privilege."
Glidden v. Szybiak Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1949 95 N.H. 318, 63 A.2d 233 Pg. 75	A four year old girl was bitten by a dog after climbing on the dog's back and pulling its ears. Defendant, the dog's owner, argues the girl committed trespass to chattels at the time of injury, and therefore should be barred from recovery.	Conduct will not constitute a trespass to chattels unless there is evidence of injury.
CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. United States District Court, Southern District of Ohio, 1997 962 F.Supp. 1015 Pg. 77	Plaintiff, CompuServe Inc. is an online communication service provider, who brings this action again defendant, Cyber Promotions, to stop defendant from sending unsolicited emails to plaintiff's customers. Plaintiff notified Cyber Promotions that they are prohibited from sending "spam" emails, but Cyber refused. CompuServe brought this action under a theory of trespass to chattels and the court now considers whether it can order injunctive relief trespass on the Internet.	"A plaintiff can sustain an action for trespass to chattels, as opposed to an action for conversion, without showing a substantial interference with its right to possession of that chattel. . . . Harm to the personal property or diminution of its quality, condition, or value as a result of defendants' use can also be the predicate for liability. . . ."
Pearson v. Dodd United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1969 395 U.S. 947, 89 S.Ct. 2021, 23 L.Ed.2d 465 Pg. 81	This case, which involves the tort of conversion, arose when two former staff members of Senator Dodd entered Dodd's office without his authority or knowledge and took numerous files. These former staffers then made copies of the files, turned them over to defendants, and replaced the original files into Dodd's office. Defendants then published the contents of these files after knowing how they were obtained.	"Because of this stringent measure of damages, it has long been recognized that not every wrongful interference with the personal property of another is a conversion. Where the intermeddling falls short of the complete or very substantial deprivation of possessory rights in the property, the tort committed is not conversion, but the lesser wrong of trespass to chattels."
O'Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1891 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 Pg. 91	Plaintiff is a female immigrant from Queenstown to Boston, who brought this action against the defendant, the ship she traveled on, for assault and negligence for having their surgeons vaccinate her upon her arrival in the United States. Plaintiff claims that she was already vaccinated and that "there was no evidence of want of care or precaution by the defendant in the selection of the surgeon, or in the procuring of the virus or vaccine matter."	"The master or owners of the ship cannot interfere in the treatment of the medical officer when he attends a passenger. He is not their servant, engaged in their business and subject to their control as to his mode of treatment. They do their whole duty if they employ a duly qualified and competent surgeon and medical practitioner, and supply him with all necessary and proper instruments, medicines, and medical comforts, and have him in readiness for such passengers as choose to employ him."
Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc. United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 1979 601 F.2d 516, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931, 100 S.Ct. 275, 62 L.Ed.2d 188 (1979) Pg. 92	During a professional football game, defendant was intentionally struck by a member of the plaintiff's team, who was acting out of "anger and frustration."	Plaintiff is "entitled to have [a] case tried on an assessment of his rights and whether they had been violated."
Mohr v. Williams Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1905 104 N.W. 12 Pg. 94	Patient (plaintiff) agrees to surgery on her RIGHT ear. During the procedure, surgeon (defendant) discovers problem in LEFT ear and operates (skillfully and successfully) on LEFT ear while plaintiff is unconscious.	If contact is made without plaintiff's consent, then the contact is wrongful, and in turn, unlawful.
De May v. Roberts Supreme Court of Michigan, 1881 46 Mich. 160, 9 N.W. 146 Pg. 99	Plaintiff brought along a friend to witness a childbirth without disclosing the fact that his friend was not employed in a professional capacity.	The law affords remedy for deceit that causes injury.
Katko v. Briney Supreme Court of Iowa, 1971 183 N.W.2d 657 Pg. 107	Plaintiff was shot by a spring powered shotgun trap set up inside defendant's unoccupied farm house. There was no warning about the gun trap and it could not be seen from the outside.	Landowners do not have the right to use lethal force to protect property from intrusion unless the intruder "threatens death or serious bodily harm to the occupiers [...] of the premises."
Hodgeden v. Hubbard Supreme Court of Vermont, 1846 18 Vt. 504, 46 Am.Dec. 167 Pg. 113	Plaintiff stole a stove from defendants. Defendants took back the stove by force. County court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, claiming that even though the defendants had the legal right to the stove, they were not justified in using force.	While recovering property, force can be used as long as the recovering party does not use unjustifiable force.
Bonkowski v. Arlan's Department Store Court of Appeals of Michigan, 1968 12 Mich.App. 88, 162 N.W.2d 347 Pg. 115	Plaintiff was accused of stealing by an agent of the defendant. While exiting the defendant's store, defendant's agent called the plaintiff back. The defendant's agent then asked the plaintiff to show him the contents of her purse. Plaintiff won action against the defendant for false arrest and slander.	If there is reasonable belief that someone is shoplifting, then the shopkeeper or agent of the shopkeeper can investigate, as long as the investigation is reasonable as well.
Surocco v. Geary Supreme Court of California, 1853 3 Cal. 69, 58 Am.Dec. 385 Pg. 118	Defendant, administrator of the city of San Francisco, destroyed the plaintiff's building in order to try to stop the spread of a fire. Plaintiff's claim is that the defendant is liable for property he destroyed.	The common law principle of necessity applies to administration of a fire. In order to save the property of neighbors, property might need to be sacrificed. If the administrator can show necessity, he or she can not be held liable for damage due to the destruction.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1910 124 N.W. 221 Pg. 121	Defendant moors his boat to plaintiff's dock, pursuant to contract to unload cargo. A storm develops, however, and defendant keeps boat moored to dock, adhering to custom. Boat buffets the dock and causes $500 damage to the dock.	Even when necessity provides a valid defense to trespass, the would-be trespasser must pay compensatory relief for damage caused to property.
Sindle v. New York Transit Authority New York Court of Appeals, 1973 33 N.Y.2d 293, 307 N.E.2d 245, 352 N.Y.S.2d 183 Pg. 128	Students riding on the bus of the defendant were in a very boisterous mood and a few vandalized the bus. The driver of the bus, an agent of the defendant, drove all of the students on the bus to the police station, bypassing several of the normal stops. Plaintiff was riding on the bus, and there is no evidence that he took part in the vandalism. Plaintiff seeks recovery for false imprisonment.	A school bus driver is charged with the "care of his student-passengers and the custody of public property" and "has the duty to take reasonable measures for the safety and protection of both." Therefore, in the case of false imprisonment, the driver has the right to show justification.
Lubitz v. Wells Superior Court of Connecticut, 1955 19 Conn.Sup. 322, 113 A.2d 147 Pg. 133	Defendant left a golf club lying on the ground of his backyard. Defendant's son, while swinging the club, struck the plaintiff. Plaintiff claims the defendant was negligent in leaving the club in the backyard, where he knew his son would play with it and cause injury.	An object such as a golf club, while capable of causing harm, is not so "obviously and intrinsically dangerous" that it is negligent to leave it lying around.
Blyth v. Birmingham Water Works Court of Exchequer, 1856 156 Eng. Rep. 1047 Pg. 134	Plaintiff's house is flooded when a water main bursts during a severe frost. The accident was caused due to encrusted ice around a fire plug connected to the water main.	"A reasonable man would act with reference to the average circumstances of the temperature in ordinary years. The defendants had provided against such frosts as experience would have led men, acting prudently, to provide against; and they are not guilty of negligence, because their precautions proved insufcient against the effects of the extreme severity of the frost of 1856, which penetrated to a greater depth than any which ordinarily occurs south of the polar regions."
Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1938 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234 Pg. 135	Appellants delivered a drum of gasoline to the appellee. While removing the cap from the drum, a spark was produced by the ill condition of the threads in the cap. The spark caused a fire which injured the appellee. Appellants argue that they are not liable, due to the event being a "freak accident."	"The test as respects foreseeability is not the balance of probabilities but the existence, in the situation in hand, of some real likelihood of some damage and the likelihood is of such appreciable weight and moment as to induce, or which reasonably should induce, action to avoid it on the part of a person of a reasonably prudent mind."
Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Krayenbuhl Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1902 65 Neb. 889, 91 N.W. 880 Pg. 138	Defendant was injured while playing on the railroad's property and recovered from the plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that the defendant does not have the right to recover because it had exercised enough care in maintaining the safety of the premises.	"[I]n all cases of this kind in the determination of the question of negligence, regard must be had to the character and location of the premises, the purpose for which they are used, the probability of injury therefrom, the precautions necessary to prevent such injury, and the relations such precautions bear to the beneficial use of the premises.
Davison v. Snohomish County Supreme Court of Washington, 1928 149 Wash. 109, 270 P. 422 Pg. 139	Plaintiffs, while driving on a bridge owned by the defendants, crashed through the guard rail. Plaintiffs claim the defendant was negligent in building the bridge because the guard rail was insufficient to keep a car from crashing through it.	Counties only need to construct barriers to a degree of protection and where they see fit. They are not required to construct guard rails strong enough to hold a car for long stretches of roadway.
United States v. Carroll Towing Co. United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1947 159 F.2d 169 Pg. 141	Carroll Towing (defendant) is towing a line of barges, including the "Anna C" (owned by Connors, plaintiff). Connors does not place an employee on board its barge. The "Anna C" breaks away from the line of barges and crashes into a tanker.	The "Hand Formula": if B < P*L, and the actor does not take the adequate precaution (B), then the actor has breached a legal duty. B = "the burden of adequate precautions." P = "the probability" that injury will result. L = "the gravity of the resulting injury"
Vaughan v. Menlove Court of Common Pleas, 1837 132 Eng. Rep. 490 Pg. 145	Defendant consructed a hayrick, or a stack of hay, near the border of the property he rented from the plaintiff. Defendant was repeatedly warned that the hayrick was in danger of catching fire over the course of five weeks. Desipite the warnings, defendant said that "he would chance it." The hay eventually caught fire, burning down both defendant's buildings and the cottages of the plaintiff on a neighboring parcel of land.	The reasonable man standard is objective, not subjective; "...you must so enjoy your own property as not to injure that of another."
Delair v. McAdoo Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1936 324 Pa. 392, 188 A. 181 Pg. 148	Defendant's tire blew out, causing him to collide with the plaintiff's car. Plaintiff brought suit against defendant, claiming that the defendant was negligent in driving with a defective tire.	"The law requires drivers and owners of motor vehicles to know the condition of those parts which are likely to become dangerous where the flaws or faults would be disclosed by a reasonable inspection."
Trimarco v. Klein Court of Appeals of New York, 1982 56 N.Y.2d 98, 436 N.E.2d 502, 451 N.Y.S.2d 52 Pg. 150	Plaintiff was injured while exiting the bathtub in his rented apartment. The bathtub had a screen of normal, untempered glass, which shattered unexpectedly and suddenly, severely injuring him. At the time, it was ordinary and recommended practice to use plastic or tempered safety glass, which had been treated with shatterproof material, in shower or bath enclosures. Plaintiff could not have known the glass was not safety glass.	By examining the common and reasonable practice of a business, the evidence of custom and usage can be proved. A common practice, however, is not "necessarily a conclusive or even compelling test of negligence."
Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co. City Court of New York, New York County, 1941 27 N.Y.S.2d 198 Pg. 154	Plaintiff's children and wife were struck by a taxi, whose driver abandoned it. The defendant is the driver's employer. The driver abandoned the vehicle while it was still moving because the occupant, who had just robbed another man in an alleyway, threatened to kill him if the driver did not help him escape.	"If under normal circumstances an act is done which might be considered negligent, it does not follow as a corollary that a similar act is negligent if performed by a person acting under an emergency, not of his own making, in which he suddenly is faced with patent danger with a moment left to adopt a means of extrication."
Roberts v. State of Louisiana Court of Appeal of Louisiana, 1981 396 So.2d 566 Pg. 157	A blind man was walking through his workplace without his cane, which he knew very well, and bumped into the plaintiff, an elderly man. The plaintiff fell down and injured his hip. The plaintiff is suing the state, claiming they were negligent in failing to properly supervise their employee, the blind man.	A man with a disability is only required to act as an ordinary reasonable man would if he were blind.
Robinson v. Lindsay Supreme Court of Washington, 1979 92 Wash.2d 410, 598 P.2d 392 Pg. 161	Defendant's snowmobile was driven by a 13 year old boy, who used it to tow plaintiff, an 11 year old girl, in an inner tube. Plaintiff's thumb was severed in the process. The issue of appeal is whether or not a minor can be held to the adult standard of care when operating a snowmobile.	When operating a "powerful motorized vehicle," minors can be held to the standard of care applied to an adult.
Breunig v. American Family Insurance Co. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1970 173 N.W.2d 619 Pg. 165	Insane woman (defendant) drives into oncoming lane of traffic, but claims that God was steering. Defendant's car strikes plaintiff's truck.	Insanity is a defense in a case of negligence ONLY IF (1) the person has no reasonable forewarning that an existing condition could cause such an incident AND (2) the condition acts suddenly and prevents the person from conforming conduct to the standard of the reasonable person.
Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc. Court of Appeals of North Carolina, 1979 40 N.C.App. 158, 252 S.E.2d 526 Pg. 168	Fred Heath crashed a plane with his wife, child, and friend inside, killing everyone. The estate of Heath's wife and child filed suit against his estate and the owners of the plane, Swift Wings, Inc., claiming he negligently piloted the plane.	The instruction to the jury included a segment claiming that Heath could only be held to the standard of a pilot with the same amount of training he had received. The standard of care for a professional is based on the standard of care applicable to all other professionals.
Hodges v. Carter Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1954 239 N.C. 517, 80 S.E.2d 144 Pg. 173	Plaintiff was a drug store owner, and his building burned down. He was insured against fire damage by several companies, all of whom declined to pay any of the losses. Plaintiff then hired lawyers, the defendants, to issue summons and complaints against the insurance companies. They sent the summons to the Insurance Commissioner instead of having them personally delivered. The insurance companies claimed this was not proper delivery, and the court agreed on appeal. The plaintiff then sued the defendants, claiming they were negligent in failing to properly serve the summons.	An attorney, like any other professional, is liable for damages caused by his negligent mistakes, held to the standard of skill and knowledge of other professionals in his field. In the case where a custom among professionals was not previously challenged, the professional can not be held liable for negligence.
Boyce v. Brown Supreme Court of Arizona, 1938 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 Pg. 177	Plaintiff was treated by the defendant, a doctor, several years previous to the suit. The defendant treated a fracture in the plaintiff's ankle by joining the plaintiff's bones with a screw, standard practice in medicine. Years later, the plaintiff requested treatment for pain in her ankle, which the defendant treated by wrapping the ankle with adhesive tape and repairing an arch support he had previously given her. When the plaintiff continued to experience pain after treatment, she went to a new doctor. This doctor, noticing a strange mark near the ankle, took an X-ray, which revealed necrosis of the bone around the screw. This new doctor removed the screw and the ankle healed normally.	In order to establish malpractice, the plaintiff needs to prove by expert testimony that the doctor did not adhere to the standard of proper medical care required at the time.
Morrison v. MacNamara District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 1979 407 A.2d 555 Pg. 181	Appellant fainted and was injured due to a medical procedure he received while standing, rather than sitting or lying down. According to an expert witness, the national standard of care for this procedure was to administer it while the patient is sitting or lying down due to the risk of the patient feeling faint. Appellee, the medical laboratory which administered the procedure, claims it is only required to adhere to a local standard of care. The trial court agreed with the appellees, and refused to instruct the jury that a national standard applied.	"Even a cursory analysis of the policy behind the locality doctrine [, which states that doctors are only held to local standards of care,] reveals that whatever relevance it has to the practice of medicine in remote rural communities, it has no relevance to medical practice in the District of Columbia. Clearly the nation's capital is not a community isolated from recent advancements in the quality and treatment of patients . . . Moreover any purported disparity between the skills of practitioners in various urban centers has for the most part been eliminated."
Scott v. Bradford Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1979 606 P.2d 554 Pg. 185	Defendant performed a surgery on the plaintiff. The surgery resulted in a new problem arising. Plaintiff is suing for medical malpractice, claiming that the defendant did not explain the treatment, risks, and other possible options enough for her to make an informed consent.	[I]n a medical malpractice action a patient suing under the theory of informed consent must allege and prove: (1) defendant physician failed to inform him adequately of a material risk before securing his consent to the proposed treatment; (2)if he had been informed of the risks he would not have consented to the treatment; (3) the adverse consequences that were not made known did in fact occur and he was injured as a result of submitting to the treatment.
Moore v. The Regents of the University of California Supreme Court of California, 1990 51 Cal.3d 120, 793 P.2d 479, 271 Cal.Rptr. 146 Pg. 191	Plaintiff was a patient of a doctor working for the defendants. When he was treated, the doctor discovered that his cells had great medical research and monetary value, but did not inform him. In the future, plaintiff received further claimed treatment, which the doctor claimed could only be done at his facility, which was only intended to gather his useful cells. Plaintiff brought suit claiming that without knowing the research value and financial interest, he could not form an informed consent.	"[A] physician who is seeking a patient's consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and to obtain the patient's informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment."
Pokora v. Wabash Ry. U.S. Supreme Court, 1934 292 U.S. 98 Pg. 200	Plaintiff approaches a railroad crossing in his automobile. He stops and tries to look, but proceeds without getting out of his car for a better vantage point. Train (defendant) strikes and injures plaintiff.	The standard of care in negligence cases is "for the judgment of a jury". In other words, the determination of duty and breach is a question of fact, not law.
Osborne v. McMasters Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1889 41 N.W. 543 Pg. 204	Defendant's drug store clerk failed to properly label a bottle of poison (per criminal statute) and sold bottle to the plaintiff, who perished.	Breach of a statutory duty "constitutes conclusive evidence of negligence, or in other words, NEGLIGENCE PER SE" when both the following are true: 1) defendant's breach of duty harms those people that the statute was designed to protect, AND 2) the harm is of the "character which the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent."
Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp. Supreme Court of Oregon, 1971 259 Or. 583, 488 P.2d 436 Pg. 206	Plaintiff was injured in a bar fight which occurred in defendant's bar. After a belligerent group approached the plaintiff's table, one of the plaintiff's friends complained to the bartender, who told him to avoid those belligerent individuals. The fight occurred not long after the warning. Plaintiff brought suit against the drinking establishment claiming the defendant was negligent in serving the belligerent individuals alcohol and allowing them in the establishment.	"A violation of a statute or regulation constitutes negligence as a matter of law when the violation results in injury to a member of the class of persons intended to be protected by the legislation and when the harm is of the kind which the statute or regulation was enacted to prevent. [. . .] However, in addition, it is proper for the court to examine preliminarily the appropriateness of the standard as a measure of care for civil litigation under the circumstances presented."
Ney v. Yellow Cab Co. Illinois Supreme Court, 1954 2 Ill.2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 Pg. 210	Defendant's servant left a taxi cab unattended without taking the key from the ignition, which was a violation of statute. A thief later stole the taxi while in flight and crashed into the plaintiff causing property damage.	An intervening agent, even an illegal one, does not necessarily break the cause and effect chain in a negligence case. The intention of a statute is equally as important as the act it prohibits when establishing actionable violation of statute in a negligence case.
Perry v. S.N. and S.N. Texas Supreme Court, 1998 973 S.W.2d 301. Pg. 215	Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants over abuse of their children at a day care. Plaintiffs claim the defendants witnessed the abuse but did not report it. A state statute requires "any person having cause to believe a child is being abused to report the abuse to state authorities." The question before the courts is "whether plaintiffs may maintain a cause of action for negligence per se" based on the statute.	"[A] decision to impose negligence per se could not be limited to cases charging serious misconduct like the one at bar, but rather would impose immense potential liability under an ill-defined standard on a broad class of individuals whose relationship to the abuse was extremely indirect."
Martin v. Herzog New York Court of Appeals, 1920 126 N.E. 814 Pg. 222	Plaintiff's buggy collides with defendant's automobile, and plaintiff dies. Plaintiff is driving without his headlights on, which violates a statute.	Breach of a statutory duty can also constitute CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE PER SE, subject to the same requirements: 1) plaintiff is a member of the class of persons that the statute is designed to protect, AND 2) harm is of the character that the statute is designed to prevent. Finally, Cardozo states that negligence per se, like all negligence, must be causally connected to the injury.
Zeni v. Anderson Supreme Court of Michigan, 1976 397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d 270. Pg. 224	Plaintiff, in the winter, was walking to work on a "well-used pedestrian snowpath, with her back to oncoming traffic" which a security officer testified was safer than the sidewalk during the wintertime, and was struck by a car driven by the defendant. Plaintiff is suing to recover for injuries sustained in the accident. Defendant claimed that plaintiff's failure to use the sidewalk constituted contributory negligence because it violated a statute.	"[W]hen a court adopts a penal statute as the standard of care in a an action for negligence, violation of that statute establishes a prima facie case of negligence, with the determination to be made by the finder of fact whether the party accused of violating the statute has established a legally sufficient excuse. If the finder of fact determines such an excuse exists, the appropriate standard of care then becomes that established by the common law."
Goddard v. Boston & Maine R.R. Co. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1901 179 Mass. 52, 60 N.E. 486 Pg. 229	Plaintiff slipped on a banana peel on defendant's railway platform. The banana peel was most likely dropped by another passenger in the crowd just moments before the plaintiff slipped on it, and would have been difficult if not impossible for the defendant's employees to spot.	The plaintiff must prove that the defendant was negligent in failing to maintain their premises.
Anjou v. Boston Elevated Railway Co. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1911 208 Mass. 273, 94 N.E. 386 Pg. 230	Plaintiff slipped on a banana peel on defendant's platform. The banana peel appeared as if it had been there for some time, long enough that an employee of the defendants should have seen it and cleaned it up.	"The obligation rested upon the defendant to keep its station reasonably safe for its passengers." Because the inference is drawn that it was there for some time, the defendants are negligent for leaving their platform in a dangerous condition.
Ortega v. Kmart Corp. Supreme Court of California, 2001 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 470, 26 Cal.4th 1200, 36 P.3d 11 Pg. 231	Plaintiff slipped in a puddle of milk in defendant's store. Plaintiff did not offer any evidence as to how long the puddle was there, but there was also no record of when employees inspected the store.	"[I]f the plaintiffs can show an inspection was not made within a particular period of time prior to an accident, they may raise an inference the condition did exist long enough for the owner to have discovered it. It remains a question of fact for the jury whether, under all the circumstances, the defective condition existed long enough so that it would have been discovered and remedied by an owner in the exercise of reasonable care."
Joye v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, 1968 405 F.2d 464 Pg. 231	Plaintiff slipped on a banana in defendant's supermarket. There was no evidence as to how long the banana had been there.	A plaintiff must establish evidence that the defendant either put the banana on the floor, or had "actual notice of its presence."
Jasko v. F.W. Woolworth Co. Supreme Court of Colorado, 1972 177 Colo. 418, 494 P.2d 839 Pg. 233	Plaintiff slipped on a slice of pizza at defendant's "pizza-hoagie counter." Plaintiff, instead of displaying constructive notice, claims that the defendant's method of selling pizza inevitably leads to a dangerous condition, which the defendant's employees also knew.	The notice requirement is for situations where a dangerous condition occurs because of an event the proprietor did not know about. "In such a situation the storekeeper is allowed a reasonable time, under the circumstances, to discover and correct the condition, unless it is the direct result of his (or his employees' acts). However, when the operating methods of a proprietor are such that dangerous conditions are continuous or easily foreseeable, the logical basis for the notice requirement dissolves. Then, actual or constructive notice of the specific condition need not be proved."
H.E. Butt Groc. Co. v. Resendez Supreme Court of Texas, 1999 988 S.W.2d 218 Pg. 234	Defendant slipped and fell on grapes at plaintiff's grocery store. Defendant sued plaintiff for negligence, "alleging that the customer sampling display posed an unreasonable risk of harm that caused her injuries."	Defendant failed to present evidence that the display created an unreasonable risk of customers falling. In order to recover, the defendant needed to prove actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition, that the condition posed an unreasonable risk of harm, that the plaintiff did not exercise reasonable care to mitigate the risk, and that the failure to use such care proximately caused injury.
Byrne v. Boadle Court of Exchequer, 1863 159 Eng. Rep. 299 Pg. 237	Plaintiff was walking along a highway when he was struck by a barrel of flour that was being lowered from defendant's window. Defendant was a flour dealer. Plaintiff submitted no evidence of negligence other than the facts above, arguing that negligence was established under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant argued that plaintiff must submit some direct evidence of negligence.	There is a presumption of negligence where "the defendant had the entire possession and exclusive use of this warehouse...", and a barrel of flour, owned by the defendant, was lowered from the warehouse and fell on plaintiff; The burden is on the defendant to show that he was not negligent.
McDougald v. Perry Supreme Court of Florida, 1998 716 So. 2d 783 Pg. 240	Plaintiff was driving on a highway when his vehicle was struck by a tire that came loose from defendant's tractor-trailer. Defendant, although he did inspect the car before the trip, including the tire, did not check thoroughly enough to see if the tire was fastened absolutely. After the accident, the defendant noticed that the chain holding the tire in place had slipped off, freeing the tire. The question before the court is whether res ipsa loquitur applies.	"[O]n the basis of common experience and as a matter of general knowledge, [this type of accident] would not occur but for the failure to exercise reasonable care [. . .] the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is particularly applicable in wayward wheel cases." This case is essentially no different from Byrne v. Boadle.
Larson v. St. Francis Hotel District Court of Appeal of California, 1948 83 Cal.App.2d 210, 188 P.2d 513 Pg. 246	Plaintiff was struck by a falling chair while on defendant's premises. The question before the court is whether res ipsa loquitur applies.	"[F]or a plaintiff to make out a case entitling him to the benefit of the [res ipsa loquitur] doctrine, he must prove (1) that there was an accident; (2) that the thing or instrumentality which caused the accident was at the time of and prior thereto under the exclusive control and management of the defendant; (3) that the accident was such that in the ordinary course of events, the defendant using ordinary care, the accident would not have happened."
Ybarra v. Spangard Supreme Court of California, 1944 154 P.2d 687 Pg. 250	Plaintiff was diagnosed with appendicitis. After being rendered unconscious for surgery to correct the problem, he woke up with severe pain in his right sholder. The plaintiff had no previous injury or pain in the sholder area. The pain eventually spread down his arm, and he developed paralysis and atrophy in the sholder. Two doctors subsequently examined him and determined that the condition was caused by trauma.	The doctrine of "res ipsa loquitur" may be applied "where a plaintiff recieves unusual injuries while unconscious and in the course of medical treatment, [and] all those defendants who had any control over his body or the instrumentalities which might have caused the injuries may properly be called upon to meet the inference of negligence by giving an explanation of their conduct."
Sullivan v. Crabtree Court of Appeals of Tennessee, 1953 36 Tenn.App. 469, 258 S.W.2d 782 Pg. 254	Plaintiff was a guest in defendant's tractor-trailer. Defendant crashed due to an uncertain reason or combination of reasons. The question before the court is whether or not res ipsa loquitur applies in single car automobile accidents.	Res ipsa loquitur "permits the jury to choose the inference of defendant's negligence in preference to other permissible or reasonable inferences" in single car accidents when "the accident was such as does not usually occur without negligence, and the cause of it was in control of the driver."
Perkins v. Texas and New Orleans Ry. Co. Supreme Court of Louisiana, 1962 243 La. 829, 147 So.2d 646 Pg. 259	Decedent was riding in a car driven by a friend, who crossed the railroad tracks in violation of statute and was struck by a train belonging to the defendant. The defendant's train was traveling in excess of the speed limit, which was a violation of statute as well.	Even when there is negligence on the part of the defendant, plaintiff must prove that the defendant's negligence actually caused to the injury.
Reynolds v. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. Court of Appeals of Louisiana, 1885 37 La.Ann. 694 Pg. 262	Plaintiff was injured after falling down unlighted steps, without a handrail, on defendant's property.	"[W]here the negligence of the defendant greatly multiplies the chances of accident to the plaintiff, and is of a character naturally leading to its occurrence, the mere possibility that it might have happened without the negligence is not sufficient to break the chain of cause and effect between the negligence and the injury.
Gentry v. Douglas Hereford Ranch, Inc. Supreme Court of Montana, 1998 290 Mont. 126, 962 P.2d 1205 Pg. 263	Defendant's servant accidentally shot plaintiff's wife.	In a case where plaintiff was injured due to a defect in defendant's property, plaintiff needs to show and prove that it was the ill condition of defendant's property that caused the injury.
Kramer Service, Inc. v. Wilkins Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1939 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 Pg. 267	The plaintiff was injured when glass fell from a previously broken window in defendant's hotel. After the incident, skin cancer developed at the point of injury and plaintiff sued for both the injury form the glass and the cancer. Plaintiff won at trial and defendant appealed.	"It is not enough that negligence of one person and injury to another coexisted, but the injury must have been caused by the negligence."
Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative Supreme Court of Washington, 1983 664 P.2d 474 Pg. 270	Group Health Cooperative negligently failed to diagnose Herskovits cancer on his first trip to the hospital, reducing his chance of survival by 14 percent. At all times Herskovits had less than a 50 percent chance of survival. The issue is whether Herskovits can maintain a cause of action against Group Health Cooperative, in light of his low chance of survival.	The court held that medical testimony of a reduction of chance of survival from 39 percent to 25 percent is sufficient evidence to allow the proximate cause issue to go to the jury. Causing reduction of the opportunity to recover (loss of chance) by one's negligence, however, does not necessitate a total recovery against the negligent party for all damages caused by the victim's death. Damages should be awarded to the injured party or his family based only on damages caused directly by premature death, such as lost earnings and additional medical expenses, etc.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 1995 43 F.3d 1311. Pg. 274	Plaintiffs claim they suffered limb reduction birth defects due to defendant's medicine, which their mothers had used while pregnant.	Plaintiffs must prove that defendant's medicine caused their specific defects, not just that it has caused defects in others, or that it has more than doubled the chance of them having their defects.
Hill v. Edmonds Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, 1966 26 A.D.2d 554, 270 N.Y.S.2d 1020 Pg. 282	Plaintiff crashed into defendant from behind after defendant left his car in the middle of the road with his lights turned off.	"Where separate acts of negligence combine to produce directly a single injury each tortfeasor is responsible for the entire result, even though his act alone might not have caused it."
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. St. M. R.R. Co. Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1920 146 Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 Pg. 283	Plaintiff's property was destroyed by a fire. Defendant's engine negligently caused a bog fire, while another fire was started independently, not by a party in the trial. The question is whether the defendant is liable for damage caused by a fire which he started when it was joined with another he did not start.	"One who negligently sets a fire is not liable if another's property is damaged, unless it is made to appear that the fire was a material element in the destruction of the property."
Summers v. Tice Supreme Court of California, 1948 199 P.2d 1 Pg. 285	Plaintiff and two defendants were hunting quail on the open range. Both defendants shot at the quail, firing in the plaintiff's direction. As a result, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his eye and upper lip.	In situations where plaintiff is injured as a result of defendants negligence, yet it is impossible for plaintiff to determine which defendant caused what injury, the defendants are jointly and severally liable for the whole injury to plaintiff as joint tort feasors. The burden is on the defendants to explain the cause of the injury.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories Supreme Court of California, 1980 26 Cal.3d 588, 607 P.2d 934, 163 Cal.Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 285, 66 L.Ed.2d 140 (1980) Pg. 287	Plaintiff was injured as the result of a drug administered to her mother during pregnancy. The question is whether plaintiff, who cannot identify the manufacturer of the precise product administered, can hold a manufacturer, which produces the exact same drug that caused her injury, liable.	In drug injury cases where a few manufacturers hold a substantial market share for one drug with the same formula, each company can be held liable for an injury by their share of that drug's market.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Daniels Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1911 8 Ga.App. 775, 70 S.E. 203 Pg. 293	Plaintiff drove his car across train tracks and was stuck on the tracks when the railroad tower-man lowered the crossing bars on either side of his car. While trying to escape plaintiff was thrown back against his car, broke several of his teeth, suffered severe injuries on his mouth and face. The court determines the scope of the railroad's liability.	In establishing liability, the entire cause and effect chain does not need to be analyzed. Plaintiff needs to prove that the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury, the close and easily identifiable reason the injury occured.
Ryan v. New York Central R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1866 35 N.Y. 210 Pg. 294	Defendant, by his negligence, set fire to his woodshed. As a result, the plaintiff's home, which was 130 feet from the shed, also took fire and was consumed.	The court ruled that the damage sustained by the plaintiff was too remote from defendant's negligence, and therefore the plaintiff could not recover.
Bartolone v. Jeckovich Surpeme Court of New York, 1984 103 A.D.2d 632, 481 N.Y.S.2d 545 Pg. 297	Plaintiff was involved in an accident from which he received relatively minor injuries which were treated. He subsequently suffered an acute psychotic breakdown, which he claims was caused in part by the accident.	"[A] defendant must take a plaintiff as he finds him and hence may be held liable in damages for aggravation of a pre-existing illness" in cases where defendant's negligence caused an injury which triggered underlying psychological problems.
In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & Co. Court of Appeal, 1921 3 K.B. 560 Pg. 300	A ship carrying a cargo of petrol was set fire and destroyed. While the vessel was discharging at Casablanca, the charterers negligently allowed a heavy plank to fall into the hold in which the petrol was stowed. The plank caused an explosion, which set fire to the vessel.	The fall of the board was due to the negligence of the charterers' servants, the charterers were liable for all the direct consequences of the negligent act, even though those consequences could not reasonably have been anticipated; and they were therefore liable for the loss of the ship by fire.
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co., Ltd. Privy Council, 1961 A.C. 388 Pg. 302	Defendants had carelessly let oil spill from their ship into Sydney harbor. Oil was carried to wharf, which was used for repair work on other ships. The oil caught fire, and caused great damage.	The test of liability for the damage done by fire was the foreseeability of the injury by fire and, as a reasonable man would not, on the facts of this case, have foreseen such injury, the appellants were not liable in negligence for the damage, although their servants' carelessness was the direct cause of the damage.
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 162 N.E. 99 Pg. 308	Two guards, employed by defendant, helped a man get on a moving train. The man was holding a package, which he dropped. The package was full of fireworks and exploded, causing a scale to fall many feet away and injure plaintiff. There was no way for the guards to know the contents of the package.	For an act to be negligent, unless that act is imminently dangerous, a duty of care is owed to a foreseeable plaintiff. There is a split of authority on duty of care. Cardozo, writing for the majority, adopted a narrow view of the duty of care: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension. . . ." Andrews, dissenting, adopts a broad view: "Where there is the unreasonable act, and some right that may be affected there is negligence whether damage does or does not result. . . . Every one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others. Such an act occurs. Not only is he wronged to whom harm might reasonably be expected to result, but he also who is in fact injured, even if he be outside what would generally be thought the danger zone. There needs be duty due the one complaining but this is not a duty to a particular individual because as to him harm might be expected. Harm to some one being the natural result of the act, not only that one alone, but all those in fact injured may complain."
Yun v. Ford Motor Co. Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, 1994 276 N.J. Super. 142, 647 A.2d 841 Pg. 319	Plaintiff's spare tire fell off while driving on a busy road at night. Plaintiff's father was struck by a car after walking across the highway to retrieve the spare tire. Although plaintiff's spare tire was previously damaged in an accident, she brought suit against the car's manufacturer.	The defendant's part, even if it were defective, did not directly cause the injury. "A tortfeasor will be held responsible for his negligent conduct if it is a 'substantial factor' in bringing about plaintiff's injuries."
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp. New York Court of Appeals, 1980 51 N.Y.2d 308, 414 N.E.2d 666, 434 N.Y.S.2d 166 Pg. 325	Plaintiff was struck by a car driven by defendant James Dickens, who had just suffered an epileptic seizure and lost consciousness. Plaintiff was then burned by boiling liquid from a kettle which was also struck by the defendant. This occurred while the plaintiff was working for defendant Felix Contracting Corp. Plaintiffs theory for bringing suit against defendant Felix is that they had "negligently failed to take adequate measures to insure the safety of workers on the excavation site."	"Where the acts of a third person intervene between the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury, the causal connection is not automatically severed. In such a case, liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant's negligence [. . .] An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause and relieve an actor of responsibility, where the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the actor negligent."
Watson v. Kentucky & Indiana Bridge & R.R. Co. Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1910 137 Ky. 619, 126 S.W. 146 Pg. 329	Defendant's train engine spilled a large amount of gasoline onto a roadway. It was later ignited by accident or malice, the intent is debated, of a third party. The resulting explosion injured the plaintiff. The question is whether the defendant can be held liable if the third party was acting out of malice.	"The mere fact that the concurrent cause or intervening act was unforeseen will not relieve t he defendant guilty of the primary negligence from liability, but if the intervening agency is something so unexpected or extraordinary as that he could not or ought not to have anticipated it, he will not be liable, and certainly he is not bound to anticipate the criminal acts of others by which damage is inflicted and hence is not liable therefor."
Fuller v. Preis New York Court of Appeals, 1974 35 N.Y.2d 425, 322 N.E.2d 263, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568 Pg. 335	Decedent committed suicide after sustaining head injuries in an automobile accident. Decedent, at the time, thought he was uninjured. The question is whether the plaintiff's evidence of cause of the suicide was sufficient to withstand dismissal and the defendants, who owned and operated the vehicle which struck decedent's car, were responsible in tort for the suicide.	"[S]uicide, as a matter of law, is not a superseding cause in negligence law precluding liability [. . .] there is neither public policy nor precedent barring recovery for suicide of an injured person driven 'insane' by the consequence of the tortious act." If the suicide was an "irresistible impulse" caused by the injury, and the decedent was "incapable of resisting the impulse to destroy himself" due to his physically damaged brain, then the jury can decide for the plaintiff.
McCoy v. American Suzuki Motor Corp. Supreme Court Washington, 1998 136 Wash.2d 350, 961 P.2d 952 Pg. 338	Plaintiff was struck by a hit and run driver while crossing the roadway after he had finished helping a driver of a Suzuki Samurai which crashed. Plaintiff is bringing suit against Suzuki, claiming that the Samurai was defective, and caused the wreck in the first place.	If Suzuki did manufacture a defective vehicle, the injuries are not so remote that liability is cut off. The plaintiff could be covered by the rescue doctrine if the vehicle was defective.
Kelly v. Gwinnell Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 Pg. 344	Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with defendant Gwinnell, who was intoxicated. Plaintiff is also holding another man, Zak, as co-defendant for serving defendant Gwinnell alcohol even though he was visibly intoxicated. There is no statute prohibiting adult hosts from serving adult guests alcohol when they are intoxicated.	"[A] host who serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a motor vehicle, is liable for injuries inflicted on a third party as a result of negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the intoxication," due to the fact that the "policy considerations served by its imposition far outweigh those asserted in the opposition."
Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co. Court of Appeals of New York, 1991 77 N.Y.2d 377, 570 N.E.2d 198, 568 N.Y.S.2d 550 Pg. 349	Plaintiff's grandmother used a drug (DES) which was later shown to cause birth defects. Plaintiff's mother claims the defects caused by the grandmother's use of the drug lead to the plaintiff being born with more severe defects and disabilities.	It is the court's "duty to confine liability within manageable limits. Limiting liability to those who ingested the drug or were exposed to it in utero serves this purpose." There is no "legal duty toward generations not yet conceived." This serves public policy to keep the availability of prescription drugs as well, since over enforcing by the court would possibly discourage research and drugs from entering the market.
Bierczynski v. Rogers Supreme Court of Delaware, 1968 239 A.2d 218 Pg. 361	Plaintiff and friend were racing their automobiles and the plaintiff's friend crashed into the defendant. Plaintiff contends that he is not liable because he himself did not crash into the defendant.	"[A]ll who engage in a race on the highway do so at their peril, and are liable for injury or damage sustained by a third person as a result thereof, regardless of which of the racing cars directly inflicted the injury or damage."
Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1983 97 Ill.2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197, 73 Ill.Dec. 337 Pg. 364	Plaintiff is the administrator of decedent's estate. Decedent perished while operating a hydraulic device manufactured by the defendant, and is bringing suit based on strict product liability. The question before the court is whether comparative negligence is applicable to products liability cases, whether comparative negligence eliminates joint and several liability, and whether retention of joint and several liability under comparative negligence denies equal protection of the law.	Comparative negligence does apply to product liability torts. "[If the court were to] eliminate joint and several liability as the defendant advocates, the burden of the insolvent or immune defendant would fall on the plaintiff; in that circumstance, plaintiff's damages would be reduced beyond the percentage of fault attributable to him," and thus joint and several liability remains under comparative negligence.
Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. Court of Appeals of New Mexico, 1982 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579, cert. denied, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 Pg. 366	Plaintiff was in an automobile accident with the defendant. There is no question of the defendant's negligence, other than the fact that another unknown driver also helped to cause the accident. "The question is whether, in a comparative negligence case, a concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the entire damage caused by concurrent tortfeasors."	"Joint and several liability is not to be retained in our pure comparative negligence system on a theory of one indivisible wrong. The concept of one indivisible wrong, based on common law technicalities, is obsolete, and is not to be applied in comparative negligence cases in New Mexico [. . .] The second ground is that joint and several liability must be retained in order to favor plaintiffs; a plaintiff should not bear the risk of being unable to collect his judgment. We fail to understand the argument. Between one plaintiff and one defendant, the plaintiff bears the risk of the defendant being insolvent."
Bundt v. Embro Supreme Court of New York, Queens County, 1965 48 Misc.2d 802, 265 N.Y.S.2d 872 Pg. 371	The questions before the court is whether satisfaction is a defense and bar to double recovery.
Cox v. Pearl Investment Co. Supreme Court of Colorado, 1969 168 Colo. 67, 450 P.2d 60 Pg. 374	Plaintiff fell on property owned by the defendant. Plaintiff settled with a joint tortfeasor, the tenant of the property. The question is whether that settlement releases the defendant as well.	"[A] joint tort-feasor is not ipso facto released by a covenant not to sue. [. . .] The danger of over compensation or double compensation is no excuse for barring a claim against joint tort-feasors."
Elbaor v. Smith Supreme Court of Texas, 1992 845 S.W.2d 240 Pg. 378	The question before the court is the legality of "Mary Carter" settlements, where plaintiffs settle with a co-defendant but bring suit against another defendant.	The court "does not favor settlement agreements that skew the trial process, mislead the jury, promote unethical collusion among nominal adversaries, and create the likelihood that a less culpable defendant will be hit with the full judgment. [. . .] Thus, [the court declares Mary Carter settlements] void as violative of sound public policy.
Knell v. Feltman United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1949 85 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 174 F.2d 662 Pg. 383	A car owned and operated by plaintiff crashed into a taxi owned by defendant and operated by his employee. Plaintiff's passenger sued defendant. Defendant sued the plaintiff, claiming the plaintiff's negligence caused the crash. At trial, the plaintiff was found responsible for some damages, and now claims since he was not a joint tortfeasor, he is not responsible.	The court sees "no substance in the suggestion that contribution between concurrent tortfeasors can be enforced only if both are judgment debtors of the plaintiff."
Yellow Cab Co. of D.C., Inc. v. Dreslin United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1950 86 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 181 F.2d 626 Pg. 386	"The question here concerns contribution between tortfeasors where the judgment creditor is the wife of the tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought." The case arose from an automobile accident between the two parties.	"Contribution [...[ depends upon joint liability. An injured party plaintiff in the suit from which a right of contribution develops must have had a cause of action against the party from whom contribution is sought."
Slocum v. Donahue Court of Appeals of Massachusetts, 1998 44 Mass.App.Ct. 937, 693 N.E.2d 179 Pg. 388	Defendant was backing out of his driveway and struck plaintiff's son. The floor mat in the defendant's car, which was manufactured by Ford, caused the car to accelerate and interfered with the braking system. Ford settled with the plaintiff. Plaintiff won against defendant, and now the defendant appeals, claiming collusion between the plaintiff and Ford.	The existence of a settlement by itself does not prove collusion. There would only be indemnity in a case where defendant was not liable.
Bruckman v. Pena Colorado Court of Appeals, 1971 29 Colo.App. 357, 487 P.2d 566 Pg. 392	Defendant was involved in an automobile accident with the plaintiff. Later, defendant was involved in another automobile accident with a third party. The question before the court is whether the defendant was able to recover damages for injuries subsequent to the injury caused by the plaintiff.	Damages are limited to those proximately caused by the party, and can not include those from subsequent causes for which the party is not responsible.
Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Division, Nat'l Steel Corp. United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1974 495 F.2d 213 Pg. 395	Plaintiffs are Canadian and allege that the defendants, American corporations, are polluting, causing damage to their properties. The question before the court is whether "[u]nder the law of the State of Michigan, may multiple defendants, whose independent actions of allegedly discharging pollutants into the ambient air thereby allegedly create a nuisance, be jointly and severally liable to multiple plaintiffs for numerous individual injuries which plaintiffs claim to have sustained as a result of said actions, where said pollutants mix in the air so that their separate effects in creating the individual injuries are impossible to analyze."	"The [P]laintif's right to recover for his harm should not depend on his ability to apportion the damage but that this is a problem which is properly left with the defendants themselves."
Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1932 85 N.H. 449, 163 A. 111 Pg. 400	Plaintiff's son died while playing on a bridge. The defendant ran wire through the bride to carry electricity for lights, and insulated the wire from weather but not from contact. The decedent lost his balance on top of the bridge and grabbed onto defendant's wire to regain his balance, which electrocuted and killed him. The question before the court is whether the defendant is liable for the death.	The defendant's only liability was "in exposing him to the danger of charged wires," not the fall itself, and is only responsible for additional injury caused by the wire.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. New York Court of Appeals, 1916 111 N.E. 1050 Pg. 409	Buick (defendant) sells car to dealer. Dealer sells car to customer (plaintiff). Customer suffers injury because of a car defect that could have been detected by Buick's reasonable inspection.	Manufacturer negligence liability is based on three elements, as stated by Cardozo in the opinion: "If the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a THING OF DANGER. If to the element of danger there is added KNOWLEDGE THAT THE THING WILL BE USED BY PERSONS OTHER THAN THE PURCHASER, and used WITHOUT NEW TESTS, then, irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it carefully."
Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. Court of Appeals of New York, 1928 159 N.E. 896 Pg. 412	Plaintiff sues defendant, a water works company, for its failure to supply adequate water to stop a fire from spreading to his warehouse. Defendant had a contract with the city to supply water.	"A member of the public may not maintain an action [for breach of contract]... against one contracting with the city ... unless the intention appears that the promisor is to be answerable to indvidual members of the public..." A duty of care is not owed to the public by the promisor that contracts with a city to supply water; failure to supply adequate water is merely a denial of a benefit. There is no statuory duty on the part of the promisor to the intended benficiaries of a contract with the city.
Clagett v. Dacy Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1980 47 Md. App. 23, 420 A.2d 1285 Pg. 414	"Appellants were the high bidders at a foreclosure sale, but because the attorneys conducting the sale failed to follow the proper procedurs, the sale was set aside [. . .] Ultimately, the debtor discharged the loan, thus "redeeming" his land, and appellants lost the opportunity to acquire the property and make a profit on its resale. They sued the attorneys [...] to recover their loss, alleging the attorneys in question owed them, as bidders, a duty to use care and diligence and to conduct the sale 'properly and carefully.'"	"Appellees were engaged to represent the mortgagee [...] not the bidders, whose interest would likely be in conflict with that of the mortgagee." The appellees owed the appellants no duty, they only owe the duty to their client.
Hegel v. Langsam Court of Common Pleas of Ohio 1971 29 Ohio Misc. 147, 55 Ohio Ops.2d 476, 273 N.E.2d 351 Pg. 417	Plaintiff claims that the defendants permitted her minor child to become "associated with criminals, to be seduced, to become a drug user and [...] failed to return her to her parents' custody on demand."	A university does not have "any duty to regulate the private lives of their students, to control their comings and goings and to supervise their associations."
L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks Supreme Court of Indiana, 1942 220 Ind. 86, 40 N.E.2d 334 Pg. 420	Defendant was caught in an escalator run by plaintiff. Defendant's injuries were aggravated due to the plaintiff delaying stopping the escalator for an unreasonable amount of time. Defendant won, and plaintiff appealed. The question before the court is whether the operator had the duty to stop the escalator.	Though the court does not deal with moral issues, "[t]here may be principles of social conduct so universally recognized as to be demanded that they be observed as a legal duty [. . .] there may be a legal obligation to take positive or affirmative steps to effect the rescue of a person who is helpless or in a situation of peril, when the one proceeded against is a master or invitor, or when the injury resulted from use of an instrumentality under the control of the defendant. Such an obligation may exist although the accident or original injury was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff or through that of a third person and without any fault on the part of the defendant."
J.S. and M.S. v. R.T.H. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1998 155 N.J. 330, 714 A.2d 924 Pg. 426	Defendant's husband sexually abused the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant should have known of her husband's actions and was negligent by not preventing him.	"Foreseeability as a component of a duty to exercise due care is based on the defendant's knowledge of the risk of injury and is susceptible to objective analysis. That knowledge may be an actual awareness of risk. Such knowledge may also be constructive; the defendant may be charged with knowledge if she is 'in a position' to 'discover the risk of harm.'"
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California Supreme Court of California, 1976 551 P.2d 334 Pg. 432	On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff. Plaintiffs, Tatiana's parents, allege that two months earlier Poddar confided his intention to kill Tatiana to Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist. They allege that on Moore's request, the campus police briefly detained Poddar, but released him when he appeared rational. They further claim that Dr. Harvey Powelson, Moore's superior, then directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar. No one warned plaintiffs of Tatiana's peril.	Court concluded that public policy favoring protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.
State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit (en banc), 1985 752 F.2d 1019, cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986) Pg. 439	Collision of defendant and another ship caused a large chemical spill in the Mississippi river. Cases against the defendant were consolidated.	"Denying recovery for pure economic losses is a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of foreseeability [. . .] Extending theories of liability may not always be the more moral course, especially in such a case [...] where the extension, in the course of awarding damages to unnumbered claimants for injuries that are unavoidably speculative, may well visit destruction on enterprise after enterprise, with the consequent loss of employment and productive capacity which that entails."
Daley v. LaCroix Supreme Court of Michigan, 1970 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 Pg. 450	Defendant crashed his car into plaintiffs' property, causing considerable property damage. Plaintiffs are suing for, in addition to property damages, mental disturbance.	"[W]here a definite and objective physical injury is produced as a result of emotional distress proximately caused by defendant's negligent conduct, the plaintiff in a properly pleaded and proved action may recover in damages for such physical consequences to himself notwithstanding the absence of any physical impact upon plaintiff at the time of the mental shock."
Thing v. La Chusa Supreme Court of California, In Bank 1989 48 Cal.3d 644, 771 P.2d 814, 257 Cal.Rptr. 865 Pg. 456	Plaintiff's child was hit by a car operated by defendant, she was nearby but did not witness the accident. Plaintiff is suing for emotional distress she suffered "when she arrived at the accident scene."	"[A] plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, and only if, said plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of the injury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress - a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances."
Endresz v. Friedberg New York Court of Appeals, 1969 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 Pg. 464	Plaintiff's wife, who was seven months pregnant, was injured in a car accident with the defendant. Plaintiff's wife later gave birth to stillborn twins. Plaintiff is suing for wrongful death.	There is no cause of action for injury to an fetus until it is born, "the damages recoverable by the parents in their own right" for suffering as a result of stillbirth "afford ample redress for the wrong done."
Procanik by Procanik v. Cillo Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1984 97 N.J. 339, 478 A.2d 755 Pg. 469	The infant plaintiff is suing defendant doctors for wrongful birth. The defendant doctors negligently failed to diagnose plaintiff's mother with German Measles while she was pregnant with the plaintiff, depriving the parents the choice of terminating the pregnancy. The plaintiff, due to his mother's disease, was born with congenital rubella syndrome.	"[A]n infant plaintiff may recover as special damages the extraordinary medical expenses attributable to his affliction, but he may not recover general damages for emotional distress or for an impaired childhood."
Taylor v. Olsen Supreme Court of Oregon, 1978 282 Or. 343, 578 P.2d 779 Pg. 480	A tree on defendant's yard splintered and fell across a public roadway. Shortly after it fell, plaintiff's car hit the tree. The tree's center had decayed, but it would not have been obvious to any normal inspection.	A landowner has the duty to maintain and inspect his premises to a reasonable degree, but the degree depends on the use and viability of inspection. There is no evidence that normal inspection would have revealed the infirm nature of the tree, and under that circumstance the defendant can not be found guilty.
Salevan v. Wilmington Park, Inc. Superior Court of Delaware, 1950 45 Del. (6 Terry) 290, 72 A.2d 239 Pg. 482	Plaintiff, Salevan, was struck by a baseball coming from the defendant, Wilmington Park, while walking down an adjacent street. The ball was struck out of the park over the side fence, a relatively common occurrence.	Property owners need to take precautions to prevent all the danger emanating from the property from injuring the public.
Sheehan v. St. Paul & Duluth Ry. Co. United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 1896 76 Fed. 201 Pg. 485	Plaintiff was trespassing on the railroad's tracks and got his foot caught in a cattle guard. A train came and ran over his foot.	There is a duty of care in averting injury in the areas where crossings would be expected or commonplace, regardless of the legality of the crossing. In other areas, where a danger is not expected, the duty to avoid or mitigate injury does not exist until the discovery of the danger.
Barmore v. Elmore Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District, 1980 83 Ill.App.3d 1056, 403 N.E.2d 1355, 38 Ill.Dec. 751 Pg. 489	Plaintiff entered defendant's house to conduct Masonic Lodge business. Both plaintiff and defendant were members of the lodge. During the course of the visit, plaintiff was stabbed by defendant's son, who had a history of mental illness and violence. Plaintiff asserts that defendant needed to warn him of hidden dangers, including the possibility of the defendant's son behaving violently. Plaintiff also contended that he was an invitee, not a licensee.	"In order for a person to be classified as an invitee, it is sufficient that he go on the land in furtherance of the owner's business. It is not necessary that the invited person gain an advantage by his entry on the land. A social guest is considered a licensee and has been defined as one who enters the premises of the owner by permission, but for the licensee's own purposes. Therefore, a social guest is a person who goes on another's property for companionship, diversion, or entertainment.
Campbell v. Weathers Supreme Court of Kansas, 1941 153 Kan. 316, 111 P.2d 72 Pg. 492	Plaintiff entered defendant's store, which he regularly patronizes. Though he didn't buy anything that day, he browsed the store and eventually went to use the bathroom, which was not regarded as a private toilet. In the dark hallway leading to the toilet, he fell into an open trap door and was injured.	"'An invitee is one who is either expressly or impliedly invited onto the premises of another in connection with the business carried on by that other. If one goes into a store with a view of then, or at some other time, doing some business with the store, he is an invitee.' Of course, if it appears that a person had no intention of presently or in the future becoming a customer he could not be held to be an invitee, as there would be no basis for any thought of mutual benefit."
Whelan v. Van Natta Court of Appeals of Kentucky, 1964 382 S.W.2d 205 Pg. 495	Plaintiff bought cigarettes while in defendant's store. When he asked for a box, he was instructed to go to a back room. While searching the back room, plaintiff fell down a stair well that he could not see, in part due to the lack of lighting. Plaintiff claims by buying cigarettes, he became an invitee rather than a licensee and is entitled to damages.	"'The possessor of land is subject to liability to another as an invitee only for harm sustained while he is on the land within the scope of his invitation.'"
Rowland v. Christian Supreme Court of California, 1968 443 P.2d 561 Pg. 502	Plaintiff, a social guest of defendant, injures his hand on a faulty porcelain handle on a water faucet. Defendant had complained to her landlord of the defect two weeks prior to the incident.	"The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land ... is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and, although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative."
Borders v. Roseberry Supreme Court of Kansas, 1975 216 Kan. 486, 532 P.2d 1366 Pg. 507	Plaintiff's friend leased a house from the defendant. The house had no guttering and the porch became icy after rain in freezing cold weather; the plaintiff's friend complained about this to the defendant. After eating dinner at the house, the plaintiff slipped and fell on the icy steps while leaving and was injured.	The lessor is not liable unless a nuisance exists on the property that is dangerous to persons outside of the leased properties that exists on the premises before the time of lease.
Pagelsdorf v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1979 91 Wis.2d 734, 284 N.W.2d 55 Pg. 511	Plaintiff, having been invited to the property by a tenant, was injured due to a poorly maintained railing on a balcony. The jury dismissed the case on the ground that the defendant, the landlord, did not know of the poor condition of the railing. Plaintiff appealed claiming the trial court "erred in failing to instruct the jury that [defendant] owed [plaintiff] a duty to exercise ordinary care in maintaining the premises."	"A landlord owes his tenant or anyone on the premises with the tenant's consent a duty to exercise ordinary care. If a person lawfully on the premises is injured as a result of the landlord's negligence in maintaining the premises, he is entitled to recover from the landlord under general negligence principles. Issues of notice of the defect, its obviousness, control of the premises, and so forth are all relevant only insofar as they bear on the ultimate question: Did the landlord exercise ordinary care in the maintenance of the premises under all the circumstances?"
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp. United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1970 439 F.2d 477 Pg. 514	Plaintiff suffered injuries from a criminal assault & battery occuring in the common hallway of her apartment building. Security measures in the building had decreased significantly from 1959, when plaintiff signed her lease, to 1966, despite an increasing number of crimes committed against tenants.	"There is a duty of protection owed by the landlord to the tenant in an urban multiple unit apartment dwelling ...[The] standard of protection may be taken as that commonly provided in apartments of this character and type in this community ... [The landlord's] duty is to take those measures of protection which are within his power and capacity to take, and which can reasonably be expected to mitigate the risk of intruders assaulting and robbing tenants."
Anderson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana, 1974 377 F.Supp. 136 Pg. 520	Plaintiff was injured in a fire caused by a heater which the defendant negligently produced and was subsequently awarded compensatory damages. Defendant moved for remittitur on the basis of the maximum recovery rule."	The court has the ability to review the award decided by the jury and decided whether it falls within a reasonable maximum recovery.
Richardson v. Chapman Supreme Court of Illinois, 1987 175 Ill. 2d 98, 676 N.E.2d 621 Pg. 524	Plaintiff was struck by a defendant's truck while stopped at a traffic light and subsequently awarded compensatory damages for the serious injuries sustained. Defendant claims the damages are excessive based on predicted costs of medical care.	"An award of damages will be deemed excessive if it falls outside the range of fair and reasonable compensation or results from passion or prejudice, or if it is so large that it shocks the judicial conscience."
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Anderson Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1998 334 Ark. 561, 976 S.W.2d 382 Pg. 540	Appellee was injured while shopping in appellant's store. Appellant's employees sent the appellee to a hospital for medical treatment. Appellant moved in limine to prohibit appellee from presenting the total amount billed by the hospital as proof of her medical expenses and asked that the evidence be limited to the actual amount for which the appellee would be responsible to pay. Appellee claims the collateral-source rule prohibits the appellant from introducing evidence showing the appellee does not have to pay the bill in full.	Collateral sources of recovery may be introduced in order to "(1) rebut the plaintiff's testimony that he or she was compelled by financial necessity to return to work prematurely or to forego additional medical care; (2) to show that the plaintiff had attributed his condition to some other cause, such as sickness; (3)to impeach the plaintiff's testimony that he or she had paid his medical expenses h imself; (4) to show that the plaintiff had actually continued to work instead of being out of work, as claimed."
Zimmerman v. Ausland Supreme Court of Oregon, 1973 266 Or. 427, 513 P.2d 1167 Pg. 545	Plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident due to the negligence of the defendant and was subsequently awarded compensatory damages for permanent injury. Defendant claimed the plaintiff should have avoided permanent injury through surgery and therefore the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages.	The jury has the ability to decide whether a plaintiff received permanent injury or in fact failed to mitigate damages.
Cheatham v. Pohle Supreme Court of Indiana, 2003 789 N.E.2d 467 Pg. 551	Defendant distributed nude photographs of plaintiff, his former wife, including her name, work address, and phone number. Plaintiff sued for invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress.	"Because punitive damages do not compensate the plaintiff, the plaintiff has no right or entitlement to an award of punitive damages in any amount." Any amount of punitive damages given to the plaintiff is a "creation of state law."
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell Supreme Court of the United States, 2003 538 U.S. 408, 123 S. Ct. 1513, (Torts Edit) Pg. 556	Although investigators and witnesses concluded that Curtis Campbell caused an accident in which one person was killed and another permanently disabled, his insurer, petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, contested liability, declined to settle the ensuing claims for the $ 50,000 policy limit, ignored its own investigators' advice, and took the case to trial, assuring Campbell and his wife that they had no liability for the accident, that State Farm would represent their interests, and that they did not need separate counsel. In fact, a Utah jury returned a judgment for over three times the policy limit, and State Farm refused to appeal.	A punitive damages award of $ 145 million, where full compensatory damages are $ 1 million, is excessive and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1970 398 U.S. 375, 90 S.Ct. 1772, 26 L.Ed.2d 339 Pg. 565	Decedent, a longshoreman, was killed while working on a ship. The plaintiff, who is his widow, brought suit against the owner of the vessel for wrongful death and pain and suffering due to negligence and unseaworthiness of the ship.	"An action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties."
Selders v. Armentrout Supreme Court of Nebraska, 1973 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 Pg. 573	Three of Plaintiff's children were killed in an automobile accident due to defendants' negligent actions. The issue of appeal involves the proper elements and measure of damages.	Recovery may be allowed for a child not only for pecuniary losses, but also for loss of "society, comfort, and companionship of the child."
Murphy v. Martin Oil Co. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1974 56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 Pg. 578	Plaintiff's husband died from severe injuries received in a fire on defendant's property. Suit was brought under the survival statute and wrongful death statute.	"To say that there can be recovery only for wrongful death is to provide an obviously inadequate justice. Too, the result in such a case is that the wrongdoer will have to answer for only a portion of the damages he caused. Incongruously, if the injury caused is so severe that death results, the wrongdoer's liability for the damages before death will be extinguished. It is obvious that in order to have a full liability and a full recovery there must be an action allowed for damages up to the time of death, as well as thereafter."
McIntyre v. Balentine Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1992 833 S.W.2d 52 Pg. 592	Plaintiff entered the highway and was struck by a tractor owned by the defendant. The tractor was speeding and both men had consumed alcohol that evening. Jury found the plaintiff and defendant equally at fault, in part due to plaintiff's intoxication.	The common law doctrine of contributory negligence is outmoded and unjust, especially in comparison to a system of comparative fault.
Seigneur v. National Fitness Institute, Inc. Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 2000 132 Md. App. 271, 752 A.2d 631 Pg. 601	Plaintiff was injured while using the exercise machines of the defendant. Although the plaintiff signed an exculpatory clause, she claimed the clause is invalid because the defendant has far more bargaining power and serves the public interest.	"The ultimate determination of what constitutes the public interest must be made considering the totality of the circumstances of any given case against the backdrop of current societal expectations."
Rush v. Commercial Realty Co. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1929 7 N.J.Misc. 337, 145 A. 476 Pg. 607	Plaintiffs were tenants of the defendant. Mrs. Rush, while using a detached privy, fell through the poorly maintained floor.	Mrs. Rush had no choice but to use the facility provided by the landlord, who has the duty to maintain it. It was not an assumption of a risk or care, since she was not required to "leave the premises and go elsewhere." The question of contributory negligence is for the jury to decide.
Blackburn v. Dorta Supreme Court of Florida, 1977 348 So.2d 287 Pg. 610	The court consolidated three cases dealing with assumption of risk as a complete bar to recovery.	"The only significant form of assumption of risk (implied-qualified) is so readily characterized, conceptualized, and verbalized as contributory negligence" that there is no "sound rational for retaining it as a separate affirmative defense to negligent conduct which bars recovery altogether."
Teeters v. Currey Supreme Court of Tennessee, 1974 518 S.W.2d 512. Pg. 614	Plaintiff received an operation from the defendant in order to ensure sterility. The defendant negligently performed the procedure, and the plaintiff discovered she was pregnant 2 years after the surgery. Since the suit was filed over 3 years following the original surgery, the defendant plead the statute of limitations, which requires action in malpractice suits before 1 year from the damage. Plaintiff filed suit 11 months following the malpractice.	"The cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations commences to run when the patient discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable care and diligence for his own health and welfare, should have discovered the resulting injury."
Freehe v. Freehe Supreme Court of Washington, 1972 81 Wash.2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 Pg. 622	Plaintiff was injured due to defendant's negligent maintenance of a tractor. The plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife respectively, and the defendant filed for summary judgment on the basis of interspousal tort immunity. The tractor and the farm operation it was located on are separate property belonging to the defendant.	Interspousal immunity is not reasonable for personal injury cases.
Renko v. McLean Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1997 346 Md. 464, 697 A.2d 468 Pg. 625	Plantiff brought a tort against her biological mother for injuries sustained in an automobile accident when she was a minor. Maryland was one of the few states still including motor torts under the parent-child immunity doctrine.	The parent-child immunity doctrine is proper if it is in the best interest of the public.
Abernathy v. Sisters of St. Mary's Supreme Court of Missouri, 1969 446 S.W.2d 599 Pg. 633	Plaintiff was injured as a result of negligence on the part of the defendant's employee. The defendant claims immunity due to the fact they are a charity.	The doctrine of charitable immunity was not well founded. "A nongovernmental charitable institution is liable for its own negligence and the negligence of its agents and employees acting within the scope of their employment."
Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1973 453 Pa. 584, 305 A.2d 877 Pg. 637	Appellants' minor son was seriously injured by a machine while attending school and his arm was subsequently amputated. Appellants claim the school district was negligent. Appellee objected on grounds of governmental immunity.	The governmental immunity doctrine is long "devoid of any valid justification" and abolished it.
Riss v. New York New York Court of Appeals, 1968 22 N.Y.2d 579, 240 N.E.2d 860, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897. Pg. 642	Plaintiff was harassed by a rejected suitor, who claimed he would kill or seriously injure her if she dated someone else. Plaintiff repeatedly asked for police protection and was ignored. After the news of her engagement, the plaintiff was again threatened and called the police to no avail. The next day, a thug, sent by the rejected suitor, partially blinded the plaintiff and disfigured her face.	The municipality does not have a duty to provide police protection to an individual. It has a duty to the public as a whole, but no one in particular.
DeLong v. Erie County New York Supreme Court, 1982 89 A.D.2d 376, 455 N.Y.S.2d 887 Pg. 644	After dialing 911, the decedent (plaintiff's wife) is fatally stabbed by a burglar. The 911 complaint writer incorrectly recorded the victim's address, in addition to other mistakes including failing to repeat the victim's address. The 911 dispatcher also failed to follow up on the complaint after discovering there was no such address as the one reported by the complaint writer.	The county does have the duty of police protection when it volunteers to protect an individual and dereliction of this duty results in harm.
Deuser v. Vecera United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, 1998 139 F.3d 1190 Pg. 648	Larry Deuser was intoxicated at the Veiled Prophet Fair in St. Louis, and was inappropriately touching women and urinating in public. He was escorted out of the fair by National Park Rangers and some time later he wandered on to a highway and was struck and killed by a motorist. This action for wrongful death was brought by Deuser's estate against the Park Rangers.	The test for whether actions of the government or government actors fall within the "discretionary function exception" is two fold. First, the court must consider whether the actions were discretionary, that is, where they a matter of choice. Second, the court must determine "whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield."
Bussard v. Minimed, Inc. California Court of Appeal, 2003 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 675, 105 Cal.App.4th 798 Pg. 661	Irma Hernandez was an employee of defendant Minimed, Inc. Minimed sprayed pesticide overnight at their facility and Hernandez became ill the following day because of the spray and asked to leave work early. On her way home, Hernandez became dizzy and crashed into the car of plaintiff, Barbara Bussard, who was stopped at a red light. Bussard filed this action against Minimed for liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.	"'[F]oreseeability' as a test for respondeat superior merely means that in the context of the particular enterprise an employee's conduct is not so unusual or startling that it would seem unfair to include the loss resulting from it among other costs of the employer's business."
O'Shea v. Welch United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 2003 350 F.3d 1101 Pg. 663	Plaintiff, O'Shea, sufferred injuries when the car he was driving was struck by a car driven by defendant, Welch. In his complaint, O'Shea alleged that Welch, an Osco employee, was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. O'Shea sought to hold Osco liable for damages under a theory of respondeat superior.	"If an employee wholly abandons, even temporarily, the employer's business for personal reasons, the act is not within the scope of employment, and the employer is not liable under respondeat superior for the employee's conduct during that lapse."
Murrell v. Goertz Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, 1979 597 P.2d 1223 Pg. 667	Bruce Goertz, was collecting money for the delivery of appellant's morning newspaper, the Daily Oklahoman, which is published by appellee. Appellant questioned Goertz about damage to his screen door caused by a newspaper boy throwing the newspaper into it, an argument arose, and appellant slapped Goertz who then struck appellant. As a result, appellant required medical treatment and hospitalization. Appellant filed suit asserting "that Goertz was a servant of appellee either by agreement between the co-defendants, or by appellee creating the apparent belief in appellant that Goertz was a servant by allowing Goertz to deliver the paper, advertise that product, and to collect for accounts due."	"The line of demarcation between an independent contractor and a servant is not clearly drawn. An independent contractor is one who engages to perform a certain service for another according to his own methods and manner, free from control and direction of his employer in all matters connected with the performance of the service except as to the result thereof."
Maloney v. Rath Supreme Court of California, 1968 69 Cal.2d 442, 445 P.2d 513, 71 Cal.Rptr. 897 Pg. 669	Plaintiff, while stopped in a left-turn lane waiting for the signal, was hit form behind by defendant, who's brakes failed. Plaintiff, now brings this action to recover damages for injuries to her person and property incurred in an automobile accident. "She appeals from an adverse judgment and from an order denying her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the issue of liability."	"Unlike strict liability, a nondelegable duty operates, not as a substitute for liability based on negligence, but to assure that when a negligently caused harm occurs, the injured party will be compensated by the person whose activity caused the harm and who may therefore properly be held liable for the negligence of his agent, whether his agent was an employee or an independent contractor."
Popejoy v. Steinle Supreme Court of Wyoming, 1991 820 P.2d 545 Pg. 673	Connie Steinle, her daughter and a niece were en route to purchase a calf for the daughter to raise on the ranch, when the truck Connie was driving collided with a vehicle driven by Ronald Popejoy. Connie died as a result of the accident and Ronald sustained injuries initially diagnosed as a muscle strain. Plaintiff, Popejoy attempted to re-open defendant, Connie Steinle's estate to recover damages for his multiple surgeries to correct his back ailments. When that failed, plaintiff filed a complaint against the personal representatives of William's [Connie's husband] estate, who had died from an unrelated illness. The complaint was premised on the theory that William and Connie Steinle were engaged in a joint venture when Connie embarked on her May 8, 1986 "business trip" to pick up the daughter's calf.	"The burden of establishing the existence of a joint venture is upon the party asserting that the relationship exists." . . . Plaintiffs must demonstrate each of the elements of a joint venture relationship in order to prevail and "must show that the joint venture relationship existed at the time of the alleged negligent conduct."
Shuck v. Means Supreme Court of Minnesota, 1974 302 Minn. 93, 226 N.W.2d 285 Pg. 678	Plaintiff, Carol L. Shuck, brings this action to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident involving a vehicle owned by defendant Hertz Rent-A-Car and driven by defendant David Means. Means was only 18 years of age at the time of the accident, while the Hertz rental contract required that drivers be at least 21. The court considers whether a car rental agency is liable under the Minnesota Safety Responsibility Act when one of its cars is leased by one person, but operated by another in violation of the rental agreement.	"Proving lack of consent in these situations requires a strong showing that the car was being used by the permittee without the owner's knowledge and contrary to his explicit instructions, or that the subpermittee was driving without the permission of the first permittee under conditions which approach the status of conversion or a theft."
Smalich v. Westfall Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1970 440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476 Pg. 681	Plaintiff, the estate of Julia Smalich, seeks damages in both wrongful death and a survival action, against defendants, Westfall and Blank. The cars owned by Smalich and Blank collided in Westmoreland County. The car owned by Smalich, was operated by Felix Rush Westfall, with Julia and her minor son as passengers. The other vehicle involved was operated by Stephanna Louise Blank. Julia Smalich suffered injuries in the collision which caused her death, but her son Michael Smalich was injured, and later recovered.	"[A] plaintiff ought not to be barred from recovery against a negligent defendant by the contributory negligence of a third person unless the relationship between the plaintiff and the third person is such that the plaintiff would be vicariously liable as a defendant for the negligent acts of the third person. . ."
Rylands v. Fletcher House of Lords, 1868 L.R. 3 H.L. 330 Pg. 692	Defendant contracts to build a reservoir on his land, which is located on top of old coal mines that are connected to the mines constructed by the plaintiff on a separate parcel of land. The reservoir fails, and water falls into the old mines, eventually flooding plaintiff's mines.	"If a person brings, or accumulates, on his land anything which, if it should escape, may cause damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. If it does escape, and cause damage, he is responsible, however careful he may have been, and whatever precautions he may have taken to prevent the damage."
Miller v. Civil Constructors, Inc. Illinois Court of Appeal, 1995 272 Ill.App.3d 263, 651 N.E.2d 239 Pg. 699	Plaintiff, Gerald Miller, was injured when a stray bullet ricocheted in the gravel pit of the defendant, Civil Constructors, Inc., and caused Miller to fall off a truck. The bullet strayed during the course of firearm target practice. Miller brings action against Civil Constructors under the theory of strict liability by asserting that the discharge of firearms in a quarry shooting range is an ultrahazardous activity.	"The essential question is whether the risk created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability even though the activity is carried on with all reasonable care" . . . "The use of guns or firearms, even though classified as dangerous or even highly dangerous, is not the type of activity that must be deemed ultrahazardous. . ."
Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co. United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 1990 916 F.2d 1174 Pg. 702	Defendant is a manufacturer of acrylonitrile, a highly flammable and toxic chemical. Defendant contracted to ship 20,000 gallons of acrylonitrile by railroad. While the car filled with the chemical was being switched to a different line at plaintiff's railroad yard, a leak was discovered. 4,000 gallons of acrylonitrile was spilled in the rail yard before the leak could be stopped. Plaintiff was ordered by the state of Illinois to pay for decontamination measures.	A shipper/manufacturer of acrylonitrile should not be held strictly liable for a spill occuring during transportation; A negligence liability standard is adequate.
Foster v. Preston Mill Co. Supreme Court of Washington, 1954 44 Wash.2d 440, 268 P.2d 645 Pg. 710	Defendant, Preston Mill Company, was conducting blasting operations and frightened a mother mink, owned by plaintiff, Foster. The mink's increased anxiety caused her to kill her kittens. Foster brought this action against the company to recover damages under a theory of absolute liability, and, in the alternative, nuisance.	"[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm."
Golden v. Amory Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1952 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d 131 Pg. 712	Plaintiffs, real estate owners by the Chicopee River, brought a suit against the defendants, owners of a hydroelectric plant in Ludlow. The Chicopee River overflowed and damaged plaintiff's real estate after a hurricane, and they now assert that defendant was negligence in its maintenance of the Alden Street dike.	The rule that "the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape," does not apply where the injury results from an act of God that the owner had no reason to anticipate.
Sandy v. Bushey Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1925 124 Me. 320, 128 A. 513 Pg. 714	Plaintiff was kicked by the defendant's horse and seriously injured. Plaintiff brings this action to recover damages for such injuries.	"The fact must be established that the injury is attributable, not to the keeping of the animal but to the injured party's unnecessarily and voluntarily putting himself in a way to be hurt knowing the probable consequences of his act, so that he may fairly be deemed to have brought the injury upon himself."
Baxter v. Ford Motor Co. Supreme Court of Washington, 1932 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409 Pg. 722	Plaintiff, Baxter, purchased a sedan from defendant St. John Motors, a Ford dealer, who had acquired the automobile in question by purchase from defendant Ford Motor Company. Baxter claims that both defendants made representations that the windshield was made of non-shatterable glass which would not break, fly or shatter, however when a pebble from a passing car struck his windshield, small pieces of glass flew into his left eye, resulting in the loss thereof.	"[T]he manufacturer is liable to the consumer, even though the consumer purchased from a third person the commodity causing the damage. . . . The rule in such cases does not rest upon contractual obligations, but rather on the principle that the original act of delivering an article is wrong, when, because of the lack of those qualities which the manufacturer represented it as having, the absence of which could not be readily detected by the consumer, the article is not safe for the purposes for which the consumer would ordinarily use it."
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. Supreme Court of California, 1963 59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 Pg. 732	Plaintiff, Greenman, brought this action for damages against defendant, Yuba Power Products, Inc, the manufacturer of a Shopsmith, a combination power tool that could be used as a saw, drill, and wood lathe. After veiwing a demonstration and reading the brochure, Greenman used the lathe tool to create a chalice from a piece of wood. As he was working the wood "suddenly flew out of the machine and struck him on the forehead, inflicting serious injuries."	"A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being."
Rix v. General Motors Corp. Supreme Court of Montana, 1986 222 Mont. 318, 723 P.2d 195 Pg. 740	Plaintiff, Michael Rix, was injured when his pickup was hit from behind by a General Motors Corporation two ton chassis-cab, which had been equipped with a water tank after sale by the General Motors dealer. Rix brought suit against General Motors on a theory of strict liability. The district court's jury verdict found for General Motors and Rix appeals.	"Under a manufacturing defect theory, the essential question is whether the product was flawed or defective because it was not construed correctly by the manufacturer. '[M]anufacturing defects, by definition, are 'imperfections that inevitably occur in a typically small percentage of products of a given design as a result of the fallibility of the manufacturing process. A [defectively manufactured] product does not conform in some significant aspect to the intended design, nor does it conform to the great majority of products manufactured in accordance with that design." . . . Stated differently, a defectively manufactured product is flawed because it is misconstrued without regard to whether the intended design of the manufacturer was safe or not. Such defects result from some mishap in the manufacturing process itself, improper workmanship, or because defective materials were used in construction.'"
Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co. Supreme Court of Michigan, 1984 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W.2d 176 Pg. 743	Plaintiff, John Prentis, fractured his hip in an accident while operating a hand-operated forklift manufactured by defendant, Yale Manufacturing Company. "John Prentis and his wife, Helen, brought suit alleging both negligence and breach of implied warranty, predicating defendant manufacturer's liability upon the alleged defective design of the forklift. Although the trial judge included both negligence and breach of warranty in his statement of plaintiffs' theory of the case to the jury, he refused to give plaintiffs' requested instructions on breach of implied warranty. A judgment for the defendant, upon a jury verdict of no cause of action, was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which held that the trial court's failure to charge the jury as requested was reversible error, mandating a new trial."	In products liability actions against manufacturers of products, where liability is predicated upon defective design, a pure negligence, risk utility test should be used.
O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1983 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 Pg. 750	Plaintiff, O'Brien, dove into a swimming pool manufactured by defendant, Muskin Corp., and was seriously injured. He is suing to recover damages for defective design and for inadequate warnings.	"In a design-defect case, the plaintiff bears the burden of both going forward with the evidence and of persuasion that the product contained a defect. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff should adduce sufficient evidence on the risk-utility factors to establish a defect."
Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. Supreme Court of California, 1991 53 Cal.3d 987, 810 P.2d 549, 281 Cal.Rptr. 528 Pg. 757	Plaintiff, Anderson, sues Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp, defendant, for his asbestosis and other lung ailments he developed through exposure to defendant's products.	Under strict liability, a manufacturer is liable "if it failed to give warning of dangers that were known to the scientific community at the time it manufacturer of distributed the product."
Friedman v. General Motors Corp. Supreme Court of Ohio, 1975 43 Ohio St.2d 209, 72 Ohio Ops.2d 119, 331 N.E.2d 702 Pg. 765	Plaintiff, Morton Friedman, brings suit against General Motors Corporation, alleging that his Oldsmobile Toronado is defective because it "leaped forward" when started with the gear in drive, and caused damage to the car and injured his family.	"A defect may be proven by circumstantial evidence, where a preponderance of that evidence establishes that the accident was caused by a defect and not other possibilities, although not all other possibilities need be eliminated."
Daly v. General Motors Corp. Supreme Court of California, 1978 575 P.2d 1162 Pg. 769	The decedent struck a metal divider while driving on the freeway. The car spun around and the decedent was thrown from the car, sustaining fatal head injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that the door lock was defectively designed. If the decedent had stayed in the car, it is likely he would have sustained only minor injuries.	"[A] system of comparative fault [as expressed in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.] should be and it is hereby extended to actions founded on strict products liability."
Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews Supreme Court of Mississippi, 1974 291 So.2d 169 Pg. 774	Plaintiff, Ernest Mathews's administratrix, brought an action against defendant, Ford Motor Co., for manufacture of a defective safety switch. Ernest Mathews was killed after he was run over by his tractor and dragged underneath a disc attachment.	"The manufacturer is not liable for injuries resulting from abnormal or unintended use of his product, if such use was not reasonably foreseeable. The issue is one of foreseeability and misuse may be foreseeable."
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 518 U.S. 470, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 135 L. Ed. 2d 700 Pg. 777	Lora Lohr brought suit against Medtronic, Inc when her pacemaker, manufactured by Medtronic, failed due to a defect in the lead of the product.	"In all preemption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has 'legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' . . . [courts] "start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co. Supreme Court of Illinois, 1975 61 Ill.2d 17, 329 N.E.2d, 785 Pg. 783	Plaintiff, James A. Peterson, is administrator of the estates of his two children who were hit by a car while walking home from school. In this suit Plaintiff brought this action against defendant, Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Company alleging that defendant sold a defective car.	"One of the basic grounds supporting the imposition of strict liability upon manufacturers is that losses should be borne by those "who have created the risk and reaped the profit by placing the product in the stream of commerce." . . . A wholesaler or retailer who neither creates nor assumes the risk is entitled to indemnity. . . . Therefore, although liability is imposed upon anyone who is engaged in the business of selling the product . . ., the loss will ordinarily be ultimately borne by the party that created the risk."
Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Ctr. Court of Appeals of California, 1986 180 Cal.App.3d 493, 225 Cal.Rptr. 595 Pg. 787	Plaintiff, Hector, alleges personal injury when a defective pacemaker was implanted by defendant, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center.	The relationship between a hospital and a patient is one of provision of professional medical services. Patients do not visit a hospital to merely purchase medical devices, but to obtain a course of treatment. Thus, as a provider of services rather than a seller of a product, a "hospital is not subject to strict liability for a defective product provided to the patient during the course of his or her treatment. . . ."
Philadelphia Electric Company v. Hercules, Inc. United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 1985 762 F.2d 303 Pg. 800	Plaintiff, The Philadelphia Electric Company, brings action for private and public nuisance and indemnity, against defendant, Hercules, Inc., for the pollution to and the clean up effort of the Delaware River.	"Whereas private nuisance requires an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land, a public nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public."
Carpenter v. The Double R Cattle Company, Inc. Supreme Court of Idaho, 1985 108 Idaho 602, 701 P.2d 222 Pg. 808	Plaintiffs, Carpenter, bring an action for nuisance against The Double R Cattle Company, who owns and operates a cattle feedlot near the plaintiff's home, after Double R expanded their property to accommodate 9,000 cattle.	"[I]n nuisance actions seeking damages the interests of the community, which would include the utility of conduct, should be considered in the determination of the existence of a nuisance."
Winget v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1963 242 S.C. 152, 130 S.E.2d 363 Pg. 812	Plaintiffs allege that defendant's operation of a grocery store next to their home constitutes a nuisance, and they seek an order to restrain defendant's from using the property for a retale grocery store.	"If a lawful business is operated in an unlawful or unreasonable manner so as to produce material injury or great annoyance to others, or unreasonably interferes with the lawful use and enjoyment of their property, it will constitute a nuisance."
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. Court of Appeals of New York, 1970 257 N.E.2d 870 Pg. 816	Defendant is the operator of a cement plant. Plaintiff sues for private nuisance, due to dirt, smoke, vibration, and particulate contamination coming from defendant's plant.	Where the benefit of an injuction against a nuisance is greatly outweighed by its costs, a court may allow payment of permenant damages to the plaintiff in lieu of injuctive relief.
Belli v. Orlando Daily Newspapers, Inc. United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 1967 389 F.2d 579, cert. denied 393 U.S. 825, 89 S.Ct. 88, 21 L.Ed.2d 96 (1968) Pg. 830	Plaintiff, Belli, an attorney of national prominence brings an action for defamation against Orlando Daily Newspapers for publishing a gossip column alleging that he and his wife charged a hotel stay and hundreds of dollars of clothing to the Florida Bar Association.	"It is for the court . . . to determine whether the words are reasonably capable of a particular interpretation,. . . it is then for the jury to say whether they were in fact understood as defamatory. If the language used is open to two meanings . . . it is for the jury to determine whether the defamatory sense was the one conveyed."
Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1945 151 F.2d 733 Pg. 834	Plaintiff, Sidney S. Grant, brings a suit for defamation against Reader's Digest for publishing an article stating that he was a representative for the Communist Party.	"A man may value his reputation even among those who do not embrace the prevailing moral standards," the standard is not "that to be actionable the words must be such as would so affect 'right-thinking' people."
Kilian v. Doubleday & Co., Inc. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1951 367 Pa. 117, A.2d 657 Pg. 837	Defendant, Doubleday, published a series of stories by a soldier who was seriously injured during the course of the Normandy invasion of WWII. Plaintiff, Colonel Kilian, was described in these stories as inflicting cruel punishments upon the troops. The soldier wrote the accounts while hospitalized 12 miles away from the action in England. He based his exaggerated fist person account on the tales of other injured soldiers.	"While, in order to support a defense of truth, it is necessary merely to prove that it was substantially true . . . specific charges cannot be justified by showing the plaintiff's general bad character. . ."
Neiman-Marcus v. Lait United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 1952 13 F.R.D. 311 Pg. 841	Defendant's authored a book titled U.S.A. Confidential, in which they mentioned that the president of Neiman-Marcus department stores uses call girls and that most of the sales people are "fairies". Plaintiff, Neiman-Marcus, brings action for libel and defamation.	"Where the group or class libeled is large, none ca sue even though the language used is inclusive. . . Where the group of class libeled is small, and each and every member of the group or class is referred to, then any individual member can sue."
Bindrim v. Mitchell Court of Appeal of California, Second District, 1979 92 Cal.App.3d 61, 155 Cal.Rptr. 29, hearing denied by California Supreme Court, 1979; cert. denied 444 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 490, 62 L.Ed.2d 412 (1979), reh. denied 444 U.S. 1040, 100 S.Ct. 713, 62 L.Ed.2d 675 (1980) Pg. 846	Plaintiff, Paul Bindrim, brought a suit against defendant, Mitchell, for publishing in her novel a character very similar to Bindrim. Bindrim is a liscensed psychologist who uses the "nude therapy" technique with patients, and Mitchell, after attending a session, wrote a novel entitled "The Touching" about the technique.	"The test is whether a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand that the fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described."
Shor v. Billingsley Supreme Court, New York County, Special Term, 1956 4 Misc.2d 857, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476 Pg. 852	Plaintiff, Shor, is operator and manager of The Toots Shor Restaurant. Shor brought action against defendants for defamation and invasion of privacy during a telecast of The Stork Club Show, a nationwide radio show.	"Since the element of damage is, historically, the basis of the common-law action for defamation, and since is it as reasonable to presume damage form the nature of the medium employed when a slander is broadcast by radio as when published by writing, both logic and policy point the conclusion that defamation by radio should be actionable per se."
Terwilliger v. Wands Court of Appeals of New York, 1858 17 N.Y. 54 Pg. 853	Plaintiff proved that defendant disclosed that plaintiff was having sexual intercourse with Mrs. Fuller, and that plaintiff would do all that he could to keep Mrs. Fuller's husband in jail so that he could continue to enjoy her favors. This disclosure caused plaintiff to become very ill, so that he could not work.	To award special damages, the damages must be the natural, immediate, and legal consequences of the defamation. In this case, the court held that plaintiff's illness was not the natural result of the defamation.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan Supreme Court of the United States, 1964 376 U.S. 254 Pg. 871	Plaintiff claimed he was defamed in a full-page ad taken out in the New York Times. The ad charged that the plaintiff, among others, had been involved with an unprecedented wave of terror against members of the civil rights movement in the south. The court determined the extent to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct.	The court held that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 418 U.S. 323 Pg. 892	The principle issue in this case is whether a newspaper or broadcaster that publishes defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is neither a public official nor a public figure may claim a constitutional privilege against liability for the injury inflicted by those statements. The case arose from an article that falsely accused plaintiff of being a communist and engaging in communist activities.	"[S]o long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Supreme Court of the United States, 1986 475 U.S. 767 Pg. 907	The court had to define the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedom of speech and press protected by the First Amendment. Plaintiff claimed that the defendant published five false stories about him, stories which claimed the plaintiff had ties to organized crime.	To ensure that true speech on matters of public concern is not deterred, the court held that the common-law presumption that defamatory speech is false cannot stand when a plaintiff seeks damages against a media defendant for speech of public concern. Therefore, the court required the plaintiff to show falsity of statement in order to prove defamation. With this opinion, the court insulated speech that is not even demonstrably false.
Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1942 42 N.E.2d 808 Pg. 1024	Defendant knows that house is infested with termites, but sells the house to plaintiff without disclosing the infestation.	Failure to disclose a defect during a sale does NOT make seller liable, unless the buyer can establish a "fiduciary relation between the parties." NOTE: The modern courts have largely eroded the Swinton position on non-disclosure. (See Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 551)

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